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Abstract
In this thesis we quantify costs of adverse selection in insurance markets where there
are multiple sources of adverse selection. We aim to find the relative impact of genetic
information as one of these sources.
Using new data on the effects of components of a polygenic model of breast cancer,
we model adverse selection in a critical illness insurance market. We confirm the
results of a previous study, which used a simpler polygene model without details of
particular genes, that polygenes pose a greater source of adverse selection risk than
the major genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2).
In a start-up market for long-term insurance, we model the progression of adverse
selection costs over time, where premiums are repriced to adapt to the information
the insurer gains about its business mix from its claims experience. In a U.K. setting
we find the greatest costs of adverse selection come from a hypothetical intermediate
stage of dementia progression which is not visible to an insurer, while testing of the
APOE gene poses very little risk. We find the U.K. government’s proposed cap on
care liability has very little impact on adverse selection costs, as it benefits a very
small proportion of people.
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Introduction
In this thesis we are concerned with measuring costs of adverse selection in insurance
markets where there are multiple sources of adverse selection. The aim of the thesis
is to estimate the relative impact of genetic information as one of these sources.
We will use multiple state Markov models to represent the insurance markets of
interest (critical illness insurance and long-term care insurance) with states indicating
health status, whether genetic test has been taken, presence of a family history and
whether the life is insured. These will be parameterised in part using transition
intensities from relevant previous studies, as well as making use of available data
from prospective cohort studies to fit transition intensities ourselves. Other transition
intensities depend on a complex pattern of genetic inheritance, to estimate these we
will simulate the future life histories of a large sample of lives. For the purpose of
illustrating the relative impact of sources of adverse selection, we do not consider the
compatibility of data to be a concern. The simulated samples might diverge slightly
from the populations we attempt to model, but the transition intensities we will use
provide us a baseline for modelling health. From this baseline, we can observe the
order of magnitude of the adverse selection costs from each source and allow us to
understand how they interact. As with any model, careful consideration should be
given over the appropriateness before applying our models to any other purpose.
Chapter 1 gives a background in some of the key concepts which we will use
throughout the work. Firstly, we describe terms relating to genetics which will be
useful to greater understand the work of this thesis. We next describe how adverse
selection arises and review all the available literature on the costs of adverse selection
due to genetics and on the evidence for its occurrence in insurance markets (or lack
thereof). A recent ruling by the European Court of Justice regarding sex discrimina-
tion in the insurance industry, has implications to our work. We close this chapter
with a brief outline of this ruling.
In Chapter 2 we consider a polygenic model of breast cancer, using known gene
data, and use this to outline a model of critical illness insurance in order to calculate
a cost of adverse selection. The multiple sources of adverse selection in this market
are both related to genetics: two major genes whose mutations are rare but confer
a very high risk of developing breast or ovarian cancer; and a polygenic component,
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where each of a large number of ‘polygenes’ increases or decreases risk of developing
breast cancer a small amount but their variants are common among the population.
Common to all previous studies assessing the cost of adverse selection (including
our work of Chapter 2), has been the assumption of an established market, i.e. the
adverse selectors have been buying insurance at that rate for such a period that
premiums have already absorbed it. Their analyses involve calculating the percentage
difference between premiums in a market with adverse selection and one without
adverse selection. They can shed no light on how the premiums would get to this
stage over time and what losses might be incurred in the process.
In Chapter 3 we take the modelling further by outlining a multiple state Markov
model for a start-up market of long-term care insurance. With this model, we explic-
itly show the progression of adverse selection costs using the development of infor-
mation that an insurer would gain from analysing the claims history of its existing
business, to reprice premiums for new business. In long-term care insurance, a major
cause of claim is associated with Alzheimer’s disease, which has a genetic component,
leading to genetics as a potential source of adverse selection. We incorporate adverse
selection from sources other than genetic information, by including states of health in
which the probability of reaching a claim is high and we assume the insurer cannot
identify lives in these states through underwriting. To overcome the complication of
insurance benefit amounts which depend on the value of previous benefit payments, we
develop a simulation approach of estimating the expected present values of insurance
benefits and premium payments.
In Chapter 4 we apply this long-term care insurance model to a United Kingdom
setting. We parameterise benefits based on the cost of care provision in the U.K. and
include a government proposal to limit the individual’s liability for their care costs.
To assess their impact over time, we calculate adverse selection costs under various
scenarios in which different sources of adverse selection are allowed to influence buying
behaviour.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we give the conclusions this work leads to and suggest where
further work may be useful in light of the direction of research in the genetics field.
2
Chapter 1
Background
In this chapter we give some background and review some of the available literature
on various concepts that will be used further in this thesis.
1.1 Genetics
Since this thesis is concerned with the use of genetic information in insurance markets,
we start by giving an overview of genetics.
To introduce genetics requires an introduction to what genes are made of: de-
oxyribonucleic acid or DNA. Most living organisms contain the molecule DNA (the
exception being RNA viruses) and use it to code genetic information. The structure
of DNA is of two strands of polymers in a double-helix, joined by hydrogen bonds be-
tween the pairing of bases: adenine with thymine and cytosine with guanine (Watson
and Crick, 1953).
Humans have 3.9× 109 base pairs (Pasternak, 1999) and in most DNA containing
cells these are arranged into 23 pairs of chromosomes in the cell’s nucleus. The sex
cells, or gametes, contain only one of each chromosome allowing one chromosome of
each pair to be received from the father and one from the mother. Mitochondrial
DNA, a sequence of only 16,600 base pairs located in the mitochondria of a cell, is
inherited exclusively from the mother.
A gene is a sequence of bases. These sequences are used to piece together proteins
from their building blocks, amino acids — a set of three bases corresponds to a partic-
ular amino acid or to start/stop the sequence. A gene’s position on a chromosome is
referred to as its locus (plural loci). Only around 1.5% of human DNA codes protein
synthesis (Sudbery, 2002).
When cells reproduce, DNA replicates in order to pass on a complete set of chro-
mosomes to the child cell, identical to the chromosomes of the parent cell. At various
points along each chromosome, DNA unwinds and the hydrogen bonds joining the
individual strands, are broken. The double stranded complementary nature of DNA
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bases allows each strand to act as a template for the other. An enzyme, known as
DNA polymerase, reads the exposed bases and joins the corresponding base to create
the new strand. Since this replication begins at various points, each segment needs
to be joined to form a complete chromosome.
Meiosis, the process of producing gametes, involves genetic recombination whereby
portions of the maternal chromosome and portions of the paternal chromosome are
joined to produce a new chromosome with genes from each of their own parents —
from the offspring’s point of view, this means a chromosome from its father contains
sequences from both paternal grandparents and similarly for the chromosome from
its mother. The probability for recombination to occur at any given location is small,
so genes which are close together are likely to stay together. Whereas, genes which
are further apart or are on a different chromosome, can be seen as being inherited
independently.
Different forms of a gene are known as alleles. For each gene, a person can there-
fore be either homozygous (both alleles are identical) or heterozygous (two different
alleles). Alleles can be associated with particular traits in a dominant (apparent in
heterozygotes) or recessive (apparent only in homozygotes) fashion. The cause of this
is related to the level of gene product being produced. Someone who is heterozygous
for a particular trait is able to synthesise some level of functional gene product from
their normal allele, the other variant they carry may result in overproduction, under-
production or synthesis of a different product. In the case of recessive traits, the level
of functional gene product produced by heterozygotes is adequate for the normal trait
to be shown. However, for dominant traits, the level is inadequate by heterozygotes
and a variant trait is shown although there may be a delay until later in life while the
lack/excess of gene product builds up to a point where the trait is shown. Someone
who is homozygous for a recessive trait will show it because they have no normal
version of the gene to produce sufficient functional gene product. The traits which
are shown are known as the phenotype, whereas the versions of the associated genes
is the genotype.
Actuaries are usually concerned with diseases which act dominantly rather than
recessive. This is because recessive gene disorders are usually present from birth or
childhood e.g. cystic fibrosis, whereas dominant gene disorders might occur later in
life. So an applicant for insurance may not yet be experiencing any visible symptoms
to tell the insurer that they are (at least) at risk of getting the disease.
Gene variations which have a frequency in the population of more than 1% are
referred to as polymorphisms. In particular, single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
are polymorphisms with a difference in a single base. Errors in the DNA replication
process occur regularly and are usually repaired quickly (De Bont and van Larebeke,
2004). However, they can persist and exist as mutations. To be passed on to offspring,
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a mutation must be present in the sex cells.
Mutations of genes coding for proteins do not necessarily cause a change in phe-
notype. The probability that a genetic disease develops in a carrier of the associated
version of a gene is its penetrance. Where this probability is very high, the gene is
said to be deterministic and it is fully penetrant. However, if it gives a higher risk of
the disease but the symptoms might never show, the gene is a susceptibility gene and
has incomplete penetrance.
Penetrance of a gene can be regulated by factors other than the gene itself. The
epigenetic processes, DNA-methylation and histone modification, act to either ‘switch
on’ or ‘switch off’ a gene without altering the genetic sequence. These processes can be
influenced by environmental factors including, for instance, a high-fat diet or cigarette
smoking (Aguilera et al., 2010).
Hence, a fully penetrant, dominant single-gene disorder will be displayed by the
carrier, whereas a recessive version may be masked for generations by the dominant
allele. This was first observed by Gregor Mendel, giving rise to the name Mendelian
inheritance.
In a polygenic disorder, multiple genes interact and each contributes to a change
in risk of disease. This creates a more complex pattern of inheritance which can result
in clusters of disease in families, but is not Mendelian.
To uncover the genes associated with diseases, geneticists have historically used
linkage analysis to narrow down the area in the genome to look at in more detail. This
involves testing all chromosomes of family members for markers (making use of the
tendency of genes which are close together to stay together described above) which
are carried by sufferers but not among healthy family members. This technique led to
the discovery of the role of gene locations with rare but high-risk disease associated
alleles, e.g. BRCA1 and BRCA2, associated with breast cancer; CFTR, which causes
cystic fibrosis; and the HD gene, which causes Huntington’s disease (Bailey-Wilson
and Wilson, 2011). More recently, as technology has advanced and costs have reduced,
genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have been used to analyse all genes at high
resolution. These analyses have aimed to find loci related to complex, non-Mendelian
disorders, by the use of thousands of unrelated participants.
Once the gene responsible for a disease is located, epidemiologists study its de-
velopment. However for a rare disorder, sampling at random from the population
is unlikely to include sufficient carriers. Instead, it is common to study the families
of those known to be affected. This will mean oversampling from a subgroup which
is not necessarily representative — it excludes families with carriers who have not
shown symptoms. This ascertainment bias can therefore result in overestimates of
the parameters of interest. Burton et al. (2000) describes this in greater detail.
For further details of human genetics, good textbooks (and also the source of much
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of this introduction) are Pasternak (1999) and Sudbery (2002).
In our modelling we will make great use of the term relative risk, particularly in
the context of gene variants. This is a means of expressing the transition intensity of
an event for one cohort, relative to some baseline cohort:
µa = µbaseline ×RRa, (1.1)
where µa and µbaseline are the transition intensities for cohort a and the baseline
cohort respectively, and RRa is the relative risk for cohort a, relative to the baseline
cohort. Using this representation of genetic risk, relative risks will easily into our
chosen modelling framework (multiple state Markov models), allowing us to estimate
transition intensities for different groups.
1.2 Adverse Selection
When an insurance company sets its premium rates, it uses a set of assumptions about
the future mortality and morbidity of the lives it expects to buy the product. The
population is not homogeneous however, and this pricing basis will produce premiums
that some will see as cheap because they consider themselves more likely to claim than
the rest of the population; while others will consider them expensive if they do not
think they will get much return from the contract. Underwriting serves to alter the
basic premium and offer more appropriate premiums where necessary, e.g. lives who
consume large amounts of alcohol might be charged a rating of say +50% on a critical
illness product; enhanced annuities give a higher rate of annuity but these are only
available to lives in ill-health who would otherwise not gain much from a standard
annuity; and so on.
If underwriters are limited in their ability to identify the heterogeneity of a popu-
lation, lives who think they are likely to claim will see greater value from the contract
and may be more likely to buy insurance. Conversely, lives who think they are un-
likely to claim may be less likely to buy the product. This we refer to as adverse
selection but we recognise that it is simply rational decision making on the part of
the proposer — unlike the similar concept of non-disclosure, whereby the proposer
fraudulently withholds information which the insurer is entitled to use. If adverse
selection occurs in the market then the average risk of the pool will be greater than
that assumed, the premiums will be insufficient to cover benefits and a loss will occur
on the business.
More formally, we define adverse selection as the decision to buy insurance based
on an assessment of one’s own probability to claim to be higher than the market
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average, implied by the premium rates on offer when the insurer is unable to make a
full assessment.
This scenario relies on asymmetric information (or information asymmetry) which
we define as the case where two parties hold differing levels of information which allows
one party a strategic advantage.
A similar, but somewhat different, concept to adverse selection is that of moral
hazard. Moral hazard occurs after the insurance contract has commenced and is de-
fined as being where the insured is not disincentivised from taking risks because their
insurance covers the potential resulting loss.
Adverse selection relies on information asymmetry, however economists largely ig-
nored the impact of asymmetric information and its influence on decisions, assuming
perfect information by all parties, until the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) and Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976). They showed this asymmetry leads to inefficiencies in the
insurance markets.
Akerlof (1970) discusses the impact of low quality goods (or ‘lemons’ as he refers
to them from his analogy to used car sales) driving out the high quality goods to
such a point where no market for the latter exists at all. In an insurance market,
when only the lemons (the lives with a high probability of claim) remain, the high
premiums required could make the market unviable.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) explored the nature of information asymmetry fur-
ther in an insurance market with competition and illustrated using indifference curves,
that pooling equilibria (where all are offered the same contract) cannot exist in their
model. Additionally, constructing contracts which appeal differently to the different
risk cohorts (by varying coverage size and price) might also not produce an equilib-
rium. They argue that in withholding the information, high-risk lives are no better off
but low-risk lives are worse off and suggest it is best for the system if high-risk lives
reveal what they know. To understand how pooling equilibria do exist in practice,
Allard et al. (1997) added distribution costs to the model and found that economies
of scale cause pooling equilibria to always exist when costs are large enough.
1.2.1 Genetic Adverse Selection
Underwriting where there is a sound statistical basis to suggest a life is more or
less likely to claim is often acceptable. Indeed there are clauses written into anti-
discrimination laws in the U.K. that permit difference in terms if it “is done by
reference to information that is both relevant to the assessment of the risk to be
insured and from a source on which it is reasonable to rely”1. However, there are
1Equality Act 2010, sch 3 para 21(1)(b)
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certain pieces of information about an individual that are contentious.
In the United Kingdom there is a moratorium on the use of genetic test results in
insurance underwriting, while some other jurisdictions, for instance the United States
of America have the prohibition enshrined in law and Sweden extends this to the
medical history of family members; whereas, in Australia there is a requirement to
divulge test results. Under the terms of the U.K.’s moratorium, an insurer may use
the results of a predictive genetic test only if it has been approved by the government
and the sum assured is greater than a product specific limit:
• Life insurance — £500,000;
• Critical illness insurance — £300,000;
• Income protection — £30,000 pa.
At the time of writing, the only approved test is for Huntington’s disease and only
for life insurance.
Since this moratorium permits individuals to withhold genetic test results, there
is an asymmetry in the information known to the two parties, and the individual is
better able to assess their likelihood of claiming. Genetic testing is not currently a
common occurrence, some tests are available through the National Health Service,
e.g. for breast cancer genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, but these are offered if there is
a high probability of a mutation being present. Hence, the volume of asymmetric
information will be relatively low. However, it is plausible that testing will become a
more frequent as costs decrease and preventative medical treatments are developed.
Much debate over the ethics and social outcomes of underwriters having access
to test results has ensued over the past two decades. On one side, the insurance
industry argued that it was fair to the other policyholders that those who bring extra
risk to the pool pay for this increased cost and that “genetic information, where
it is actuarially relevant, is little different from other forms of predictive healthcare
information” (Daykin et al., 2003). However opponents to its use see their genes as
the most personal of information and want their privacy protected. They fear the
creation of a genetic underclass who are uninsurable because of what they view as
discrimination.
Before much research had been conducted, the press had hyperbolic reactionary
quotes such as, “Non-disclosure of genetic-test results could spell the end of the life-
insurance market,”2 and headlines including, “Fears raised over genetic tests”3. In
contrast to the extreme statements, the U.K. government has not legislated on the
2Attributed to Achim Wambach, University of Munich, by The Economist magazine on the 19th
of October, 2000 — http://www.economist.com/node/398173
3The Observer on the 22nd of October, 2000 — http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2000/oct/
22/personalfinancenews.observercashsection2
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subject, but instead set up advisory bodies who would issue advice based on avail-
able evidence: the Human Genetics Advisory Commission in 1996 which became the
Human Genetics Commission (HGC) in 2000. The result is the agreement with the
Association of British Insurers (ABI) to create and implement the moratorium on the
use of genetic testing set out at the start of this section which came into existence in
2001 for 5 years (and renewed three times since, currently until 2017) until further
research could be performed.
The genetics and insurance committee (GAIC) was given the task of approving
genetic tests under the moratorium until it was disbanded in 2009. Although only
one test went through the full approval process (others were submitted but GAIC was
suspended and re-established before completion), under advisement from geneticist,
Professor Sandy Raeburn, the ABI regarded eight genetic disorders being significant
to insurance business:
• Breast and ovarian cancers (of the hereditary form);
• Early onset Alzheimer’s disease;
• Familial adenomatous polyposis;
• Hereditary motor and sensory neuropathy;
• Huntington’s disease;
• Multiple endocrine neoplasia;
• Myotonic dystrophy;
• Adult polycystic kidney disease, although this was later dropped from the list
due to its testing method (discussed below).
To feed into the debate, actuarial research has aimed to quantify the impact on
insurance business of not being able to underwrite when genetic information (with
the possible inclusion of family histories) is withheld from the insurer.
Costs of Genetic Adverse Selection
The history of quantitative research in genetics and insurance begins with Macdonald
(1997). This study used a ‘top-down’ approach to model all genetic disorders in a life
insurance market: extreme assumptions are made regarding the frequency of genetic
disorders, their impact on mortality and the rate of testing. The moments of the
financial impact of not being able to use the results of genetic tests are calculated
— in this case by solving Norberg’s equations (Norberg, 1995) — and where these
are negligible, it can be concluded that adverse selection from genetic testing is not a
9
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concern. He found that adverse selection in the form of high risk lives buying larger
sums assured posed a greater threat than those lives merely increasing their rate of
purchase. Indeed, there was an approximately linear relation between the size of
benefit purchased by adverse selectors and the size of loss, as a percentage of baseline
costs.
Since the epidemiological consequences often take some time to emerge after the
discovery of the role of genes in particular diseases, the simple assumptions of this
method are an advantage. However, its ability to draw conclusions when the adverse
selection costs are non-negligible, is limited. In this case, a ‘bottom-up’ approach —
modelling particular genetic disorders with realistic assumptions — is more appropri-
ate.
The first such bottom-up modelling was that of Lemaire et al. (2000). They
calculated the relative prices of term assurance for women with a family history of
BC or OC (which itself can be argued to be genetic information) and for women with
mutations in either the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes which are known to cause BC and
OC. The epidemiology of BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations available to them at this
time was limited to estimates of the penetrance and a normal distribution for age of
onset for a non-specific BRCA mutation.
In the follow-up to this work, Subramanian et al. (1999) considered the insurance
purchase behaviour for lives before and after a test for BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations
and used this to calculate costs of adverse selection — the percentage by which pre-
miums calculated assuming no adverse selection should be increased in the presence
of adverse buying behaviour. Set in a Markov environment, this model allowed the
possibility of buying varying sums assured at an increased probability after a positive
test; and a possibly lower sum assured at a decreased probability of purchase after
a negative test. Additionally the probability of lapsing the policy was lower after a
positive test. When pricing in knowledge of any family history, these adverse selection
costs were minimal. However, when family history could no longer be used as a rating
factor, adverse selection costs were substantial.
Possibly because BC is the most prevalent form of cancer in the world (Parkin
et al., 2001), a large body of research on the disease exists. This has yielded a
progression of epidemiology which has been followed by a series of actuarial studies
involving BC since the first work by Lemaire et al. (2000). We list the key milestones
of this research here:
• The epidemiology available to Macdonald et al. (2003b) allowed them to calcu-
late stand-alone critical illness premiums specific to those with either a BRCA1
or BRCA2 mutation respectively. Subsequently they calculated the adverse se-
lection cost from lives testing positive for either of these buying insurance at an
increased rate.
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• Gui et al. (2006) included the development of a family history of BC or OC
among first degree relatives (mother/sisters) as a state in their models of life
insurance and critical illness markets. This allowed them to consider testing
to be done after a family history has emerged (which is more realistic) and to
calculate adverse selection in situations where family history can and cannot be
used as a rating factor.
• Antoniou et al. (2002) proposed a hypothetical polygenic model of BC risk
without epidemiology of particular genes. Macdonald and McIvor (2006, 2009)
used this to calculate family history ratings and adverse selection costs in a
critical illness insurance market.
• Viswanathan et al. (2007) used an elastic demand model to create a dynamic
response from lives, to the price being charged by the insurer (which itself is
dynamic based on how it thinks the population would respond). The underlying
model of BC/OC was that of Subramanian et al. (1999). Elasticity of demand
was calculated based on survey responses. They found price elasticity of demand
to have only a minimal impact on adverse selection costs.
• Lu et al. (2011b) applied the semi-Markov model of progression of BC and OC
from Lu et al. (2011a) (which included the major genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2
only) to an income protection insurance market and answered questions similar
to those answered by the preceding studies. This model incorporated the varying
treatments given to women with and without a BRCA1 or 2 mutation and the
recurrence of their cancer later in life. During the period of any treatment (or
during some other sickness), she would be unable to work.
In each of these studies the results were similar: premiums chargeable to lives with a
high risk genotype would be very high and possibly beyond insurability limits, however
in a market the size of the U.K., the costs of adverse selection would be negligible
or small enough to be managed by the insurer. Chapter 2 of this thesis develops the
polygenic model of BC risk in the advent of the development of actual epidemiology
for some of the polygenes hypothecated by Antoniou et al. (2002).
Actuarial research involving other disorders has also been conducted, a signifi-
cant volume of which has been done in the Genetics and Insurance Research Centre
(GIRC).
The first bottom-up modelling performed by GIRC was on Alzheimer’s disease
(AD), a form of dementia which primarily affects older people, above 60 years old. It
is known that the APOE gene is associated with AD (Saunders et al., 1993) however
this is not the only component of the genetic risk. Macdonald and Pritchard (2001)
calculated the adverse selection costs from lives who know they have a high risk
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genotype for AD in a long-term care market. While the premiums appropriate for
lives with the highest risk variant of APOE may be up to 40% higher than average
premium, adverse selection costs were generally not significant. The only case where
single-premiums would have to rise significantly is when the market is small, APOE4
carriers (the high risk variant) have risks of developing AD at least as high as observed
and are highly likely to buy insurance and there is extensive testing of APOE.
AD can also affect people under 60 years old, in a form known as early-onset
Alzheimer’s disease. The genes involved in early-onset AD are known to include
APP, PSEN-1 and PSEN-2. Gui and Macdonald (2002) modelled critical illness and
life insurance markets in a Markov and semi-Markov framework respectively — due
to the survival after diagnosis being duration dependent, the life insurance market
is semi-Markov. They considered a method whereby they paid out the value of the
reserve upon transition into the early-onset AD state or the sum assured on death
without early-onset AD. This is the same method referred to as ‘instantly reinsuring’
in Gui et al. (2006). They found similar conclusions to those of Macdonald and
Pritchard (2001), that adverse selection costs are negligible unless the market is small
and buying behaviour of high risk lives is ‘extreme’.
Adult polycystic kidney disease (APKD) is a single gene disorder caused by muta-
tions in one of at least two genes: APKD1 and APKD2. It can lead to end stage renal
disease (kidney failure), thereby triggering a critical illness claim. Before DNA-based
testing was available, at risk individuals (those with a family history of APKD) could
be tested with ultrasound for signs of cysts, long before symptoms had developed.
Since this does not involve direct testing of DNA or chromosomes, it was outside
the narrow definition of a genetic test in the moratorium. Gutie´rrez and Macdonald
(2003) modelled a critical illness insurance market where adverse selection comes af-
ter a positive test result which is hidden from the insurer. They also considered the
cases where negative results were also hidden and where family history rating was not
permitted. Again, while premiums for those carrying an APKD mutation were large,
the costs of adverse selection were not very high — around 5% increase to premiums
in a small market when the moratorium is extended to family history.
With the development of reliable DNA-based tests for APKD, Gutie´rrez and Mac-
donald (2007) revisited their previous work to perform their analysis with the 3 genetic
subgroups (no mutations, APKD1 mutation and APKD2 mutation) now possible,
as opposed to their previous 2 genetic subgroups (no mutation, mutation of either
APKD1 or APKD2). Additionally, they assumed dialysis is available to those with
ESRD and the possibility of a kidney transplant (with varying scarcity) to model
the development post-ESRD to extend the model to a semi-Markov model of a life
insurance market. One of the more interesting points of this work was that individ-
uals with a family history could be charged lower premiums if they tested positive
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for APKD2. However, as this would be divulging an ‘adverse’ test result, this would
not be permitted under the moratorium and consequently the individual would not
be able to benefit from this extra knowledge.
Huntington’s disease (HD) is a neurological disease which leads to loss of cognitive
function and death and whose sole cause is from mutations in the HD gene. These
mutations are of the form of repetitions of the trinucleotide, CAG, in a particular
region of the gene. Penetrance depends on the number of CAG repeats with a lower
average age of onset as number of repeats increases: < 36 repeats is normal and won’t
develop HD; 36–39 repeats, the individual could develop HD; ≥ 40 repeats will cause
HD. Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2002) modelled the onset and development of HD and
they applied it to critical illness insurance and life insurance markets in Gutie´rrez and
Macdonald (2004). Although the positive test result for the HD gene is the only one
which is permitted under the moratorium, the adverse selection costs calculated by
Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2004) were negligible for life insurance and very small for
critical illness insurance (where the test results are not usable).
MacCalman (2009) performed further analysis on HD to address an issue of relia-
bility of insurance estimates when epidemiological data could be affected by ascertain-
ment bias. She fitted a Normal distribution for age-at-onset which did not include the
allowance of number of CAG repeats that Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2004) included.
She confirmed the high premiums that would be necessary when genotype of HD is
known to be adverse.
Lu et al. (2007) modelled hereditary nonpolyposis colorectal cancer (HNPCC), a
form of cancer which is caused by mutations in any of MLH1, MSH2, MSH6, PMS1
and PMS2 (the DNA mismatch repair genes). Colorectal cancer is one of the most
common forms of cancer and, like many other cancers, it can be sporadic or hereditary.
The majority of HNPCC cases are a result of mutations in MLH1 and MSH2 so these
are what they considered in their modelling of a critical illness insurance market.
Premium rates for people with a mutation exceeded the common limit of insurability
(extra premiums of 250%), while those with a family history of the disease could be
charged an extra premium of 30–374% depending on entry age and term. However,
the cost of adverse selection on genetic tests or family history was very small.
Although each of these studies has found that in isolation the adverse selection
costs are small, they noted a caveat that it could mount up when considering a bigger
picture, with all genetic disorders contributing. Macdonald and Yu (2011) brings
together all of the major gene disorders discussed above (the polygenic model of BC
is excluded), with the addition of myotonic dystrophy (MD). By piecing together the
models for each disease, they model them all in the context of both critical illness
and life insurance markets. In each market, the impact of a moratorium on genetic
testing was minimal and on use of family history small enough that they would not
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have ‘any measurable effect.’
Economic Outcomes
The impact of adverse selection has also been measured in terms of welfare and market
efficiency. Before genetic testing was the issue, tests for human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) were a concern in a similar manner. Doherty and Thistle (1996) found
that when information was symmetric between the insurer and individual, the value
of the information was negative so insurance discourages them from being tested.
This is due to a risk-averse individual preferring to avoid the lottery they would be
faced with around the high and low risk policies for which they would be charged.
Obviously, a public health goal would not be to deter testing so this is an undesired
outcome. However, if test results cannot be observed, there is a positive private value
in getting tested but at a trade-off in loss of market efficiency since premiums would
be increased to cover adverse selection.
A similar study was performed by Hoy and Polborn (2000) in the case of a life
insurance market — where the loss to be covered is not clearly definable like it is
in other markets. They created scenarios in which a new test could lead to either
Pareto improvements or Pareto worsenings. They suggest that when only few people
are tested, it is likely that prices will not change much but those being tested will
benefit.
Hoy and Witt (2007) applied their results to the genetic testing of BRCA1 and
BRCA2. In a simulated market of 10-year term assurances offered to women aged
35 to 39, they showed that market efficiency could suffer when a large proportion of
women made use of genetic tests.
Evidence of Genetic Adverse Selection
Justification for the existence of genetic adverse selection can be found in some of
the available literature but most studies do not find evidence to reject a hypothesis
of no adverse selection in the market. Understandably from the rarity of mutations,
empirical evidence for adverse selection based on genetic testing is limited. Some
studies have been done, which we review below, but we will see that their results are
not necessarily reliable.
Macdonald and Tapadar (2010) aimed to find how high average insurance pre-
miums would have to go before low-risk lives would stop buying, thereby creating
adverse selection, using utility theory. They argued that adverse selection would oc-
cur if the expected utility from insurance purchase was lower than if insurance was
not purchased. Under their model, purchase was binary: the life bought insurance if
this improved their expected utility, or they did not buy it. They fitted 4 models of
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utility, for a genetic disorder with environmental interactions, and found no evidence
that adverse selection would cause a serious risk.
Macdonald and McIvor (2009) performed a similar analysis, using the same utility
functions as Macdonald and Tapadar (2010), with their own BC polygene model.
Their findings were that very low-risk polygenotypes would not buy insurance under
2 of the utility models.
Both of these studies assumed rational behaviour on the part of the customer,
without any allowance for emotion. However, knowledge that one’s risk profile implies
a higher than average probability of disease can create anxiety (Aktan-Collan et al.,
2001), while Loewenstein (2000) outlines how this type of visceral factor can have
‘important, but often unappreciated consequences for behaviour’.
The first study to use empirical data to assess the existence of adverse selection
was Zick et al. (2000). They were concerned with how testing for BRCA1 might
influence purchase of life insurance. Their ‘at-risk’ group comprised female members
of kindred K2082, a large extended family in Utah and Idaho which is known to be
at risk of having a particular BRCA1 mutation (Goldgar et al., 1994; Botkin et al.,
1996). They were given genetic counseling before any decision to take a test and at
the receipt of test results. The control group comprised of women who had previously
been interviewed for having a family history of BC or OC. The same selection criteria
— no missing data, no life insurance paid by employer and no personal history of
cancer — was applied to both groups. Their statistical analyses showed that neither
positive, nor negative test results, were significant factors in buying insurance giving
insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis of no adverse selection. They suggest
reasons why there was not stronger evidence of adverse selection. These include that
these women and the insurers have knowledge of their family history so a test ‘serves
to confirm’ what they already suspected — their behaviour might have been impacted
upon first suspicion but at the same time, the insurers would put up their premiums.
Additionally, they suggest that a year’s follow-up period may have been too short as
the women who tested positive would have more pressing concerns than insurance, e.g.
how to reduce their risk of cancer. As the authors acknowledged, most of the women
in the study identified themselves as ‘active members of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints’, a very patriarchal religion which supports traditional gender
roles. Since life insurance tends to be used as a means of protecting income, a group
where women are often housewives might be expected to have lower life insurance
cover. Putting these two points together could make generalising the results invalid.
Aktan-Collan et al. (2002) surveyed participants of a genetic testing programme for
HNPCC one year after their test. Prior to testing, all participants were considered to
have 50% chance of having a mutation based on confirmations of mutations in family
members in a previous study. In a questionnaire the participants were asked about life
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and health insurance before and after the test. Although they found no significant
increase in purchases after the test which would have illustrated adverse selection
from the test results, a significantly higher proportion of mutation carriers had health
insurance before even having the test. They suggest respondents not wishing to admit
that they had used the test results as means of making their decision to buy could be
a possibility for this anomaly.
Armstrong et al. (2003) performed a retrospective cohort study on women who had
received genetic counseling and/or a genetic test for BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations at
their university clinic. Their counseling involved up to 3 stages: general information
about BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing and breast cancer risk; an individualised assess-
ment of their breast cancer risk before testing; women who agree to testing receive
their results with ‘further counseling’ to explain its implications. For this study, the
participants were mailed questionnaires to ask about life insurance and their experi-
ences in purchasing it. The results showed an association with the predicted level of
breast cancer risk and increases in life coverage. Additionally, carriers of a BRCA1/2
mutation were significantly more likely to increase the life cover.
Zick et al. (2005) used the results of a randomised controlled trial that aimed to
evaluate genetic education and counseling for adult children of AD patients. Ques-
tions about insurance were only a part among a wider whole in the evaluation. The
control group were told of their AD risk based on sex and family history, while the
other subjects were tested for at least one APOEε4 allele, the high risk variant, and
advised based on this additional information and given counseling. Participants were
followed for a year after the initial interview. In a bivariate analysis, the authors
found the percentage of APOEε4 positive subjects who had changed their long-term
care insurance coverage to be significant, as was the percentage who were considering
changing their level. Taylor et al. (2010)’s research using a later iteration of the trial
which went further in genotyping, agrees with this finding. However, in a multivariate
analysis by Zick et al. (2005), which controlled for confounding factors, this signifi-
cance was reduced, such that the p-value was 5.11% for a positive test result being a
factor in those who had changed. The sample size was small and the authors stressed
the need for a larger and more diverse sample.
Oster et al. (2010) compared ownership levels of long-term care insurance of lives
at risk of HD with the general population. Their study followed a group of lives
with a family history of HD who were to be given a genetic test, asking them at
various intervals about their level of insurance coverage. They compared this with
details of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) of individuals over 50 years old,
which also includes a small number of individuals under 50 years old, because it asks
about long-term care insurance ownership. Since HD has usually manifested by the
time people are old, they excluded people older than 65 from the HRS dataset in
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an attempt to address the mismatch. In comparing ownership after controlling for
various factors including age, they found that the individuals who they were following
had a significantly higher ownership than the general population. Additionally, they
found a significant difference between ownership among those with a positive test
result and those with a negative test result, implying adverse selection based on test
results. However their design has flaws which could invalidate their results. They
acknowledge that there is an issue with the sample size of tested individuals and
that there is selection bias. However, they do not consider the effect of repeatedly
asking individuals whether they have insurance to cover the potential costs of their
care. Since this is not a product that is commonly purchased, particularly at the
ages in the dataset, this could have the potential to affect a significant proportion of
purchases.
Evidence of Adverse Selection — Other than Genetics
We now turn to examples of adverse selection being found without specific cause for
its occurrence. If genetics is considered as merely one of many ways that individuals
can measure themselves as likely or unlikely to claim under a policy then there may
be no reason to assume that their decision making process would differ and we review
a selection of work on more general adverse selection in insurance markets.
Health insurance in the United States is often provided as an employment benefit
so commonly people are automatically enrolled in a group policy. Brown (1992)
measured adverse selection in terms of the underbuying of lives who see themselves as
low risk. Since automatic enrollment reduces adverse selection in the group market
(low-risk lives would be unlikely to opt out as it is paid for by the employer), he
suggests that the individual market would have higher potential adverse selection.
He uses data from a national survey which collected details of insurance levels and
opinions of health from 2,745 randomly selected families (2,515 with a group policy
and 225 in the individual market). From this he estimated a measure for the quantity
of insurance for each family as a factor of the insured’s risk characteristics and design of
the policy. To find the discrepancy between predicted and actual insurance purchase,
he fitted a linear model which controlled for various variables expected to influence
purchase. A response of good health in the survey was a significant factor in this
model, hence he concluded the presence of adverse selection. He notes however, it
may be possible that low-risk lives are off their demand curve (i.e. in receipt of
more insurance than they would otherwise purchase) in the group market, hence the
‘control’ does not necessarily follow what behaviour would truly be, distorting results.
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) analysed a U.K. insurance company’s book of
compulsory and voluntary annuity business, sold over a 17-year period, for evidence
of adverse selection. They focused on three features of annuities: the initial annual
17
Chapter 1: Background
payment; degree of back-loading (from some form of escalation); and size of payments
to the estate after death. Since these features would appeal differently according to
how a person views their mortality (assuming the insurer has not got the information
to make the pricing indifferent to mortality i.e. asymmetric information), they analyse
the mortality experience with a statistical model. Their results show significantly
lower mortality among lives who bought policies with a high degree of back-loading in
both markets; in the voluntary market there was significantly higher mortality among
those who bought policies with payments to the estate, however the in the compulsory
market this was only the case among lives who bought a 10 year guarantee period.
They argue that this suggests some unobserved factors of mortality is correlated to the
choice of annuity and is consistent with models of adverse selection. They highlight
that adverse selection is but one possibility and suggest that preference, for instance
to leave a bequest, could be the causative factor if they are correlated with mortality
even if the individual is unaware.
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) investigated the nature of private information
in a long-term care insurance market. They analysed results of the HRS, which in
addition to asking about about long-term care cover, also asks participants about
nursing home use and the expectation of moving to a nursing home among other
questions. Their findings included a positive correlation between private information
about level of risk of going into a nursing home and insurance coverage (adverse
selection). However, in looking at the actual experience, they found nursing home
care use not to be positively correlated with insurance coverage. They suggest the
discrepancy is partly due to pessimism — individuals who actively try to improve
health, thereby avoiding/delaying nursing care, are likely to overestimate their risk.
This pessimism could be considered an example of the inability to assess one’s
own risk described by Siegelman (2003). He views methods used for testing adverse
selection as flawed because they rely on an individual to assess their own health
which is inherently difficult. Indeed, he suggests an insurance company who receives
a medical report about the individual will no doubt have a better ability to assess the
risk. While he concedes that adverse selection does exist, he considers the impact of
adverse selection on the markets to be the more important aspect for researchers.
Courbage and Roudaut (2008) analysed the French market for long-term care
insurance using the second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2005), a database of over 22,000 Europeans over 50
years old with details including various influences on health and insurance ownership.
Their aim was to understand the variables influencing demand for long-term care
insurance in the French market, one of the largest for this type of insurance in the
world. They found that individuals with high alcohol consumption or body mass
index have a higher probability of owning long-term care insurance. Additionally,
18
Chapter 1: Background
those who self-reported their health to be bad had a higher probability of buying the
insurance.
1.3 Sex Discrimination
Across most types of insurance, experience generally differs by sex. In some types,
the difference reverses as age progresses e.g. critical illness morbidity is lower for men
at young ages but higher after around age 45, when males start to have a higher risk
of stroke and heart attack (see Chapter 2).
In the U.K., sex was permitted to be used as a rating factor under the Equality
Act (2010) and previously the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) in a similar wording to
that for disability mentioned above. Similar practice existed in many countries across
the European Union and the wider world, as limited by local laws. In 1985, the
insurance industry’s interpretation of the law was tested in the U.K. legal system in a
case regarding a woman being charged more for her permanent health insurance4 with
the court finding in favour of the insurance company. Thus clear biological differences
(and statistical correlations in the untested case of car insurance) prevailed in allowing
sex as a pricing factor.
This legal exemption to discriminate was brought to an end in March 2011, when
the European Court of Justice ruled in a case brought initially before the Belgian
courts by Belgian consumer organisation Test-Achats. The court’s finding was that
pricing with sex as a rating factor is contrary to the principles of the European Union
and would not be permitted from 22nd December, 2012 (European Court of Justice,
2011).
Sex is a genetic difference, determined by the sex chromosomes: XX for females
and XY for males, but it is not unknown to the insurer. The Court’s ruling restricts
insurers only for using sex in their pricing (premiums must be equal for males and
females). When setting reserves or performing valuations the insurer is not prevented
from using the information of a policyholder’s sex.
We assume that insurers’ responses will be to charge premiums based on aggregate
risk on an assumed business mix. There is the potential that this could increase
adverse selection. However, while insurers are able to collect detail of sex from the
application (or at least infer to some extent from the name) the response time to
adjust prices should restrict the potential adverse selection costs. The ability to
determine the sex of the customer should also ensure capital positions are not subject
to uncertainty of future benefits/premium due to the mix of sex.
4Pinder v The Friends Provident Life Office (County Court, 15.8.85) EOR5D
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Polygenes and Major Genes for
Breast Cancer in a Critical Illness
Market
2.1 Introduction
Breast cancer (BC) is the most prevalent form of cancer in the world (Parkin et al.,
2001) and a common cause of critical illness insurance claims. Established risk factors
for BC include age, lifestyle factors, reproductive factors, and genetics (Washbrook,
2006). We consider the impact of the genetic risk on insurance products. Legal
restrictions on the ability to use genetic information in insurance underwriting create
an opportunity for individuals to select against an insurance company.
Rare inherited mutations in either of two genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, confer
greatly increased risk of BC and of ovarian cancer (OC). These are known as ‘single
genes’ or ‘major genes’ because mutations in either are sufficient to increase the risk,
in this case by affecting production of a DNA-repairing protein produced in the BC
pathway (Tutt and Ashworth, 2002). Mutations come in many different forms, and
although some are benign, others cause a very high risk of BC or OC. Epidemiology
rarely goes to the level of particular mutation, so they are commonly treated as
being homogeneous and it is only the presence of a mutation that determines the
risk. Moreover, occurrences of mutations are more common within subgroups of the
population, e.g. the frequency of BRCA1 185delT and BRCA2 6174delT among the
American Ashkenazi Jewish population is about 1% each (Sudbery, 2002), compared
to about 0.2% each for any mutation in either BRCA1 or BRCA2 based on Antoniou
et al. (2002)’s prevalence estimates.
The implications for life, critical illness and income protection insurance of these
genes have been extensively studied (Lemaire et al., 2000; Subramanian et al., 1999;
Macdonald et al., 2003a,b; Gui et al., 2006; Viswanathan et al., 2007; Lu et al.,
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2011a; Lu et al., 2011b). These studies came to the same general conclusions: high
premiums for lives known to have mutations, however the overall impact of adverse
selection when underwriters cannot use test results is minimal.
Current and future epidemiology is turning towards multifactorial models of ge-
netic risk, in which variations in large numbers of genes, and environmental factors,
interact to modify disease risk. Antoniou et al. (2002) proposed such a model for BC
risk, known as a ‘polygenic’ model because it assumes: (a) that a large number of
genes have two variants each; (b) that one variant of each gene increases risk and the
other reduces risk; and (c) that the overall risk is the sum of the contributions from
each gene (in a sense to be made precise later). The ‘high-risk’ varieties of each gene
are not necessarily rare, but the additional risk they each confer is small compared
with that conferred by BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations. We refer to the collection of
genetic loci in this model, and the variants at each, as a ‘polygene’.
In the absence of any known candidates for genetic loci contributing to the poly-
gene, Antoniou et al. (2002) assumed that there were three, each contributing an effect
of identical size independently of the others. Using the hypergeometric inheritance
model of Lange (1997), they estimated the standard deviation of the distribution of
the relative risk attributable to a BC polygene.
Macdonald and McIvor (2006, 2009) incorporated this polygenic model, along with
models of BRCA1 and BRCA2 risk, into a Markov model of stand-alone critical illness
(CI) insurance. They estimated premium ratings conditional on either knowing an
individual’s genotype (assuming genetic testing for the major genes and the polygene)
or a family history of BC and OC. They found that the larger proportion of premium
increases was the result of the polygene. However, they suggested that the heavy tails
in the distribution of relative risks caused by there being only three genetic loci in
the polygene could have skewed the results.
Seven single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) that affect the onset of BC have
subsequently been described (Easton et al., 2007; Hunter et al., 2007; Stacey et al.,
2007; Cox et al., 2007). They are all candidates for the actual genetic loci in the
polygene hypothesised by Antoniou et al. (2002). However, since in total they con-
tribute about 3.6% of the heritable risk of BC (Easton et al., 2007) and the two major
genes another 25%, it is highly probable that the number of genetic loci involved will
be well over 100. We describe these developments in Section 2.2.1, and extend the
findings to a plausible polygenic model accounting for 75% of the total heritable risk.
We note that even since commencing work on this project using these seven SNPs,
another eighteen loci have been identified with similar distributions, validating the
assumptions we make in Section 2.2.2. The identification of the genetic loci that con-
tribute to the risk of BC is progressing quickly and replication of results is already
being sought for a further sixty-nine loci (Ghoussaini et al., 2012).
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In Section 2.3 we estimate the effect on stand-alone CI premiums of this polygenic
model, given a family history of BC or OC, along the lines of Macdonald and McIvor
(2006). We simulate the life histories of women within families. We find the distri-
bution of genetic risk within families that develop a family history of BC or OC, and
families that do not.
The European Court of Justice in March 2011 removed sex as a permissible in-
surance underwriting factor, from December 2012. This has particularly interesting
implications for the pricing of BC risk, because men and women carry genotypes and
develop family histories equally, but the risk of developing BC overwhelmingly affects
women (male BC exists but is very rare). Thus men may disclose information affect-
ing BC risk while being at virtually no risk of developing it themselves. We adapt
our model to this new European context in Section 2.4. Additionally, in Section 2.5,
we adapt the model to the terms of the moratorium in force in the United Kingdom
which limits the use of genetic information in underwriting. This extends the insur-
ance market model of Macdonald and McIvor (2009) to potential adverse selection in
the light of recent epidemiology and in the new legal environment.
The work in this chapter has been published in the Scandinavian Actuarial Journal
(Adams et al., 2013).
2.1.1 Review of Previous Actuarial Models
In Chapter 1 we reviewed the findings of previous models of adverse selection across
all of the genetic studies. Here, we review the modelling methodology in the previous
actuarial studies briefly mentioned above, pertaining to BC and OC.
Lemaire et al. (2000)’s life insurance model was of the form of a double decrement
for death before BC or BC development with a single decrement for death from
any cause after BC. Their approach used one-year probabilities of decrement and an
assumption of mid-year payment of benefit to calculate single premiums by summing
over possible outcomes. This was done for lives with varying family history details
(one or two first-degree relatives; BC or OC; and age of onset of affected relative) using
the probabilities derived by Claus et al. (1994) for BC and Hartge et al. (1994) for OC.
For BRCA mutation, they performed their modelling by use of penetrance and age
at onset distribution of BC from Claus et al. (1994) and an estimated adjustment to
population probabilities for OC based on the broad range of estimates in the medical
literature.
Subramanian et al. (1999) set out a Markov model for the term assurance market.
They calculated ratios between the forces of mortality for women with family history
or BRCA mutation compared to the baseline mortality based on the model of Lemaire
et al. (2000). Their market model worked as follows:
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• Women started untested, either insured or uninsured;
• Family history during modelling and was set according to the scenario;
• Testing for BRCA mutation was at a constant rate, with the probability of
positive result determined by family history;
• Test results would influence a woman’s decision to purchase life insurance,
change sum assured or lapse her policy.
In common with subsequent models, they calculated average single premiums by
solving Norberg (1995)’s equations and compared to their baseline to calculate costs
of adverse selection.
Macdonald et al. (2003a) used a Markov model for BC/OC to estimate the con-
ditional probabilities of BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations (epidemiology had developed
allowing them to consider these separately), given at least partial knowledge of family
history. They used a ‘brute force’ method, summing over the possible family struc-
tures and the associated probabilities. Transition intensities for the development of
BC and OC with a BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation were fitted to Ford et al. (1998)
and the distribution of the mutations came from Parmigiani et al. (1998). Macdonald
et al. (2003b) used these results when calculating the premiums for stand-alone critical
illness insurance charged with only a partial knowledge of family history. They com-
puted adverse selection costs using a Markov model for the insurance market where
all lives started uninsured and there could be no lapsing. The transition intensity for
purchase after test was allowed to increase for positive results. Similarly, the sum
assured for adverse selectors could be at an increased level.
Gui et al. (2006) set up semi-Markov and Markov models for life insurance and
critical illness insurance markets respectively. These included the development of
family history itself as a state. They calculated the probabilities of developing a family
history (two first-degree relatives having BC/OC before age 50) directly for each
genotype and from these the transition intensities by summing over the probabilities
of each possible event leading to a family history. In their models, genetic testing was
only available after the development of a family history. To deal with the semi-Markov
nature of life insurance markets, they used the method of Gutie´rrez and Macdonald
(2004): calculate the expected present values of the reserve at the point of BC/OC
development and set this to be the sum assured payable on developing BC or OC.
Transition intensities related to BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations were from models
fitted to Antoniou et al. (2003)’s estimates. Mortality after BC/OC diagnosis was
independent of the genotype and based on Coleman et al. (1999). Other transition
intensities were those used by Macdonald et al. (2003b).
Macdonald and McIvor (2006)’s polygenic model had women inheriting common
but small impact genes. Inheritance of these polygenes was not the Mendelian pattern
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they used for the major genes; instead parents were each assigned a total number of
identical high risk alleles and inheritance was through a hypergeometric distribution
based on Lange (1997) (as discussed above). Due to the number of possible geno-
types, performing the same summation as Gui et al. (2006) would have taken a vast
amount of computer time so they performed simulations to derive their family history
details (premium rates and transition intensities). They used the BRCA1 and BRCA2
transition intensities and allele frequencies of Antoniou et al. (2002) since these had
been calculated in a model which included the polygenic component. Macdonald and
McIvor (2009) applied this model in a market for critical illness insurance, with a
state for family history, in a similar manner to Gui et al. (2006) to compare the costs
of adverse selection from the polygenes and the major genes.
Viswanathan et al. (2007) allowed lives to react not only to test results, but to the
changes in price also. They set out a discrete-time Markov model of annually renew-
able life insurance based on Subramanian et al. (1999). The quantity of insurance to
purchase at the renewal date was such that for price, P , quantity, Q and elasticity of
demand, λ, P λQ = c, where c is a constant. Elasticity of demands were estimated by
asking a small sample of health care workers how much insurance they would purchase
given prices and a higher or lower risk risk of death. Premiums were also allowed to
change based on anticipated demand (after taking account of the change in price),
such that an equilibrium was reached where the insurer calculated an expected profit
of zero.
Lu et al. (2011a) modelled the development of BC in the context of income pro-
tection insurance with allowance for only the major genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2). To
allow for the possibility of recovery, they included the effects of treatments; while
after recovery, they allowed for recurrence. These treatments depended on the type
of BC diagnosed so transition intensities to various levels of severity were fitted using
medical literature. Their overall BC onset intensities were those fitted by Gui et al.
(2006). Lu et al. (2011b) used this model of BC development in order to calculate the
associated insurance premiums and policy values. Since their recovery was duration
dependent, the model is semi-Markov; in common with Gui et al. (2006), they used
Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2004)’s trick of paying the prospective policy value upon
transition into an otherwise duration dependent state to bring it back into the Markov
framework.
Following on from this work, we will set out a multiple state Markov model for an
insurance market. We will draw greatly from Macdonald and McIvor (2006, 2009),
the only other studies to include a polygenic component of BC risk.
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2.2 The Polygenic Model
In this section we describe the polygenic model of BC risk, which we will use to
estimate genotype specific transition intensities for BC onset when we set out our
Markov model of female lifetime in Section 2.3. This will further allow us to model
adverse selection for lives who have a high (or low) risk of developing BC.
A polygenic model of inheritance exists where a trait is affected by variants of
multiple genes. The trait of interest to us is the age-related risk of developing BC.
We assume that individual genes — BRCA1, BRCA2 and the loci contributing
to the polygene — each show simple Mendelian inheritance. Thus a parent with
a single mutated copy of either BRCA1 or BRCA2 (other risky major genotypes
being rare enough to ignore) has a 50% chance of passing the mutation on to each
offspring (male or female) they have. A parent with no such mutation (which we
call the BRCA0 genotype) passes on only the BRCA0 genotype to offspring. Thus
the increased BC risk associated with major gene mutations shows the same simple
Mendelian inheritance as the major gene itself.
However BC risk conferred by the polygene does not show simple Mendelian inher-
itance. The phenotype associated with the polygene is the aggregate of the ‘pheno-
types’ associated with each contributing genetic locus. Although these ‘phenotypes’
may be thought of as each obeying Mendel’s laws, they are effectively unobservable
individually. Thus, a mother who has an average polygenic risk of BC may have
daughters whose polygenic risk can range between very high and very low. Espe-
cially when the number of contributing loci is high, this may distort the pattern and
usefulness of a family history of BC.
2.2.1 Pharoah’s Model
The model of Pharoah et al. (2008) combines multiplicatively the effects of seven
known genetic loci to assign a total relative risk of BC. They are assumed to have no
effect on OC risk. Since everyone has two functioning alleles of every gene (except
those on the X and Y chromosomes), there are three possible combinations of alleles
at each locus: no high-risk alleles; one low-risk allele and one high-risk allele; or
two high-risk alleles. If the population prevalence of a high-risk allele at locus i
is pi, these three genotypes have population prevalences (1 − pi)2, 2pi(1 − pi) and
p2i respectively. They report the relative risk of developing breast cancer for each
high-risk allele, relative to a low-risk allele, known as the per allele risk. Table 2.1
sets out the estimated per allele risk and associated 95% confidence interval of the
high-risk variant relative to the low-risk and population prevalences for each of these
polygenes with their identification number in the SNP database1, commonly referred
1http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/SNP/
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Table 2.1: Per allele risk with 95% confidence intervals and population prevalences
of genetic loci known to contribute to the polygenic risk of breast cancer (Pharoah
et al., 2008) with the approximate standard deviation of the per allele risk estimate.
Locus i dbSNP Per Allele Risk Population Prevalence, σi
Number (95% Confidence Interval) pi
1 rs2981582 1.26 (1.23, 1.30) 0.38 0.0179
2 rs3803662 1.20 (1.16, 1.24) 0.25 0.0200
3 rs889312 1.13 (1.10, 1.16) 0.28 0.0153
4 rs3817198 1.07 (1.04, 1.11) 0.30 0.0179
5 rs13281615 1.08 (1.05, 1.11) 0.40 0.0153
6 rs13387042 1.20 (1.14, 1.26) 0.50 0.0179
7 rs1053485 1.13 (1.06, 1.18) 0.86 0.0310
to as ‘dbSNP Number’, as well as our own reference label, locus i for i = 1, 2, . . . , 7.
For example, an individual with 2 high-risk alleles at both the rs2981582 and the
rs1053487 loci has a relative risk of 1.262× 1.132 = 2.0272 and the probability of this
combination is 0.382 × 0.862 = 0.1068. Also given is our calculation of the standard
deviation of the estimate, calculated based on a normal approximation since their
point estimates for the mean are based on GWAS of large numbers of lives, as
σi =
Upper Confidence Interval− Lower Confidence Interval
2× 1.96 , for i = 1, 2, . . . , 7.
(2.1)
2.2.2 Extending The Model
Easton et al. (2007) suggest that these seven loci account for 3.6% of familial risk,
while the major genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 account for another 25%. Antoniou et al.
(2001) concluded that a polygenic model is a better fit for the remaining familial
risk than any model incorporating another major gene (a putative BRCA3, which
has not been found despite intensive searching). We assume that the genetic loci
which contribute to the polygene and have yet to be discovered, have characteristics
broadly similar to the seven described above. Therefore we assume that there are
20 additional sets of seven loci with relative risk and associated confidence intervals
identical to those of the set of seven known loci. Thus in total we have 147 loci with
the 140 undiscovered loci labelled locus 8, 9, 10, . . . , 147. For convenience, we index
the postulated loci such that loci 8, 15, . . . , 141 all have the same characteristics as
locus 1; loci 9, 16, . . . , 142 have the same characteristics as locus 2, and so on. These
additional 140 loci account for the remaining 71.4% of familial risk. Thus, our model
is an extrapolation from the characteristics of known loci to complete the posited
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polygene.
The interaction of major gene mutations with genetic loci contributing to the
polygene was not discussed in Pharoah et al. (2008). Further research has suggested
where interactions may or may not exist (see Antoniou et al., 2008), but this is not yet
well established, so we have assumed that the effect of the polygene risk on a BRCA1
or BRCA2 mutation carrier is the same as that on a non-carrier — the relative risk
arising from the polygenotype is multiplicative to the BRCA specific onset of BC.
Since BRCA mutations are rare — Antoniou et al. (2002) estimated mutant allele
frequencies of BRCA1 and BRCA2 as 0.00051 and 0.00068 respectively — this should
not distort results greatly.
2.2.3 Notation
We introduce notation to describe genotypes, hazard rates and relative risks.
1. Let G be the set of all possible polygenotypes. Assume that n genetic loci
contribute to the polygene. Let Gi be the set of all possible genotypes at the
ith genetic locus. (For our model, Gi = {0, 1, 2} for all i would suffice.) Then
the polygenotype in G of a woman drawn at random from the population is a
random variable denoted by G = (G1, G2, . . . , Gn), with Gi ∈ Gi, i = 1, . . . , n.
Additionally, we denote by g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) a realisation of G.
2. Choose a starting age x low enough that no cases of BC have occurred. As
noted in Antoniou et al. (2001), the proportions of lives in the population with
each polygene mutation will change as higher-risk lives get BC and die earlier
than lower-risk lives, lowering the average risk of survivors. The population
prevalence of major genes and the polygene at age x will be that arising from
Mendelian inheritance, with no survivorship effect yet.
3. Let tp
g
x be the probability that a woman free of BC at age x is still free of it age
x+ t, given she has genotype g.
4. Let pg be the population prevalence of polygenotype g ∈ G, assumed to be that
of our chosen starting age x.
5. Denote the age-dependent population BC transition intensity at age x + t by
µBC (x+ t), and the polygenotype-specific transition intensity at age x + t by
µBCg (x+ t) for polygenotype g ∈ G.
6. Define λ (x+ t) to be the baseline BC transition intensity at age x + t. We
choose our baseline genotype to be a woman with zero high-risk variants at
each locus contributing to the polygene, i.e. λ (x+ t) = µBC(0,0,...,0) (x+ t).
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7. Define RRi,gi to be the relative risk associated with polygenotype gi ∈ Gi at
locus i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and RRg to be the relative risk for polygenotype g ∈ G,
assuming that the relative risks associated with genotypes at each contributing
genetic locus are constant (so we have proportional hazards). The average
relative risk within the population at age x+ t is denoted RR (x+ t).
8. For the ith locus, define
βi = log(RRi,1), (2.2)
where RRi,1 is the per allele relative risk of the high-risk variant of locus i, given
in Table 2.1.
With our notation established, we can now set out the main definition of our
model. The multiplicative model is defined by assuming that a woman with genotype
gi at the ith locus (i = 1, . . . , n) has onset rate of BC equal to:
µBCg (x+ t) = λ (x+ t)RRg = λ (x+ t)RR(g1,...,gn) = λ (x+ t)
n∏
i=1
RRi,gi . (2.3)
In our simple model, we may define gi to be the number of high-risk alleles carried
at the ith locus. Then
µBCg (x+ t) = µ
BC
(g1,...,gn)
(x+ t) = λ (x+ t) exp(β1g1 + . . .+ βngn), (2.4)
which is a Cox-type proportional hazards model with the gi as covariates.
2.2.4 Distribution of Relative Risk
Since each locus contributes three possible genotypes, and we have assumed that
there are 147 loci, in total the polygene has 3147 (of the order of 1070) variants. For
comparison, the population of the world today is less than 1010. We have modelled
the 147 loci as 21 independent duplicates of the set of seven known loci. This means
that many of the resulting 3147 polygenotypes have identical relative risks. However
there are still too many to carry out computations by direct summation over all
polygenotypes. We therefore find an approximate distribution for relative risk to
allow the use of numerical methods to simplify the calculations.
In this section, we assume that the genotype at each locus is both defined and
denoted by the number of high-risk alleles denoted Gi, for Gi ∈ Gi = {0, 1, 2}. Define
p∗i to be the population prevalence of the high-risk allele at the ith locus, so Gi ∼
Bin (2, p∗i ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , 147. Then the relative risk contributed from locus i, RRi,Gi
in a woman drawn at random from the population is a random variable, taking on the
values RRi,0 = 1, RRi,1 and RRi,2 = RR
2
i,1 with probabilities (1−p∗i )2, 2p∗i (1−p∗i ) and
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p∗i
2 respectively. G1, G2, . . . , G147 are assumed to be independent random variables
and for j = 1, . . . , 7, the random variable Gj+7k has the same distribution as Gj, for
each k = 0, 1, . . . , 20.
Then the (random) log relative risk associated with locus i can be written as
logRRi,Gi = βiGi. (2.5)
We assume that p∗j+7k = pj for j = 1, 2, . . . , 7 and k = 0, 1, . . . , 20 with the value of
pj given by Table 2.1. For j = 1, . . . , 7, let G
∗
j be the random variable representing the
total number of high-risk variants in the 21 analogues of locus j, in a woman drawn at
random from the population, i.e. G∗j =
20∑
k=0
Gj+7k ∼ Bin(42, p∗j). This distribution can
be well approximated by a normal distribution: G∗j ∼ N (42p∗j , 42p∗j(1 − p∗j)). More-
over, let RR∗j,G∗j be the random variable representing the total relative risk contributed
by the 21 analogues of that locus, in that same woman, i.e. RR∗j,G∗j =
20∏
k=0
RRj+7k,Gj+7k
and
logRR∗j,G∗j =
20∑
k=0
logRRj+7k,Gj+7k =
20∑
k=0
βj+7kGj+7k =
20∑
k=0
βjGj+7k = βjG
∗
j . (2.6)
Now, we have the distribution,
βjG
∗
j ∼ Bin
(
2× 21× βj, p∗j
)
. (2.7)
Hence, assuming polygenes are inherited and act independently, the total relative risk
RRG of a woman drawn at random from the population has a distribution given by:
logRRG =
7∑
j=1
βjG
∗
j ∼ N
(
7∑
j=1
42βjp
∗
j ,
7∑
j=1
42β2j p
∗
j(1− p∗j)
)
. (2.8)
Hence, relative to polygenotype g = (0, 0, . . . , 0) using the point estimates of rela-
tive risk and their associated probabilities from Table 2.1, the polygene relative risk is
approximately log-normally distributed with parameters E (logRRG) = 17.4289 and
σlogRR = 1.20 at outset, where σlogRR is the standard deviation of logRRG . This is
reasonably close to the simpler model using the hypothetical polygene with three loci
(which was used in Macdonald and McIvor, 2006) of Antoniou et al. (2002), who cal-
culated an estimate of 1.29 for the standard deviation with a 95% confidence interval
of (1.096, 1.521) using a U.K. population based cohort.
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2.2.5 Baseline Rate of Onset of Breast Cancer
In Equation (2.3), µBCg (x+ t) is defined in terms of baseline hazard rate, λ (x+ t).
However, λ(x + t) is not directly observable. What is observable is the population
average onset rate, µBC (x+ t), which embodies the survivorship effect mentioned in
(b) of Section 2.2.3 above. Here we show how to calculate λ (x+ t) and constrain the
average onset rate of BC for survivors at age x + t in the model to be equal to the
population onset rate. Noting that the mean relative risk at age x+ t, RR (x+ t), is
given by:
RR (x+ t) =
∑
g∈G
pg tp
g
xRRg∑
g∈G
pg tp
g
x
, (2.9)
we use the relation
λ (x+ t) =
µBC (x+ t)
RR (x+ t)
, (2.10)
Our distribution of log relative risk implies a mean relative risk of approximately
7.7× 107. Hence the baseline onset rate of BC at the starting age x is,
λ (x+ 0) ≈ µ
BC (x+ 0)
7.7× 107 . (2.11)
To find λ (x+ t) for t > 0, we solve differential equations for tp
g
x for g ∈ G
d
dt
tp
g
x = −µBCg (x+ t) tpgx
= −λ (x+ t) RRg tpgx
= −µ
BC (x+ t)
RR (x+ t)
tp
g
xRRg
= −
µBC (x+ t)
∑
h∈G
ph tp
h
x∑
h∈G
ph tphxRRh
tp
g
xRRg . (2.12)
Using the approximate distribution derived in Section 2.2.4, the sums over geno-
types in Equation (2.12) become integrals, i.e.
d
dt
tp˜
r
x ≈ −
µBC (x+ t)
∫∞
−∞ flogRRG (s) tp˜
s
x ds∫∞
−∞ flogRRG (s) tp˜
s
x exp(s) ds
tp˜
r
x exp(r). (2.13)
where tp˜
r
x is the probability that a woman free of BC at age x is still free of BC
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Figure 2.1: A model for critical illness insurance policyholder. Transition to ‘Dead’
or ‘Other CI’ states is at rates depending only on age x. The onset rate of OC,
µOCg (x+ t), depends also on the BRCA genotype but is unaffected by polygenotype
part of g, while the onset rate of BC, µBCg (x+ t), depends on both the polygenotype
and BRCA genotype parts of g.
at age x + t given that the logarithm of her relative risk is r, for −∞ < r <
∞, and flogRRG (s) is the probability density function of logRRG . We calculated
these integrals numerically using Simpson’s Rule (see Appendix A) over the range
[E (logRRG)− 6.25, E (logRRG) + 6.25] with a step size of 2−6.
The simultaneous differential equations were then solved using a fourth order
Runge-Kutta method (see Appendix A) with step size 2−13 and the boundary condi-
tions that 0p˜
r
x = 1 for all r.
2.3 Cost of Family History
2.3.1 Insurance Model
In this section we consider women who develop a family history of BC or OC and the
impact this has on premiums payable for insurance. This allows us to consider the
appropriateness of the use of family history when underwriting in the absence of tests
for either the major genes (MG) — BRCA1 and BRCA2 — or polygenes (PG).
The insurance contract of interest is stand-alone critical illness insurance with
benefits payable on the occurrence of a defined critical illness, but not on earlier
death. This type of product is of interest due to the high proportion of claims that
can be directly attributed to BC. It is also the simplest to model as there is no need
to consider post-onset survival.
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Consistent with previous work (Gui et al., 2006; Macdonald and McIvor, 2006),
we define a family history to be one in which two or more first degree relatives have
been diagnosed with BC or OC before age 50.
We construct a Markov model for the lifetime of an individual female as illustrated
in Figure 2.1. To incorporate the major genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, we augment
the set of possible genotypes to G∗ = {0, 1, 2} × G. Observed overall genotypes are
thus g = (g0, g1, . . . , g147) where g0 ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the major genotype corresponding to
BRCA0, BRCA1, BRCA2 respectively. For consistency with previous work, transition
intensities from ‘Healthy’ to ‘Dead’ and ‘Other CI’ are taken from Gutie´rrez and
Macdonald (2003). Their mortality rates were based on the English Life Tables No.
15, which were constructed based on the mortality experience of England and Wales
over the period 1990–1992. The onset of ‘Other CI’ was calculated by fitting the major
causes of such a claim: stroke, heart attack (both adjusted for lives who do not survive
the 28 days required for a claim in a typical CI contract) and cancer (see Appendix
B). The transition intensity into the ‘Dead’ state was adjusted to remove strokes
and heart attacks that would result in claim since a claim would have already ceased
their policy. The cancer component of ‘Other CI’ includes the onset of all cancers so
onset rates of BC and OC have been removed from them, using transition intensities
from Macdonald et al. (2003a) as these were calculated from the same data (Cancer
Registrations 1990–1992). BC and OC onset rates are those used in Macdonald and
McIvor (2006), calculated from cancer registrations in England and Wales 1983–1987,
for consistency with the adjustments for BRCA mutations estimated by Antoniou
et al. (2002).
2.3.2 Premiums
Premium rates for each relative risk are calculated as continuously payable level net
premiums by solving Thiele’s equations using a Runge-Kutta algorithm with step size
2−11 years and force of interest 0.05 per annum. A summary of these premiums as a
percentage of those chargeable to a life with no BRCA mutation and RRg = RR (x)
is shown in Table 2.2, allowing us to see how deviations from the population average
risk at outset impacts premium rates.
First we examine premium rates for lives with no BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation.
Premiums for very low risk lives (BRCA0 and logRRg < logRR (x) − 1) approach
a limit of between 70-80% of premiums chargeable to a life with an average level of
risk (BRCA0 and logRRg = logRR (x)) depending on age and term. Premiums for
very low risk lives can be attributed to the amount required to cover costs of ovarian
cancer and other critical illness. However for even slightly elevated risk (BRCA0 and
logRRg = logRR (x) + 1) premiums should be loaded approximately 40%, reaching
uninsurable rates (> 400% of unrated premium) for very high risk lives (BRCA0 and
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logRRg = logRR (x) + 3), although the proportion of lives with such a high risk is
small.
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If we ignore the polygene effect by looking at logRRg = logRR (x), women with
a BRCA mutation are uninsurable at most ages and terms. In our model which
incorporates both a major gene and polygenes, a woman with a BRCA mutation but
low polygenic relative risk becomes insurable. However in most of these low relative
risk cases, the effect of the BRCA gene is still stronger than the decrease in BC risk
from the polygene because the polygene does not change the high risk for ovarian
cancer caused by BRCA mutations.
The ratings due to polygene vary by age and term, the highest ratings for lives
without a BRCA mutation being for 40 year olds with a 10 year term. The reason
for this can be seen in Figure 2.2: BC is a significant proportion of the onset rates
and this proportion reaches a peak between the ages of 40 and 50 so the polygene has
the highest impact on policies with terms that include this age range. The polygene
influence decreases as heart attack and other forms of cancer unaffected by the poly-
gene reduce the weighting of BC in the makeup of premium rates. Hence, for lives
aged 30 years, there is a peak in ratings for those with a high polygene risk with a 20
year term compared to 10 or 30 year terms. Conversely, since the low polygene risk
removes proportionally more of the benefit, there is a dip for lives aged 30 with a low
polygene risk for a 20 year term.
For lives with a BRCA mutation, the highest ratings are earlier than the highest
for lives without a BRCA mutation — 30 year olds with 10 year term compared to
40 year olds with 10 year term respectively — because the major genes have their
strongest impact between ages 30 and 40, although BC is overwhelmingly dominant
at all ages considered.
2.3.3 Simulation of Family Histories
Our aim in this subsection is to model the development of family histories. This will
allow us to find the joint distribution of relative risk and major genotype, conditional
on family history status and current age. Additionally, we will use the results to
calculate family history onset rates in Section 2.5.2.
Recall from Section 2.1.1 that Gui et al. (2006) calculated the probabilities of
developing a family history by summation over the possible events. Due to the large
number of possible genotypes and inheritance possibilities in our model, it is not
tractable to compute onset rates of family history analytically. Instead we simulate
the future lifetimes of a large number of lives and their families.
The simulation model that we use is described fully in Macdonald and McIvor
(2006). We summarise it here, and set out the change to inheritance methodology.
1. A family starts with 2 parents, whose polygenotype and BRCA genotype are
randomly sampled according to the population distributions in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.2: Stacked onset rates for selected critical illnesses and death of females.
Sources: Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2003); Macdonald and McIvor (2006).
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Table 2.3: Probability mass function of number of daughters in a family conditional
on there being at least one daughter. Source: Macdonald et al. (2003a).
No. of Daughters Probability
1 0.54759802
2 0.33055298
3 0.09749316
4 0.02111590
5 0.00285702
6 0.00035658
7 0.00002634
2. The number of daughters is randomly sampled from a random variable with the
probability mass function given in Table 2.3. We use the distribution estimated
by Macdonald et al. (2003a). This was based on Shaw (1990)’s estimate of the
number of children born to women who were themselves born in England and
Wales in 1940–44, extrapolated according to the proportions of children born to
women who were married in 1961–65 according to the 1971 census.
3. Daughters are the same age and born when the mother, assumed to be healthy,
is age 30.
4. Each daughter inherits polygenes and BRCA genes from their parents indepen-
dently of each other according to Mendel’s laws, acting at each major gene locus
and each polygene locus. The validity of this assumption could be questioned —
it is conceivable that some of the polygene loci might be within close proximity
to another on the same chromosome and exhibit some level of linkage.
5. Per-allele relative risk for locus i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 147, is sampled from a normal
distribution with standard deviation σi and mean equal to the point estimate
listed in Table 2.1 and held constant for all lives in the simulation. In this way
we include the sampling variance from Pharoah et al. (2008) in our modelling,
as well as the sample variance from our simulation.
6. Full life histories of mother and daughters are simulated using their respective
genotypes and treating each of the decrements in Figure 2.1 as independent
competing risks.
As noted in Macdonald and McIvor (2006), this results in censorship whereby a
life who moves to another critical illness state cannot have a subsequent cancer but
the effect is minimal as only around 6% of lives have made such a move to other
critical illness states by age 50, which is our cut-off age for family history.
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The simulation of a large number of lives (within 15,000,000 families) allows us to
observe the distribution of relative risk at any age x, and how it depends on family
history.
2.3.4 Distribution of Relative Risk by Underwriting Class
In order to calculate the premiums to charge an insured population, we find the
distributions of relative risk and BRCA mutations for lives with and without a family
history.
For each life, at every age x+ t, we know her genotype, whether she is healthy and
which relatives, if any, have so far been diagnosed with BC or OC before age 50. We
categorise this large quantity of data at each age by: BRCA genotype; logRRg ; and
presence of family history. Since logRRg is a continuous quantity we discretise it into
100 ‘bins’ of uniform length 0.125 over the range [logRR (20)−6.25, logRR (20)+6.25].
We choose this range because it is large enough that the probability of a life having
a relative risk outside it, is 1.924× 10−7. For family history categorisation, we define
two underwriting classes
1. ST — Unrated — Females without a family history.
2. FH — Rated — Females who have developed a family history.
Denote the mean and standard deviation of log relative risk at age x in ST by
ESTlogRR (x) and σ
ST
logRR (x) respectively and similarly for FH.
We ran the model 500 times to produce confidence intervals for the estimates of
the means and standard deviations of logRRG . The resulting discretised distributions
for the average of our simulations are shown in Figure 2.3 for ST and FH at ages
x = 30 and 50 for each genotype. (Note that Figure 2.3 includes male lives which we
need in simulations in Section 2.4.)
The distribution of relative risk of BRCA0 lives within each underwriting class,
remains roughly the same at each age despite higher risk lives leaving the class (by
either getting cancer or developing a family history). There is very little difference in
the spread of logRRG in ST and in FH; σ
FH
logRR(x)/σ
ST
logRR(x) is close to 1 (see Table
2.5). However, as can be seen from the plots and Table 2.4, there is a significant
difference in the mean of logRRG in each class, with E
FH
logRR (x)−ESTlogRR (x) between
1.1 and 1.2. This results in average relative risk within FH being approximately 250%
higher than within ST at ages 30, 40 and 50, making it a good proxy for genetic risk.
To check convergence, we compare to estimates based on 100 simulations, shown in
Tables 2.6 and 2.7. As these show little difference at ages of interest, we continue
with the 500 simulations we have performed.
For lives with a BRCA mutation, the differences between the mean of logRRG in
each underwriting class are lower than that of BRCA0 and decreases with age. While
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Table 2.4: Mean of log relative risk for female lives in underwriting classes ST and
FH based on 500 simulations.
BRCA Age (x) ESTlogRR (x) 95% Confidence E
FH
logRR (x) 95% Confidence
Interval −ESTlogRR (x) Interval
0 20 17.43 (17.24, 17.64) 0.85 (0.40, 1.35)
30 17.43 (17.24, 17.64) 1.18 (1.05, 1.33)
40 17.43 (17.23, 17.63) 1.24 (1.20, 1.29)
50 17.41 (17.22, 17.61) 1.16 (1.13, 1.19)
1 20 17.43 (17.24, 17.65) 0.46 (−1.29, 2.98)
30 17.43 (17.24, 17.65) 0.89 (−0.29, 2.23)
40 17.32 (17.14, 17.51) 0.86 (0.73, 1.03)
50 17.18 (17.01, 17.36) 0.56 (0.48, 0.65)
2 20 17.43 (17.23, 17.65) 0.81 (−1.00, 2.97)
30 17.43 (17.23, 17.65) 0.99 (−0.23, 2.39)
40 17.34 (17.16, 17.54) 1.01 (0.87, 1.18)
50 17.22 (17.04, 17.39) 0.82 (0.74, 0.93)
there are insufficient lives with a family history at age 30 to draw solid conclusion,
there are significant differences between FH and ST at ages 40 and 50. The spread
of logRRG in FH is slightly smaller than ST for BRCA2 at age 50. However at all
other ages, and for BRCA1, there are no significant differences.
The proportions of lives with a BRCA mutation in each of the underwriting classes
is also significantly different, as can be seen in Table 2.8.
2.3.5 Notation
We introduce notation to be used in this section. Suppose a life aged x has applied
for a policy with term n years.
1. flogRR,G0|x,FH(r, g) is the joint probability density function for logRRG and ma-
jor genotype, G0, conditional on a life aged x having developed a family history
of BC or OC. For succinctness, this is abbreviated to fFHx (r, g). A similar
expression is used for ST .
2. Ar,g,x:n is the expected present value of 1 paid on transition to a state other than
Healthy or Dead for a life with relative risk er and major genotype g currently
aged x.
3. ar,g,x:n is the expected present value of an annuity of 1 paid continuously while in
the Healthy state for a life with relative risk er and major genotype g currently
aged x.
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Figure 2.3: Distributions of relative risk for females and males: (a) BRCA0, age 30;
(b) BRCA0, age 50; (c) BRCA1, age 30; (d) BRCA1, age 50; (e) BRCA2, age 30; and
(f) BRCA2, age 50, averaged over 500 simulations.
40
Chapter 2: Polygenes and Major Genes for Breast Cancer in a Critical Illness Market
Table 2.5: Standard deviation of log relative risk for female lives in underwriting
classes ST and FH based on 500 simulations.
BRCA Age (x) σSTlogRR(x) σ
FH
logRR(x)/σ
ST
logRR(x) 95% Confidence
Interval
0 20 1.203 1.009 (0.767, 1.292)
30 1.202 1.045 (0.963, 1.135)
40 1.199 1.016 (0.991, 1.046)
50 1.188 1.000 (0.984, 1.017)
1 20 1.203 0.336 (0.065, 1.258)
30 1.202 0.677 (0.197, 1.411)
40 1.141 0.946 (0.867, 1.030)
50 1.083 0.976 (0.910, 1.026)
2 20 1.203 0.250 (0.062, 1.478)
30 1.202 0.441 (0.114, 1.472)
40 1.154 0.928 (0.841, 1.027)
50 1.097 0.905 (0.843, 0.972)
Table 2.6: Mean of log relative risk for female lives in underwriting classes ST and
FH based on 100 simulations.
BRCA Age (x) ESTlogRR (x) 95% Confidence E
FH
logRR (x) 95% Confidence
Interval −ESTlogRR (x) Interval
0 20 17.43 (17.25, 17.60) 0.874 (0.459, 1.423)
30 17.43 (17.25, 17.59) 1.179 (1.064, 1.347)
40 17.42 (17.25, 17.59) 1.196 (1.157, 1.243)
50 17.40 (17.23, 17.57) 1.112 (1.084, 1.140)
1 20 17.43 (17.25, 17.60) 0.742 (−0.810, 2.676)
30 17.43 (17.25, 17.60) 0.898 (0.000, 2.003)
40 17.31 (17.14, 17.46) 0.874 (0.750, 1.040)
50 17.17 (17.02, 17.31) 0.555 (0.467, 0.651)
2 20 17.43 (17.26, 17.60) 0.560 (−0.241, 2.213)
30 17.43 (17.26, 17.60) 1.065 (0.001, 2.344)
40 17.34 (17.18, 17.49) 1.010 (0.876, 1.190)
50 17.20 (17.06, 17.35) 0.820 (0.729, 0.950)
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Table 2.7: Standard deviation of log relative risk for female lives in underwriting
classes ST and FH based on 100 simulations.
BRCA Age (x) σSTlogRR(x) σ
FH
logRR(x)/σ
ST
logRR(x) 95% Confidence
Interval
0 20 1.203 1.025 (0.792, 1.307)
30 1.203 1.047 (0.966, 1.130)
40 1.199 1.011 (0.989, 1.011)
50 1.188 1.004 (0.991, 1.019)
1 20 1.203 0.336 (0.133, 1.085)
30 1.203 0.677 (0.242, 1.448)
40 1.142 0.946 (0.871, 1.023)
50 1.085 0.976 (0.926, 1.032)
2 20 1.202 0.245 (0.086, 0.712)
30 1.202 0.425 (0.175, 1.376)
40 1.154 0.930 (0.830, 1.028)
50 1.098 0.905 (0.847, 0.977)
Table 2.8: Proportions of lives with a BRCA mutation.
ST FH
Age BRCA1 BRCA2 BRCA1 BRCA2
30 0.0020 0.0027 0.0125 0.0112
40 0.0019 0.0025 0.0639 0.0518
50 0.0015 0.0023 0.0400 0.0293
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Table 2.9: Distribution of premium rates charged to lives with a family history as a
percentage of the premium charged to lives without a family history.
Age Term Mean 95% Confidence Standard
(%) Interval (%) Deviation
30
10 192.7 (162.4, 225.2) 0.1661
20 187.3 (162.7, 212.6) 0.1262
30 168.5 (150.4, 186.9) 0.0930
40
10 247.3 (235.4, 259.4) 0.0596
20 202.0 (193.2, 210.3) 0.0419
50 10 158.6 (154.8, 162.5) 0.0204
4. ΠSTx:n is the level premium for a life without a family history.
5. ΠFHx:n is the level premium for a life with a family history.
2.3.6 Ratings for Presence of Family History
With these distributions of polygene relative risk and of major gene mutations, we
will calculate the level premiums that would cover the cost of CI benefits payable
assuming underwriters may use family history as a factor.
The appropriate level premium for lives that have presented a family history is
calculated as
ΠFHx:n =
2∑
g=0
[∫ ∞
−∞
fFHx (r, g)Ar,g,x:n dr
]
2∑
g=0
[∫ ∞
−∞
fFHx (r, g)ar,g,x:n dr
] (2.14)
and a similar expression can be written down for ΠSTx:n .
We use the estimated distributions based on each of our 500 simulations to estimate
premium rates for lives with a family history and show how uncertainty may cause
them to vary. Results of this are shown in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.4. They show a
narrow confidence interval for age 50 at entry. However younger ages at entry have a
broader interval, up to 65% of the unrated premium.
The approach taken by Macdonald and McIvor (2006) was to compare weighted
premiums for lives with a family history (as calculated above) to the premiums ap-
propriate for a life with BRCA0 and polygene relative risk RRg = 1. However, the
average polygene risk within the unrated pool will be somewhat higher — they used
a binomial distribution for the log risk, centred at 0 — which increases the average
premium for lives without a family history, offsetting some of the extra payable for the
lives with a family history. In a reconciliation exercise, this was found to be around
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Figure 2.4: Histograms of ratings for presence of family history as a percentage of the
premium charged to lives without a family history.
40%.
Allowing for this change, and comparing our average ratings in Table 2.10, the
results from the two polygene models do show some differences at ages at entry 40
and 50 of 30–40% while age 30 is far greater at all terms by 100–250%. Macdonald
and McIvor ran their model only once and at age 30 they had 91 lives with a family
history, 9 of which had a BRCA mutation as well as polygene relative risk greater
than 1, resulting in large premium ratings. It is therefore possible that the difference
between our results and theirs at age 30 is down to sampling. In either case, the
largest part of rating is attributable to the polygenes.
2.4 Effect of the ‘Test-Achats’ European Court of
Justice Ruling
Recall from Chapter 1 that the European Court of Justice ruled that pricing with
sex as a rating factor would not be permitted from 22nd December 2012. We assume
that insurers’ response will be to charge premiums based on aggregate risk on an
assumed business mix. It is not clear whether this extends to underwriting based on
justifiable biological risk and it is possible that this would need to be tested in court.
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Table 2.10: Level net premiums for females with a family history of BC or OC as a
percentage of those for females without a family history, averaged over simulations.
Also shown are equivalent results from Macdonald and McIvor (2006). Note MG
results use P+MG for experience basis but MG only for pricing basis.
Genetic Age 30 Age 40 Age 50
Study Model 10 yrs 20 yrs 30 yrs 10 yrs 20 yrs 10 yrs
% % % % % %
Ours P+MG 193 187 169 247 202 159
MG 110 108 106 149 133 113
M&M (2006) P+MG 444 341 275 244 207 171
MG 138 132 123 113 109 103
Table 2.11: Probability mass function of the number of children in a family. The
probability that a particular child is born female is 1/2.06. Source Macdonald et al.
(2003a).
Number of Children Probability
0 0.090
1 0.130
2 0.400
3 0.200
4 0.137
5 0.031
6 0.009
7 0.003
For example it is not clear whether or not a man, who has a family history of BC
among his female relatives should be given the same rating his sister would be given.
There are two possibilities:
1. Females receive a rating reflecting the average risk of a female with a family
history and male lives are not rated.
2. Males and females are rated equally for a family history of BC or OC based on
the aggregate risk of their sales mix.
The model described above needs to be adjusted to include male lives. Each family
is randomly assigned a number of children following the distribution of family size and
sex calculated by Macdonald et al. (2003a) (see Table 2.11).
Research by Tai et al. (2007) shows an increased risk of male BC due to BRCA
mutations, particularly BRCA2. However, detailed research is limited, partly due to
the rarity of BC in males. BRCA mutations have also been linked to prostate cancer
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(see Narod et al., 2008) but this is not usually a severe form of cancer and diagnosis
is often missed until later in life. Consequently it would not be particularly helpful
in identifying potential BRCA carriers from family history. We therefore perform
simulations and calculate male premiums ignoring BRCA mutation in males except
for transmission from father to daughter. Transition rates for males are those given
in Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2003) (see Appendix B).
2.4.1 Notation
To distinguish between males and females we introduce further notation
1. fx (r, g) is the joint distribution function for logRRG and and major genotype,
G0.
2. fFH|F (x) and fFH|M(x) are the probabilities that a female and male respectively,
develop a family history of BC or OC by age x.
3. AFx:n and A
M
x:n are the expected present values of 1 paid to a life aged x in
underwriting class ST immediately on transition to a claim state for females
and males respectively for a term of n years.
4. aFx:n and a
M
x:n are the expected present values of a continuously payable annuity
at rate 1 per annum while in an insured state, to a life currently aged x and in
underwriting class ST for females and males respectively for a term of n years.
5. AFr,g,x:n and a
F
r,g,x:n are the female log relative risk and major genotype specific
assurance and annuity functions defined above in Section 2.3.6.
6. Π′FHx:n is the premium when males with a family history are rated with females.
7. We denote the probabilities a newborn is female or male as pf = 1/2.06 and
pm = 1.06/2.06 respectively.
8. P (M) and P (F ) are the proportion of males and females respectively who buy
our insurance contract.
2.4.2 Preliminary Analysis
Table 2.12 gives the premium rates as a percentage of those for a female with logRRg =
logRR (x) and no BRCA mutation.
The percentages of females and males who develop a family history in our simula-
tions are shown in Table 2.13. At each age there is no significant difference between
the percentages of females with a family history of BC or OC and those of males.
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Table 2.12: Premium rates for males as a percentage of premium rates for females
with logRRg = logRRx and no BRCA mutation.
Age 30 Age 40 Age 50
Term 10 Term 20 Term 30 Term 10 Term 20 Term 10
74% 88% 104% 97% 113% 128%
Table 2.13: Percentage of healthy lives with a family history of breast or ovarian
cancer shown by sex and age.
Females Males
Age Mean 95% Confidence Standard Mean 95% Confidence Standard
Interval Deviation Interval Deviation
20 0.0002 (0.0001, 0.0003) 0.00005 0.0002 (0.0001, 0.0003) 0.00005
30 0.0020 (0.0015, 0.0028) 0.00034 0.0020 (0.0015, 0.0028) 0.00032
40 0.0220 (0.0169, 0.0285) 0.00334 0.0226 (0.0170, 0.0294) 0.00356
50 0.0880 (0.0680, 0.1117) 0.01290 0.0940 (0.0717, 0.1202) 0.01407
For calculation of unisex premiums we set an even split between the sexes at
each age of our insured population: P (M) = P (F ) = 0.5. In reality the respective
weightings of each sex will depend on the target market of the insurer.
First we calculate the expected present value of benefits for a female in ST aged
x for term n as
AFx:n =
2∑
g=0
[∫ ∞
−∞
fSTx (r, g)A
F
r,g,x:n dr
]
, (2.15)
and the expected present value of her continuously payable annuity as
aFx:n =
2∑
g=0
[∫ ∞
−∞
fSTx (r, g) a
F
r,g,x:n dr
]
, (2.16)
We want to rate lives in FH for only the extra risk they bring to the pool due to
the higher onset rates of BC and OC females in the class will experience. It is then
necessary to consider them as paying the premium ΠSTx:n plus an additional sum. They
are therefore included among the proportion of females when calculating our unisex
premiums for underwriting class, ST , as
ΠSTx:n =
AFx:n P (F ) + A
M
x:n P (M)
aFx:n P (F ) + a
M
x:n P (M)
. (2.17)
Note that setting the proportion of males, P (M) = 0 results in the premiums
calculated above in Equation (2.14).
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Table 2.14: Distribution of premium rates charged to female lives with a family history
as a percentage of the unisex premium charged to lives without a family history.
Age Term Mean 95% Confidence Standard
(%) Interval (%) Deviation
30
10 207.6 (172.0, 247.3) 0.1983
20 193.4 (166.6, 222.0) 0.1415
30 167.4 (149.2, 186.3) 0.0961
40
10 250.4 (236.2, 265.7) 0.0741
20 196.0 (186.8, 206.5) 0.0484
50 10 151.5 (147.3, 156.3) 0.0233
Treating females from FH as if they were in ST , who are on average lower risk,
will create a shortfall in income which must then be spread across the rated business.
2.4.3 Females receive a rating, Males do not
The simplest of the two underwriting possibilities recognises that the presence of a
family history of BC or OC does not suggest a high risk for male lives and allows all
males to belong to class ST . Males and females are charged the same unisex premium
for the ‘standard’ risk. Females who have a family history pay an extra premium for
the increased risk they pose. Thus the total premium for FH lives, ΠFHx:n , is
ΠFHx:n =
P (F )
2∑
g=0
∫ ∞
−∞
fx (r, g)
(
AFr,g,x:n − ΠSTx:n aFr,g,x:n
)
dr
+ P (M)
(
AMx:n − ΠSTx:n aMx:n
)
fFH|F (x)P (F )
2∑
g=0
∫ ∞
−∞
fFHx (r, g)a
F
r,g,x:n dr
+ ΠSTx:n . (2.18)
In comparing Tables 2.9 and 2.14, the effect of unisex premiums is to increase
ratings slightly at younger ages where male CI costs are lower than females — reducing
the premiums that females pay — and to decrease ratings slightly at older ages where
males have high heart attack and stroke rates (see Figure 2.5) — increasing the
premiums that females pay.
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Figure 2.5: Stacked onset rates for selected critical illnesses and death in males.
Source: Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2003). The population average female CI rate
from Figure 2.2 is overlaid for comparison.
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Table 2.15: Distribution of premium rates charged to male and female lives with a
family history as a percentage of the unisex premium charged to lives without a family
history.
Age Term Mean 95% Confidence Standard
(%) Interval (%) Deviation
30
10 153.8 (136.4, 174.0) 0.1010
20 146.5 (133.4, 159.9) 0.0719
30 133.4 (124.3, 142.2) 0.0487
40
10 173.0 (165.9, 179.3) 0.0355
20 146.3 (141.8, 150.7) 0.0227
50 10 124.8 (122.9, 126.9) 0.0106
2.4.4 Females and Males receive a rating
If rating females but not males for a family history of BC or OC is seen as sex
discrimination, the shortfall in unrated premium will be spread over males also, i.e.
males with family history belong to underwriting class FH. Our rated premium
becomes more general:
Π′FHx:n =
P (F )
2∑
g=0
∫ ∞
−∞
fx (r, g)
(
AFr,g,x:n − ΠSTx:n aFr,g,x:n
)
dr
+ P (M)
(
AMx:n − ΠMx:n aMx:n
)
fFH|F (x)P (F )
2∑
g=0
∫ ∞
−∞
fFHx (r, g)a
F
r,g,x:n dr + fFH|M(x)P (M) a
M
x:n
+ ΠSTx:n . (2.19)
Since the extra cost of a high proportion of high-risk female lives in the FH
underwriting class is spread over approximately twice the number of lives than when
only females are rated, it is not surprising that the ratings and standard deviations
in Table 2.15 are approximately half those in Table 2.14.
2.5 Calculating Adverse Selection In An Insurance
Market
With the identification of these seven loci, the possibility of testing for an individual’s
overall BC risk is one step closer. If a life has a pre-symptomatic genetic test, then
under the UK’s moratorium on the use of genetic information in underwriting, the
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life is not required to divulge these test results. This asymmetry of information
presents the life with an opportunity to change their buying behaviour. Lives who
see themselves as low-risk may buy less insurance, while lives who see themselves as
high-risk may buy more insurance. Both are forms of adverse selection.
Recall from Section 1.2 that researchers have found adverse selection in insur-
ance markets where individuals have private information: Brown (1992) in health
insurance; Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) in annuities markets; and Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006) in a market for long-term care. Armstrong et al. (2003) found car-
riers of BRCA1 or BRCA2 were significantly more likely to increase their life cover.
However, Zick et al. (2000) suggest that women who have tested positive for BRCA1
mutations are not more likely to purchase more life cover than untested women. Nei-
ther are women who have tested negative for BRCA1 less likely to purchase life cover
than untested women. They suggest that their follow-up period is too short since
many participants were still dealing with the health impacts of receiving a positive
test result.
A common outcome of positive BRCA mutation tests is the removal of breasts
(mastectomy) and ovaries (salpingo-oophorectomy) as a means to reduce risk. Skytte
et al. (2010) found over a 10-year period, 50% of mutation carriers had a preventative
mastectomy and 75% salpingo-oophorectomy. However, polygenes have not yet got
such a clinical use so a woman who knows she is high risk might not have prophylactic
surgery and instead purchase CI.
In this section we look at the potential cost of adverse selection based on the
results of genetic tests.
We set up a model for an insurance market and parameterise it appropriately. The
likely buying patterns and testing arrangements are uncertain so we investigate how
the cost might change in response to these factors.
2.5.1 Market Model
We expand our insurance model to an insurance market, incorporating buying be-
haviour that may change due to the result of genetic testing. The product of interest
is again stand-alone critical illness. To ensure the model is Markov, the premium is
payable continuously as a current risk premium instead of a level premium. This risk
premium at time t is calculated for each sex as the weighted average cost of expected
claims arising in (t, t + dt), with weights equal to occupancy probabilities in insured
states assuming no adverse selection — all lives purchase insurance at the same stan-
dard rate. To conform to the EU legislation, these gender-specific risk premiums will
have to be averaged across the two sexes with the weights for each being the overall
probability a male and female is insured respectively, calculated assuming adverse
selection to take place.
51
Chapter 2: Polygenes and Major Genes for Breast Cancer in a Critical Illness Market
ff - -
?
HHHHHHHHHj ?

?
F1 Uninsured
Untested
No Family History
F4 Uninsured
Untested
Family History
F5 Uninsured
Tested
Family History
F2 Uninsured
Tested
No Family History
F3 Insured
No Family History
F6 Insured
Family History
F7
Critical
Illness
F8
Dead
Figure 2.6: A model of female insurance states for an insurance market where genetic
testing may be available before and after family history at different rates. The arrows
to Dead and Critical Illness states are omitted but these may be entered from any
other state.
Since the premiums payable assume a lower-than-experienced rate of claim, a loss
will arise. This loss is the cost of adverse selection and is calculated as the difference
between outgo and premium income and expressed as a percentage of premium income
received with adverse selection present, to show how much all premiums must increase
as a result of the insurer not seeing test results.
All lives are assumed to be 20 years old, healthy, untested and uninsured at the
start of our modelling.
The model is illustrated in Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
Different scenarios are modelled to show the effects of uncertain parameters as
follows:
1. The rates of going into a tested state are those used by Macdonald and McIvor
(2009) which they based on Ropka et al. (2006)’s estimate of 59% uptake: High
with rate 0.08916 per annum; Medium with rate 0.04458 per annum; or Low
with rate 0.02972 per annum. All testing is performed on lives between ages 20
and 40.
2. Market size is at two levels represented by the rate at which a standard life
enters the insured state: a Large market with rate 0.05 per annum or Small
market with 0.01 per annum.
3. After receiving test results, a life may change their buying behaviour. Low risk
lives either buy at the same standard rate, half the standard rate or do not buy
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Figure 2.7: A model of male insurance states in an insurance market. Depending on
legislation, lives in state state M6 will belong to either underwriting class ST or FH.
at all. High risk lives, regardless of the size of market, will buy at rate 0.25
per annum which we take to represent a ‘Severe’ level of adverse selection; or
at rate 0.1 per annum which we consider to be ‘Moderate’ adverse selection.
A life is deemed to be high risk if their log relative risk is higher than the log
of the population average relative risk plus the threshold in the scenario (see
below). They are low risk if their risk is lower than the log of the population
average relative risk minus the threshold. Additionally, a life with a mutation in
either BRCA1 or BRCA2 is always deemed high risk, regardless of the polygene
relative risk.
The threshold of relative risk serves to classify lives into three categories of relative
risk. It is varied to show the effect of how different from the population risk a life
needs to see herself as being before she considers herself to be high risk or low risk i.e.
whether the product represents high or low value to her. We limit ourselves to using
high-risk and low-risk thresholds that are symmetric around the log of population
average relative risk. However, in reality, the distance from this average that is needed
to change behaviour may differ for low-risk and high-risk lives. We choose average
relative risk as a central point because the premium charged will be approximately
equal to the appropriate premium for a BRCA0 life with average relative risk. When
tested lives consider whether they are getting a cheap or expensive rate, it will be with
reference to this average premium. However, this will create an imbalance between
the proportions of high and low risk lives (see Table 2.16). Macdonald and McIvor
(2009) used the mode of their distribution as the centre.
This could be enhanced with the use of some decision making methodology e.g.
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Table 2.16: Proportion of lives at age 20 considered Low or High Risk at each threshold
point.
Threshold 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Low Risk (%) 72.8 57.6 41.1 26.0 14.5 7.0 2.9
High Risk (%) 27.2 15.3 7.5 3.2 1.1 0.4 0.1
utility theory or prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1992) to assess whether the product represents good value. Previous work
has aimed to find the potential for adverse selection using utility theory by consid-
ering boundaries for which lives would not buy insurance; they do not consider how
lives would buy at an increased rate because their expected utility framework only
answers the question whether or not to buy. For instance Macdonald and Tapadar
(2010) modelled a multi-factorial gene disorder that interacts with the environment
and found no realistic circumstances where healthy lives would choose not to buy
insurance. Whereas Macdonald and McIvor (2009) found that under two of the four
utility models used (the same as those parameterised in Macdonald and Tapadar
(2010)), lives with a very low risk polygenotype would not buy insurance.
2.5.2 Family History Onset Rate
The market model includes the onset of family history as an event. We define the
onset rate of family history as
Onset Rate =
New family history cases in period
Exposed to risk
, (2.20)
where the exposed to risk is the sum over all lives of the number of years the life is
healthy and has not yet developed a family history in the period. As can be seen in
Figures 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10, the log of the onset rate has a strong linear dependence on
the individual’s log polygene risk. However, there is divergence from the straight line
at each end of the plots, particularly in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 families. This is due
to the very small number of lives with the extremes of relative risk. With a small
value for the denominator in Equation (2.20) for each additional family history there
is a large jump in the calculated onset rate. We therefore omit groups where there
are less than 10 lives contributing to the exposure. There is a large difference where
a parent carries a BRCA mutation so these are considered separately. As there is no
observable difference between sexes, we ignore sex as a factor. Family history cannot
arise after the life is age 50 as the definition is limited to cancer before age 50 and all
lives are assumed to be born at the same time.
54
Chapter 2: Polygenes and Major Genes for Breast Cancer in a Critical Illness Market
llll
lllll
l
lll
l
lll
lllll
lllll
llllll
lllll
llllll
llllll
lllll
llllll
lllll
llll
lllll
llll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
llll
lllll
llll
llllll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l ll
l
l
l
l
llll
llll
l
lllll
llll
14 16 18 20 22
−
15
−
10
−
5
BRCA0 Family, Age>46
Log RR
Lo
g 
FH
 R
at
e
l
ll
l
l
llll
lll
l
llll
lllll
lll
llllll
lllll
llllllll
llllll
llllll
llllll
llllll
lllll
llllll
llllll
llll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
ll
lll
llll
llll
l
l
ll
llll
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
llll
llll
ll
l
14 16 18 20 22
−
15
−
10
−
5
BRCA0 Family, 41<Age<=46
Log RR
Lo
g 
FH
 R
at
e
lll
l
lll
l
l
l
ll
lll
l
lll
llll
lllllllll
llllll
llll
lllll
lllll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
llll
llll
llll
lllll
ll
ll
l
lll
ll
lll
ll
l
lll
ll
ll
lll
l l
l
ll ll
ll ll
ll
lll
lll
14 16 18 20 22
−
15
−
10
−
5
BRCA0 Family, 36<Age<=41
Log RR
Lo
g 
FH
 R
at
e
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
lll
ll
llll
lll
llll
lllll
lllll
llll
lll
llll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
llll
llll
llll
llll
llll
llllll
llll
lll
lll
l
l
ll
l
ll l
l l
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
14 16 18 20 22
−
15
−
10
−
5
BRCA0 Family, 31<Age<=36
Log RR
Lo
g 
FH
 R
at
e
Figure 2.8: Logarithm of family history onset rates for families with no BRCA muta-
tion in either parent. Each circle represents the calculated onset rate for a particular
age, sex and relative risk combination. Groups of size less than 10 are omitted from
the plots.
Based on the linearity of the log of the onset rate, we fit linear models for the log
of the onset rate as the response variable, using simulations from Section 2.4, with log
relative risk and age as explanatory variables and Normal errors. Since the sizes of
the simulated onset rates are small, this is unlikely to be associated with high adverse
selection costs, we will therefore be satisfied with simple predictor functions. We
choose a predictor with quadratic terms for age and log relative risk and interactions
between each, and choose variables to be included in an iterative process by analysing
the fit and removing the least significant term, subject to the deviance not increasing
a significant amount, until we are left with p-values< 5% for each term (Crawley,
2012).
Denote the BRCA0 specific onset rate of family history as µHBRCA0 (r, x) for a life
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Figure 2.9: Logarithm of family history onset rates for families where a parent has
a BRCA1 mutation. Each circle represents the calculated onset rate for a particular
age, sex and relative risk combination. Groups of size less than 10 are omitted from
the plots.
56
Chapter 2: Polygenes and Major Genes for Breast Cancer in a Critical Illness Market
l
l ll
ll
ll
lllll
lllll
lll
lllllll
llll
lll
llll
llll
llll
lllll
llll
llll
lllllllll
lllll
lllll
ll
l
l
lll
lllll
lll
lll
ll
lll
ll
l
lll
ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
llll
lll
lllll
l
14 16 18 20 22
−
15
−
10
−
5
BRCA2 Family, Age>46
Log RR
Lo
g 
FH
 R
at
e
llllll
lllll
l
l
ll
lll
lllll
l
l
lllll
llll
llll
llll
lll
llll
lll
llllll
llllll
lllllll
llll
lllllll
llll
l
llll
lll
lll
lll
ll l
lll
l
ll
l
ll l
ll
l
l
lll lll
l lllll
ll
ll
l
14 16 18 20 22
−
15
−
10
−
5
BRCA2 Family, 41<Age<=46
Log RR
Lo
g 
FH
 R
at
e
lllll
l
lll
l
llll
l
llll
lllll
lllllll
llll
lll
lll
lll
lll
llll
lll
llll
llll
ll
lllll
llll
lllll
l
lll
lll
lllll
l
l
ll
l
lll
l
l
llll
lll
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l l
lll
ll
l l
l
l
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
14 16 18 20 22
−
15
−
10
−
5
BRCA2 Family, 36<Age<=41
Log RR
Lo
g 
FH
 R
at
e
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
llll
lllll
llll
lllll
llll
lll
lllll
lll
lllll
llll
lllll
lllll
lll
ll
llll
lll
llllll
l
l
ll
lllll
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
l
14 16 18 20 22
−
15
−
10
−
5
BRCA2 Family, 31<Age<=36
Log RR
Lo
g 
FH
 R
at
e
Figure 2.10: Logarithm of family history onset rates for families where a parent has
a BRCA2 mutation. Each circle represents the calculated onset rate for a particular
age, sex and relative risk combination. Groups of size less than 10 are omitted from
the plots.
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aged x with logRRg = r and similarly for BRCA1 and BRCA2.
For BRCA0 this results in the following,
µHBRCA0 (r, x) =
exp(−21− 0.4696x+ 0.0081x2 + 0.0463xr − 0.0006x2r), if x < 500, if x ≥ 50.
(2.21)
Since the BRCA mutations are assumed to have an effect only from age 30 onwards,
these rates are fitted in two stages, x ≤ 30 and 30 < x < 50. We pool the lives from
all families where a BRCA mutation is present for x ≤ 30 due to sparse data:
µHBRCA1 (r, x) =

exp(−12.44512− 4.44898x+ 0.2486xr), if x ≤ 30
exp(−37.63246 + 4.34126x− 0.2344xr + 1.5182r), if 30 < x < 50
0, if x ≥ 50
(2.22)
and
µHBRCA2 (r, x) =

exp(−12.44512− 4.44898x+ 0.2486xr), if x ≤ 30
exp(−31.44989 + 0.20735x− 0.011xr + 1.17576r), if 30 < x < 50
0, if x ≥ 50.
(2.23)
2.5.3 Cost of adverse selection
The cost of adverse selection may be expressed as a percentage of premium income
and defined as
E(PV Benefits|Adverse Selection)−E(PV Premium Income|Adverse Selection)
E(PV Premium Income|Adverse Selection) ,
(2.24)
with a risk premium rate calculated assuming no adverse selection occurs. This result
tells us how the premium rates of all lives must increase as a result of adverse selection
being present in the market.
To calculate benefit outgo and premium income, it is necessary first to calculate
the probability of uninsured lives being in insured states at time 0 < t < 40 (or equiv-
alently between ages 20 and 60). We denote these probabilities, with consideration
for genotype, as gt p
j,k
x , i.e.
g
t p
j,k
x = P (In State k at age x+ t|G∗ = g and in State j at age x). (2.25)
They may be calculated by solving the Kolmogorov forward equations (see Appendix
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A):
d
dt
g
t p
j,k
20 =
∑
l 6=k
(
g
t p
j,l
20µ
l,k
20+t − gt pj,k20 µk,l20+t
)
. (2.26)
This was done using a 4th order Runge Kutta algorithm with a step size of 2−12 and
boundary conditions: g0p
F1,F1
20 = 1 and
g
0p
Fj,Fk
20 = 0 for (j, k) 6= (1, 1) and similarly for
males.
We introduce notation for the critical illness hazard rate at age x, which is the
same for any state: αFg,x for a female with genotype g and α
M
g,x for males; and α
j
x
as the mean critical illness hazard rate for lives in state j with weightings equal to
occupancy probabilities assuming no adverse selection.
The continuously payable risk premium rate at time t may then be found using
a similar technique to that used to calculate the premiums in Equation (2.17), by
calculating the mean critical illness hazard rate for female lives in ST , αF3x+t, and
including lives in FH when averaging across the sexes:
ΠST (t) =
∑
g∈G∗
pg
[
pfα
F3
20+t
(
g
t p
F1,F3
20 +
g
t p
F1,F6
20
)
+ pmα
M3
x+t
(
g
t p
M1,M3
20 +
g
t p
M1,M6
20
)]
∑
g∈G∗
pg
[
pf
(
g
t p
F1,F3
20 +
g
t p
F1,F6
20
)
+ pm
(
g
t p
M1,M3
20 +
g
t p
M1,M6
20
)] .
(2.27)
Lives in states M3 and F3 (see Figures 2.7 and 2.6) belong to the same under-
writing class, ST , due to the requirement of unisex rates. However, the question over
how to treat males with a family history among their female relatives is still present.
Again there are two possible cases:
1. Only females underwritten (lives in M6 are in ST underwriting class)
ΠFH (t) = αF620+t − αF320+t + ΠST (t) ; (2.28)
2. Males and females are both underwritten (lives in M6 are in the FH under-
writing class)
Π′FH (t) =
∑
g∈G∗
g
t p
F1,F6
20 pg pf
(
αF620+t − αF320+t
)
∑
g∈G∗
pg
(
g
t p
F1,F6
20 pf +
g
t p
M1,M6
20 pm
) + ΠST (t) . (2.29)
While these two possibilities may present difficulty to an insurer’s underwriting
department, the proportion of lives that develop a family history represents only 0.09%
of male lives at its peak at age 50 from Table 2.13, so when testing is available to
all lives, the impact of underwriting is negligible and we give results for only females
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being underwritten.
The expected present value of benefits and premiums needed for Equation (2.24)
are then calculated with occupancy probabilities found in the presence of adverse
selection, by numerical integration using Simpson’s formula as follows:
E(PV Benefit|Adv. Sel.) =
∑
g∈G∗
pg
[
pf
∫ 40
0
e−δt
(
g
t p
F1,ST
20 +
g
t p
F1,FH
20
)
αFg,20+t dt
+pm
∫ 40
0
(
g
t p
M1,ST
20 +
g
t p
M1,FH
20
)
αMg,20+tdt
]
(2.30)
and
E(PV Premium|Adv. Sel.) =
∑
g∈G∗
pg
[
pf
∫ 40
0
e−δt
(
g
t p
F1,ST
20 +
g
t p
M1,ST
20
)
ΠST (t) dt
+pm
∫ 40
0
e−δt
(
g
t p
F1,FH
20 +
g
t p
M1,FH
20
)
ΠFH (t) dt
]
,
(2.31)
with a step size of 2−11 and force of interest, δ = 0.05.
2.5.4 Results
We choose scenarios which allow us to show the impact of successively adding sources
of adverse selection to analyse where the adverse selection costs can be attributed.
The likely testing arrangements are by no means certain. Testing for BRCA1
or BRCA2 mutations from the National Health Service is available only after it is
apparent there is risk of the woman having a mutation and always requires some
family history2. However, since inheritance of polygene risk does not necessarily
result in the pattern of inheritance where an individual can be assigned a reasonable
probability of having a high risk genotype, a similar testing regime may not be as
effective. As the science develops and more genes are identified, the feasibility and
cost of testing will improve. Pharoah et al. (2008) discusses the use of population
testing as a way of identifying high-risk women in order to target the more expensive
means of detecting breast cancers, e.g. MRI screening, for early diagnosis. They
found that the use of a few susceptibility alleles could be used to distinguish woman
as high risk could improve the efficiency of BC screening programmes.
This is being further investigated in a trial across Greater Manchester by the Pre-
2http://www.nhs.uk/Livewell/Breastcancer/Pages/Breastcancergenes.aspx 4th August,
2013
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dicting Risk Of Cancer At Screening study (PROCAS) (Howell et al., 2012). PROCAS
is using a combination of family history, lifestyle, breast density and genetics to es-
timate breast cancer risk. Women who are deemed to be high risk are then given
advice on how to reduce their risk and offered more frequent monitoring.
If the testing is extended in this way across the country, the potential for adverse
selection increases greatly, with most lives being aware of their risk profile. How well
this information would be interpreted by the average person is debatable — without
genetic counselling, the implications of the results would be unlikely to be properly
understood: high risk lives becoming fearful which could impair the rational decision
making process (Loewenstein, 2000). Early detection will however change the shape
of rate tables and these early cases could be at a stage that is not covered under the
critical illness cover e.g. ductal carcinoma in situ is not considered a critical illness by
many insurers, but left untreated may develop into invasive breast cancer. Where the
prognosis improves such that a claim would not be viable, the inclination to adversely
select would decrease so we include the Moderate adverse selection rate to reflect this
case.
We include scenarios representing an extension of the current National Health
Service policy to include polygene testing after a family history has been observed,
and where testing is available to all women regardless of family history.
The results of these scenarios are shown in Tables 2.17 to 2.21:
1. High risk lives adversely select at a Severe rate after a polygene test (Table
2.17).
2. Low risk lives change behaviour after a polygene test, while high lives risk buy
at the standard rate (Table 2.18).
3. High risk lives adversely select at a Severe rate after tests for polygene and
BRCA — lives with BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations are considered high risk,
regardless of polygene relative risk (Table 2.19).
4. High risk lives adversely select at a Moderate rate after tests for polygene and
BRCA — lives with BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations are considered high risk,
regardless of polygene relative risk (Table 2.20).
5. High risk lives adversely select at a Severe rate after tests for polygene and
BRCA — lives with BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations are considered high risk,
regardless of polygene relative risk. Tests available only to lives with a family
history of breast or ovarian cancer (Table 2.21).
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The costs involved look comparable to those in Macdonald and McIvor (2009).
However our model differs from theirs in a number of ways, key of which is the Euro-
pean Union ruling described in Section 2.4. This spreads the costs over approximately
twice the volume of premium. Thus the costs suggested by our model would need to
be approximately doubled to apply to a regime where sex discrimination is permitted.
Where this is the case, our somewhat moderate costs could become quite substantial
particularly when passed on to the customer.
One observation of note is that a large part of the cost of adverse selection could
come from low risk lives buying at a lower rate after testing. Although the reduction
in the portfolio of insured lives by any individual low risk life increases the average
risk by a smaller amount than the gain of a high risk life, the volume of low risk lives
underbuying compared to high risk lives overbuying causes this high cost relating to
low risk lives. This is somewhat in contrast to Subramanian et al. (1999) who found
that the lapsing of women who test negative for a BRCA mutation was of a much
lower impact than women with a positive test result increasing benefit levels for a life
insurance contract. Their work did not include the polygenic model of BC risk, which
introduces wide heterogeneity within the major gene groupings.
Adding BRCA to the test regime makes only a small impact when already testing
for polygenes. This validates the overall finding of Macdonald and McIvor (2009),
that the bigger part of adverse selection cost is down to the polygene.
As previously stated, very few lives develop a family history. If testing is lim-
ited only to those who have a family history then the cost from adverse selection is
negligible, reaching a peak of 0.003% in a small market with High test rate.
In a small market, under the Moderate adverse selection scenarios there are still
reasonable costs involved, up to 15%. Indeed the change from the Severe rate of
insurance purchase is quite small as this is already a very high rate of insurance
purchase compared to the Standard purchase rate.
2.6 Conclusions
The discovery of a small number of ‘breast cancer polygenes’ has allowed us to take
another look at Macdonald and McIvor (2006)’s work which previously used a hypo-
thetical model in order to assess the findings, and update their results as necessary.
They had suggested the simplifications of that model create a heavy tail that distorts
the costs. We have found that their results for family history ratings, when corrected
to use the standard premium as numeraire, are reasonable. Additionally their con-
clusion that the bigger part of adverse selection risk is attributable to polygenes still
stands in a model based on actual genetic data. However they understate the size of
the adverse selection cost compared to that arising under our actual gene model.
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The change of European law to enforce the use of unisex pricing, while creating
additional concerns for an insurer’s underwriting team and adding a level of risk from
business mix, acts to spread the cost of adverse selection over a wider base whose
behaviour is not subject to change. The premiums chargeable to a female with family
history would be roughly halved if the same rating was applied to a male despite the
lack of additional risk implied for the male.
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Modelling Long-Term Care
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we set out models to allow us to assess the costs of adverse selection in
a start-up market for long term care insurance (LTC) and assess the relative impact
of different sources of adverse selection in this market. LTC provides the policyholder
with a benefit to cover the cost of payments to a carer or care home. In Chapter 4
we will apply this modelling to a U.K. setting.
Previous actuarial models of genetic adverse selection (including our work in Chap-
ter 2) have assumed an established insurance market. In such markets, premiums
have already absorbed the cost from an increased proportion of high-risk lives, and
we merely find by what factor they are larger than if there was no adverse selection.
Since we are considering a start-up market, we will assume that insurers initially have
insufficient experience to set premiums appropriately. As they gain experience, they
will compare actual cashflows with what was expected, and respond to differences by
changing premiums chargeable to new business. In this way, we make the premium
rates dynamic. As the premiums adjust, so will the costs of adverse selection and
our model will be able to chart these costs over time. This methodology, where we
explicitly model the emergence of information and its relation to adverse selection
costs, could also be applied to an established market where a new source of adverse
selection is being introduced.
There are two main reasons for requiring care: reduced functional ability and
reduced cognitive function (dementia). We will start by describing these causes, then
review previous models of long-term care.
LTC is a product to pay for old-age care, so our modelling will commence with
detailing a model for old-age health in Section 3.2. This will involve estimating
transition intensities between states in a Markov model. We will also introduce and
parameterise an intermediate state for dementia, where the life has noticed the initial
signs of the disease but a lack of clinical diagnosis creates an information asymmetry
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and hence an opportunity for adverse selection.
Under a LTC contract, benefit payments may depend on path taken by the insured
through the health model. In order to approximately calculate the expected present
values of future benefits at the start of each calendar year of a policy’s existence, in
Section 3.3 we specify a model to simulate future lifetimes and the resulting LTC
cashflows.
In Section 3.4 we will set out a model for a start-up insurance market. In this
market model, we will describe how we will use the expected present values calculated
from our simulations in order to calculate our dynamic premium rates.
3.1.1 Functional Ability
We measure reduction in functional ability in terms of activities of daily living (ADLs)
e.g. the Barthel and Katz indices (Mahoney and Barthel, 1965; Katz et al., 1970),
and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) — these are not as fundamental
as ADLs but still necessary to retain one’s independence — that can no longer be
performed. The ADLs used to trigger an insurance claim are typically needing as-
sistance with at least two of bathing, dressing, toileting, transferring, continence, or
feeding. We use the same language as is used among insurers to describe the level of
disability:
• A person that has problems performing x ADLs is said to have xADLs;
• A person that can perform all ADLs is said to have no ADLs.
Once functional ability has been lost, it is not necessarily permanent and lives can
recover to healthier states. In this way it is similar to income protection insurance
and much like income protection, a desirable feature from an insurer’s perspective
may be a deferred period to prevent the high cost of claims underwriting when the
claimant does not require a long period of care.
3.1.2 Cognitive Function
Dementia is an umbrella term for a group of disorders which impair cognitive function
by affecting thought processes, memory, judgement and personality. Although the
main sufferers are the elderly, some diseases occur at younger ages. It is progressive,
so symptoms gradually worsen but sufferers may show these symptoms inconsistently:
they may have periods of lucidity despite severe progress of the disease. As it pro-
gresses and the sufferer loses the ability to take care of him/herself, informal care
from family members or formal care in a nursing home may be necessary.
Diagnosis is aided by use of a mini-mental state examination (MMSE) (Folstein
et al., 1975) — a series of 30 questions with particular focus on orientation to time
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and place, memory and arithmetic — where lower scores indicate a decreased level
of cognitive ability. However, this test cannot easily distinguish between cause of
dementia (Santacruz and Swagerty, 2001).
We class the causes of reduced cognitive function into two groups: dementia due to
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and dementias that are not caused by Alzheimer’s Disease
(Non-AD).
Alzheimer’s Disease
The main type of dementia is AD which is responsible for 65–70% of cases (Berr et al.,
2005). There is a great deal of overlap in the symptoms shown with those of non-AD,
so diagnosis of AD can only be made with certainty at autopsy where the brain may be
properly analysed. Characteristics within the brain include a build-up of proteins on
the outside of neurones (β-amyloid plaques), inside of neurones (hyperphosphorylated
tau protein) and a loss of neurones and synapses.
Its causes are not known but it is thought to have a strong genetic component;
Gatz et al. (2006) estimates that between 60–80% of the risk is genetic.
There are two distinct varieties of AD, named for the timing at which they occur:
early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, which usually affects lives aged less than 60 years old
and late-onset Alzheimer’s disease, the more common form and which affects lives
aged 60 years and older. Early-onset AD should not be confused as merely being the
earlier occurrence of AD as the known causes are different — specifically, the genes
known to cause early-onset AD do not have an impact on late-onset AD (Gerrish
et al., 2012).
Early-onset AD is commonly referred to as Mendelian AD because the pattern
of inheritance it generally follows is Mendelian. The genetics in this variety is well
established (albeit not completely) with strong evidence supporting the main causes
of early-onset AD as being mutations of the genes which code for the amyloid pre-
cursor protein, presenilin 1 and presenilin 2 (Alagiakrishnan et al., 2012). These gene
mutations are rare but result in a very high probability of developing AD. They cause
high production rates of amyloid beta peptides which clump together into the amyloid
plaques of Alzheimer’s disease.
However, the genetics of late-onset AD is not so well understood and the only gene
known to affect its development and that has sufficient epidemiology for modelling
purposes is the apolipoprotein E gene, APOE. In the advent of genome-wide associ-
ation studies, identification of potential susceptibility genes has picked up pace and
there have been many candidates for association with late-onset AD. The progress of
the research is reviewed in Alagiakrishnan et al. (2012): susceptibility genes for which
results have been replicated, giving strong evidence for their association with late-
onset AD, are the phosphatidylinositol-binding clathrin assembly protein (PICALM),
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clusterin (CLU), complement receptor 1 (CR1), B1N1 and GRB2-associated-binding
protein 2 (GAB2) genes. Coon et al. (2007) established APOE as “the major suscep-
tibility gene” for late-onset AD.
There is also a potential role of epigenetics in the risk of developing late-onset
AD. Histone modification is a process which can cause genes to either be expressed
or silenced and “abnormal methylation pathways are detected in the brains of people
afflicted with dementia” (Alagiakrishnan et al., 2012). Environmental factors can also
contribute to epigenetic gene expression for example there is suggestion of interaction
between APOEε4 variant and cholesterol in Chandra and Pandav (1998). Epigenetics
could therefore play a role in altering the risk associated with genetic risk. However,
we do not include this in our modelling as the data required to fit relevant parameters
is unavailable.
Since we are concerned with post-retirement care, we are only interested in late-
onset AD. Therefore, when we refer to AD, this is specifically the late-onset variety.
Non-Alzheimer’s Dementia
The various diseases that cause dementia, other than AD, include but are not limited
to
• Vascular dementia (also known as multi-infarct dementia) — usually caused by
small strokes and is the second most common cause of dementia (Battistin and
Cagnin, 2010);
• Dementia with Lewy bodies — Lewy bodies are aggregates of protein in nerve
cells;
• Parkinson’s disease — usually presents with motor symptoms, caused by degen-
eration of the central nervous system, before dementia develops later;
• Huntington’s disease — a genetic disorder, however symptoms usually show
much earlier than the post-retirement ages we are concerned with so this would
not add to the adverse selection costs in the type of insurance product we are
concerned with.
3.1.3 Previous Models of Long-Term Care
Here we review the methodology and the aims of some of the models of long-term
care in the U.K. The major difference between the methodologies is with regards to
the use of either transition intensities or prevalence rates.
The first studies we consider used a transition intensity based approach. Transition
intensities are a more fundamental quantity than prevalence rates — with transition
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intensities into and out of a state, one can calculate prevalence at any given time.
The benefit of using transition intensities is that they allow greater flexibility in the
modelling — the prevalence of diseases can change overtime and using transition
intensities enables this to happen. However they are more difficult to come by —
whereas prevalence requires only a snapshot of a population at one point, to estimate
transition intensities, we need to understand how the population changes over time.
Ideally, such an exercise would involve revisiting the population at a later time to find
the details of any changes in health, increasing the cost and duration of analysis.
Macdonald and Pritchard (2000) set out a Markov model for the onset of AD
dependent on the APOE variants carried by the life. They had a state for where the
AD had progressed to the stage of requiring care in an institution (residential care
home), but data available to them was limited for their transition intensities post AD
diagnosis. They use this model in Macdonald and Pritchard (2001) in the context
of an established market for LTC to calculate potential adverse selection costs from
high-risk genotypes buying at an increased rate. As a proxy for the onset of a claim,
they consider the trigger for a claim to be the transition into an institution. They
calculated single premiums for each genotype using Norberg (1995)’s equations and
averaged these across genotype with weights equal to the proportion of lives assumed
to buy insurance. Adverse selection cost was calculated as the percentage increase in
premiums after increasing the proportion of lives of high-risk genotypes among those
who buy the contract.
Pritchard (2006) fitted a Markov model for disability with 5 levels of functional
disability to the results of the National Long Term Care Study in the U.S (Manton,
1988). His aim was to estimate the costs of disability claims in a LTC contract. He
calculated the expected present value of the benefits attributable to occupancy of
each state and found that where studies exclude recovery, they could substantially
overstate the cost of benefits.
Akodu (2007)’s Markov model of functional ability and cognitive function was
based on the Cognitive Function and Ageing Studies I (CFAS) data. CFAS collected
their data by conducting interviews with over 13,000 participants in a longitudinal
study MRC CFAS (1998). Akodu (2007) did not consider dementia types separately,
but instead classed any life with MMSE score below a certain point as cognitively
impaired. To perform a sensitivity analysis on how dementia was defined, models
were fitted for MMSE scores below 10, 18, 20 and 21 which were chosen to conform to
classifications given by McNamee (2004), Neale et al. (2001) and Spiers et al. (2005)
respectively. It was not an insurance model therefore its aim was not to measure
adverse selection; instead it was estimating the future demand for long-term care in
the U.K. based on projected population sizes of different states.
We now move onto studies which used a prevalence data based approach. A
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drawback of using such data is that it requires an assumption of static prevalence,
whereas in reality the pattern may change over time.
Similarly, the Personal Social Service Research Unit (PSSRU) of the London
School of Economics and the University of Kent, have performed various modelling
exercises with regards to long-term care demand and expenditure using updated ver-
sions of Wittenberg et al. (1998)’s spreadsheet based model e.g. Hancock et al. (2007);
Wittenberg et al. (2006). They split the population by risk-factors: age, gender, de-
pendency, household type, housing tenure (as a proxy for economic circumstances)
and whether in receipt of informal care. The number of males and females in each age
band were projected forward using the U.K.’s Office for National Statistics’ and Gov-
ernment Actuary’s Department’s projections. These were further split into cells for
the remaining factors and a probability of receiving formal care attached by fitting
functions to the General Household Survey results. A development to Wittenberg
et al. (1998) of note was by Comas-Herrera et al. (2003). This was by amending
the probability of receiving formal care to include services for cognitive impairment
specifically.
Nuttall et al. (1994) used Office of Population Censuses and Surveys prevalence
data to fit a discrete-time multiple state model of disability in the U.K.. The aim was
to project future demand and costs of care and assess the implications on different
sectors’ ability to finance LTC. They used 3 states to represent the health of lives,
with separate models for different levels of disability. To fit their transition intensities
they assumed prevalence of disability was unchanging, although as they point out,
their calculated intensities contradict this assumption.
Rickayzen and Walsh (2002) extended Nuttall et al. (1994)’s model to allow tran-
sition between ADL states, including recovery. Annual probabilities of transition
between states and trends for how these might change over time, were derived from
the General Household Survey, Government Actuary’s Department projections and
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys data. They used this to project the number
of disabled people with no regard to care costs.
We would like to develop a multiple state model, based on elements of Macdonald
and Pritchard (2001)’s and Akodu (2007)’s models, which uses transition intensities
and includes both cognitive and functional disabilities.
3.2 Model of Old Age
In this section we set out our model of old age which will form the basis of our LTC
models in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. We start with a continuous-time Markov model of old
age as illustrated in Figure 3.1 and parameterise the transition intensities between
states.
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Figure 3.1: A Markov model of functional ability and cognitive function. The arrows
to the Dead state are omitted but may be entered from any state.
The Markov framework is an essential assumption for our modelling methodology
and is very common in actuarial modelling of life histories. Intuitively, the transitions
might be expected to contradict such an assumption. However, there is a difficulty
in fitting anything more complex as the data required, such as duration of state
occupancy and the path taken to the current state, are often unavailable. Macdonald
and Pritchard (2000) discusses the Markov nature of the mortality of individuals
with AD. They justify the Markov property by citing studies which have found no
association between duration of AD and increased mortality (Barclay et al., 1985;
Bracco et al., 1994; Burns et al., 1991; Diesfeldt et al., 1986; Heyman et al., 1996;
Sayetta, 1986; Walsh et al., 1990).
In the absence of data to provide a more suitable model, and for mathematical
convenience, we assume all state transitions depend only on the current state, i.e. are
Markov.
For each state ik, we call i its cognitive ability type (the progress of dementia) and
k its functional ability type (the number of IADL or ADLs). Changes in cognitive
ability type are assumed to be independent of functional ability type. Similarly,
changes in functional ability type are assumed to be independent of cognitive ability
type. To express this mathematically, we have µik,ilx+t = µ
jk,jl
x+t and µ
ik,jk
x+t = µ
il,jl
x+t.
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McGuire et al. (2006) suggest the latter of these assumptions is not valid. In an
American population, they found those with the lowest level of cognition (as diag-
nosed by telephone interview) had greater odds of ADL disability. Iwasa et al. (2008)
conducted an analysis of how specific areas of cognitive function related to functional
decline among a Japanese community. Their results showed a link between ADLs and
either a decline in information processing speed or orientation to time and place. How-
ever due to different methods in diagnosis of cognitive function and functional ability
among studies, reliable data for the purposes of fitting into our model is scarce. We
therefore continue with this assumption in place and now parameterise the transitions
between states.
Inclusion of recoveries adds complexity of the model. However as mentioned above,
Pritchard (2006) found that excluding recoveries results in overstating the cost of ben-
efits. For this reason, in our model it is possible to recover from functional disabilities.
3.2.1 Notation
We introduce the notation which will be used in this section:
1. As introduced above (and included here for ease of reference), µik,jlx+t is the tran-
sition intensity from state ik to state jl at age x+ t.
2. In the case dementia, where genotype specific intensities are necessary, denote
the transition intensity from state, ik, to state, jl, at age, x + t, for a life with
genotype, g, by µik,jlx+t,g.
3. The relative risk of AD cause by APOE genotype, g, at age, x, is denoted by,
%x,g.
4. Let µˆix+t be the ungraduated force of mortality at age x + t from state 0i esti-
mated by Akodu (2007).
5. The graduated relative risk of mortality caused by functional disability type i,
relative to lives with no ADLs, is denoted by ρi; while ungraduated for lives
aged x, is denoted by ρˆx,i.
6. In common with standard actuarial notation, qx+t and px+t are the one year
probabilities of death and survival respectively, for a life aged x + t. After
applying mortality improvements, these become qxt and p
′
x,t respectively.
7. The factor by which to reduce the 1-year probability of death, t years after the
date of the underlying mortality table for a life who was aged x at t = 0 is
denoted by RFx+t,t,y. The The associated reduction factor applicable to µ
00,4
x+t ,
is denoted by υx,t.
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8. The set of all states in our final Markov model of health is denoted by S.
3.2.2 Functional Ability
We first consider the transition between functional ability types. Transitions between
functional ability types are reversible, e.g. it is possible that a person could go from
Healthy to > 1 ADL and subsequently ‘recover’ to having 1 ADL. Transition intensi-
ties are therefore required in both directions connecting each functional ability type,
for a given cognitive function type.
Functional ability transition intensities are taken to be those derived by Akodu
(2007), who fitted functions to using the penalised least squares method of Pritchard
(2006). This is the only study that calculates age dependent incidence of functional
ability for a U.K. population. It is based on a large body of data (13,004 lives in the
first phase of a two phase, longitudinal study) and is fitted with a Markov model,
consistent with our assumptions.
A limited number of other studies report the incidence of functional disability but
these are usually concerned with predictive factors for its onset and do not include
recovery, e.g. Alexandre et al. (2012) found age dependent incidence by particular
ADLs for a Brazilian population; and Tas¸ et al. (2007) performed a prospective lon-
gitudinal study from the Rotterdam Study (Hofman et al., 1991). Pritchard (2002)
included transitions between various levels of functional disability (defined by number
of ADLs) using the US National Long-Term Care Surveys.
Akodu (2007)’s intensities were fitted using the penalised maximum likelihood
method of Pritchard (2006) and graduated to the following functions depending on
which best fit the shape:
• Makeham: µik,ilx+t = αkl + β exp (γkl (x− 68.5 + t));
• Weibull: µik,ilx+t = γijβkl
(
x+t
βij
)γkl−1
; and
• Linear: µik,ilx+t = αkl + βij (x+ t).
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list where each applies and their corresponding parameters.
3.2.3 Mortality Without Dementia
We next parameterise the mortality for lives who have not developed dementia (i.e
from state 0j). We observe in Akodu (2007) that, apart from lives with 1 ADL, the
mortality rates experienced by lives in functionally disabled states are significantly
higher than the point estimates for lives with no ADLs. Therefore we will need to
fit mortality dependent on functional ability. For simplicity we will use a relative
risk approach, where we have some base mortality rate applicable to lives who have
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Table 3.1: Parameters and functions for transition intensities between functional abil-
ity type states for males. Source: Akodu (2007).
From To Parameter Fitted
Status (k) Status (l) αkl βkl γkl Function
None IADL - 7.3× 101 3.89× 100 Weibull
1-ADL 1.72× 10−2 5.24× 10−3 1.63× 10−1 Makeham
≥ 2 ADLs −1.68× 10−2 2.99× 10−4 - Linear
IADL None 9.51× 10−1 −9.66× 10−3 - Linear
1-ADL 9.6× 10−2 1.01× 10−3 - Linear
≥ 2ADLs −1.13× 10−2 1.26× 10−2 1.21× 10−1 Makeham
1-ADL None 6.54× 10−1 −6.76× 10−3 - Linear
IADL 4.38× 10−2 1.60× 10−5 - Linear
≥ 2ADLs 2.81× 10−1 −1.44× 10−3 - Linear
≥ 2ADLs None −5.58× 10−2 8.65× 10−4 - Linear
IADL 5.74× 10−2 −3.89× 10−4 - Linear
1-ADL −7.12× 10−2 2.30× 10−3 - Linear
Table 3.2: Parameters and functions for transition intensities between functional abil-
ity type states for females. Source: Akodu (2007).
From To Parameter Fitted
Status (k) Status (l) αkl βkl γkl Function
None IADL −4.95× 10−1 8.35× 10−3 - Linear
1-ADL - 7.64× 101 5.22× 100 Weibull
≥ 2ADLs 1.54× 10−2 −1.70× 10−4 - Linear
IADL None 6.17× 10−1 −5.48× 10−3 - Linear
1-ADL −6.28× 10−1 1.09× 10−2 - Linear
≥ 2ADLs 8.53× 10−2 1.78× 10−3 - Linear
1 ADL None 4.89× 10−1 −5.18× 10−3 - Linear
IADL −1.22× 10−1 2.18× 10−3 - Linear
≥ 2ADLs - 6.36× 101 4.52× 100 Weibull
≥ 2ADLs None 2.88× 10−2 −3.19× 10−4 - Linear
IADL 2.83× 10−2 −2.96× 10−4 - Linear
1 ADL 5.25× 10−1 −4.87× 10−3 - Linear
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no functional disability and apply some factor to calculate mortality for lives with a
functional disability.
For a level of consistency with Macdonald and Pritchard (2001), we choose as our
base mortality rate for lives with no cognitive disability, the CMI (2009)’s AMC00
and AFC00 assured lives mortality rates for male and female lives respectively (the
previous study used CMI (1990)’s AM80 and AF80, previous versions of assured
mortality). They were calculated from the experience of subscribing U.K. insurance
companies over the period 1999–2002, and they apply to a life attaining age x on the
1st of July, 2000.
In this most recent series of mortality tables, there are mortality rates dependent
on smoker status. Although it is common practice for insurance companies to use
separate tables in their modelling, we use the combined tables. There is evidence
that smoking is a significant factor for increasing the risk of developing AD (Cataldo
et al., 2010). However, if we ignore fraudulent non-disclosure, information of smoker
status is not hidden from the insurer — insurers routinely ask on the application
form — so there is no information asymmetry and consequently no adverse selection.
We therefore feel the choice to use the combined tables is justified in keeping the
complexity of the model to a minimum.
Both sets of mortality data were graduated by the CMI using Gompertz-Makeham
formulae for ages x ≤ 100 and a blending formula to blend the rate from age x = 100,
µ100, to µ120 = 1 with specified curve parameter. For males they use
µ00,4x =

exp
[
−4.01872 + 5.8902x−70
50
− 1.1515 (x−70
50
)2]
+0.00044726 if 17 < x ≤ 100,
0.407367
(
(120−x)1.25
201.25
)
+
(
1− (120−x)1.25
201.25
)
if 100 < x ≤ 120,
and for females they use
µ00,4x =
0.00014423 + exp
(−4.389068 + 5.584346x−70
50
)
if 17 < x ≤ 100,
0.354144
(
(120−x)1.25
201.25
)
+
(
1− (120−x)1.25
201.25
)
if 100 < x ≤ 120.
Now we calculate the relative risks of death while functionally disabled using data
from Akodu (2007). Akodu (2007) performed analysis on the CFAS study which
sampled lives from sites around the U.K., over the period 1991–1994. We assume
these relative risks are applicable to our chosen mortality rates.
The ungraduated relative risk of mortality, relative to lives with no ADLs, ρˆx,i, is
calculated as
ρˆx,i =
µˆix
µˆ0x
. (3.1)
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Figure 3.2: Forces of mortality in a relative risk model. The force of mortality for lives
with no disability, point estimates and confidence intervals are from Akodu (2007).
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Table 3.3: Relative risk of mortality according to functional ability type, relative to
a life with no ADLs, for males and females.
Functional Male Female
Ability
IADL 5.179 2.770
1-ADL 2.844 1.456
≥ 2ADLs 6.737 8.746
For simplicity, we fit a constant relative risk of mortality for functional disability type
i, as the weighted average over all ages, where the weight for age x is 1/V ar(µˆix).
These are shown in Table 3.3. The mortality rate for state ij is given by
µij,4x+t = ρiµ
0j,4
x+t. (3.2)
To check consistency with the CFAS data, we apply these relative risks, relative to
Akodu (2007)’s fitted force of mortality for lives with no ADLs, in Figure 3.2. For each
level of functional disability, the force of mortality is within 95% confidence intervals
at every age, hence there would be no evidence against our constant relative risks.
3.2.4 Mortality Improvements
Recent years have shown substantial improvements in mortality (Office for National
Statistics, 2012b). Willets et al. (2004) suggests that over the past century, the biggest
driver of these improvements was the development of vaccines and antibiotics to treat
infectious disease. They also outline the areas causing mortality change at the start
of this century:
• The ‘cohort effect’ — the phenomenon whereby mortality improvement differs
by year of birth. In particular those born in the U.K. during the period 1925–
1945 have experienced the most rapid improvements in mortality compared to
other generations.
• The ‘ageing of mortality improvement’ — over time, the ages which display the
highest rates of mortality improvement are increasing.
• Increased uncertainty at younger ages.
• Changes in prevalence of cigarette smoking.
• Widening social class differentials — mortality has improved more quickly for
those in higher socio-economic classes.
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Without projecting changes in mortality in a pricing basis, insurance contracts
that extend over a long period could experience have significantly lighter mortality
than what was assumed. For products which provide benefits contingent on survival,
this could mean longer lasting periods of benefit payments than had been priced for,
potentially causing a loss. LTC is one such product — benefits are paid while the
insured is alive in a disabled state. We therefore include allowance for mortality im-
provement in our modelling, but we assume no changes to the relative risks associated
with functional disability calculated above.
To project the mortality improvements, we use CMI (2011)’s mortality projections
model, which combines cohort effects and age effects of mortality improvement. This
model uses a large number of age and birth year dependent assumptions, which are
listed in Appendix C.
Each component is projected independently from the year 2008. The method uses
a cubic formula to blend the most recently observed improvement rate (which we will
refer to as the initial rate) to some long-term average, over an assumed period of
years. The cohort component is assumed to tend to zero in the long-term. For the
age-effect, we choose a long-term average of 1% at all ages, for males and females;
this is consistent with the Government Actuary’s Department’s principle projection1.
The rate of convergence is controlled by a parameter, which we denote by β, for the
level of convergence achieved at the midpoint of the blending period. Let w (β, t, T ),
be the weighting of the most recently observed improvement rate for the projected
mortality improvement at time t, during a convergence period lasting T years. This
is calculated as,
w (β, t, T ) = a
(
t
T
)3
+ b
(
t
T
)2
+
t
T
+ 1, (3.3)
where a = −2 + 8β, b = 5.16β and c = −4 + 8β.
Let ζAgex,t be the age-effects component of the mortality improvement rate for a
life aged x, at time, t. ζAgex,0 and ζ
Age
x,TAgex
therefore represent the age effect initial and
long-term rates respectively. ζAgex,t is calculated as,
ζAgex,t = w
(
β, t, TAgex
)
ζAgex,0 +
(
1− w (β, t, TAgex )) ζAgex,TAgex , (3.4)
where TAgex is the period of convergence for the age-effects component at age x. The
cohort effect component is calculated similarly.
The projected mortality improvement rate for a life aged x in the year 2008 + t, is
denoted by ζx,t and calculated by combining the age-effect and cohort components:
ζx,t = ζ
Age
x,t + ζ
Cohort
2008+t−x,t. (3.5)
1http://www.gad.gov.uk/Demography\%20Data/Life\%20Tables/Varmortass.html, retrieved
31/07/2013.
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For non-positive values of t, i.e. for year 2008 and earlier, we use the experienced
mortality improvement rates, which are listed in Appendix C.
The method used by Continuous Mortality Investigation (2011) to apply these
improvement rates to a mortality table, is to first calculate a set of base reduction
factors, using all of the available observed data, i.e. from 1st January, 1990. From
this base reduction factor, they rebase it to the date of the mortality table being used.
The base reduction factors, RF ∗x,t are calculated at integer age x, and time since the
date of our mortality table, t, as,
RF ∗x,t =
RF ∗x,t−1
(
1− ζx,1990−2008+t−1
)
if t ∈ Z+
1 if t = 0.
(3.6)
From these base reduction factors, the reduction factors for a mortality table appli-
cable y years after 1st January, 1990, RFx,t,y are calculated as,
RFx,t,y =
RF ∗x,t+byc
1−(y−byc)RF ∗x,t+byc+1
y−byc
RF ∗x,byc
1−(y−byc)RF ∗x,byc+1
y−byc . (3.7)
where x and t are integers. For non-integer x and t, we calculate RFx,t,y using geo-
metric interpolation: first on age, and secondly on time, as
RFx,t,y =
(
RFbxc,btc,y1−(x−bxc)RFbxc+1,btc,yx−bxc
)1−(t−btc)
×
(
RF1+bxc,1+btc,y1−(x−bxc)RF2+bxc,1+btc,yx−bxc
)(t−btc)
. (3.8)
This produces factors to reduce qx, the 1-year probability of death, at integer ages
and times: q′x,t = RFx+t,t,y qx+t and p
′
x,t = 1 − q′x,t. However, we use the force of
mortality, µ00,4x+t so we need to calculate a consistent factor to improve the force of
mortality.
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Now, RFx,0,y = 1, i.e. qx = q
′
x,0, therefore
∫ 1
0
µ00,4x+t dt =
∫ 1
0
υx,t µ
00,4
x+t dt so υx,t = 1
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. For t ≥ 1 we have
hp
′
x,t
hp′x,t−1
=
p′x,t+h−1
p′x,t−1
hp
′
x,t =
p′x,t+h−1 hp
′
x,t−1
p′x,t−1
=
1+hp
′
x,t−1
p′x,t−1
exp
(
−
∫ h
0
υx,t+s µ
00,4
x+t+s ds
)
=
p′x+t+h−1 exp
(
− ∫ h
0
υx,t−1+s µ
00,4
x+t−1+s ds
)
p′x,t−1
−
∫ h
0
υx,t+s µ
00,4
x+t+s ds = log
[
p′x,t+h−1
p′x,t−1
exp
(
−
∫ h
0
υx,t−1+s µ
00,4
x+t−1+s ds
)]
υx,t+h µ
00,4
x+t+h = −
d
dh
p′x,t+h−1
p′x,t+h−1
+ υx,t−1+h µ
00,4
x+t−1+h
υx,t+h =
−
d
dh
p′x,t+h−1
p′x,t+h−1
+ υx,t−1+h µ
00,4
x+t−1+h
µ00,4x+t+h
. (3.9)
For t ≥ 1, to solve Equation (3.9), we approximate the derivative d
dh
p′x,t+h−1 numeri-
cally with a central difference method,
d
dh
p′x,t+h−1 ≈
p′x,t+2h−1 − p′x,t−1
2h
. (3.10)
The mortality intensities from the healthy state are for lives attaining age x on 1st
of July, 2000, while our modelling date is some 12.5 years later, on the 1st of January,
2013. The results of this mortality improvement applied to lives in Healthy are shown
in Figure 3.3. The force of mortality used by Macdonald and Pritchard (2001) is
higher than what we use, particularly for males; while at the oldest ages theirs is lower,
particularly for females. This is driven by the pattern of mortality improvements: as
we have discussed, there are birth year and age effects on mortality improvement,
whereas Macdonald and Pritchard (2001) assumed an average improvement factor
applicable to all lives.
A noticeable feature of the improved mortality intensities is that they are not
continuous functions. The reason is the recursive nature of calculating υx,t. We could
write Equation (3.9) as a system of 2h non-homogeneous recurrence relations, denoted
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Figure 3.3: Force of mortality from the ‘Healthy’ state with and without mortality
improvements. Improved mortality shown from 2013 with points representing the
start and end points of a 30 year period for lives aged 62.5, 67.5, . . . , 87.5 in 2013.
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by fx,s,n, with 0 < s ≤ 1 and s+ n = t > 1, in the form:
υx,t = fx,s,n = g(x, s+ n) + fx,s,n−1 µ(x+ s+ n), (3.11)
where g(x, s+n) = − d
ds
p′x,s+n−1/(p
′
x,s+n−1µ
00,4
x+s+n), and µ(x+s+n) = µ
00,4
x+s+n−1/µ
00,4
x+s+n
and fx,s,0 = 1. To be continuous at t = 1 we need lim
t→1+
υx,t = 1, but at age x = 62.5
for instance, we have
lim
t→1+
υ62.5,t =
− d
ds
p′62.5,s−1|s=1
p′62.5,0
+ µ00,462.5
µ00,463.5
≈ 0.8607. (3.12)
Hence, υ62.5,t is discontinuous at t = 1, and due to the recurrence relationship, is
then discontinuous at each integer value of t. Since the functions, g(x, s + n) and
µ(x+ s+ n) are continuous at non-integer values of t = s+ n, we have the piece-wise
continuity observed.
3.2.5 Genetics of Alzheimer’s Disease
In this section we describe the impact of the APOE gene in AD onset and parameterise
a genetic component of the disease into our model.
The major genetic risk factor for AD is the APOE gene (Coon et al., 2007), which
codes for a protein that transports lipids around the circulatory system. There are at
least three allele variants, the most common of which are named ε2, ε3 and ε4. This
leads to possible 6 genotypes: ε2ε2, ε2ε3, ε2ε4, ε3ε3, ε3ε4 and ε4ε4. Relative to ε3,
ε4 makes a life more susceptible to developing AD, while ε2 reduces susceptibility.
However, the processes that cause these differences in susceptibility are yet to be
established (Huang and Mucke, 2012).
It is possible to test which variants are present in a life’s genome, indeed this
is among the genes tested by companies offering genetic tests to individuals such as
23andMe2. However it is unlikely to be used predictively by doctors in relation to AD
since there is currently no preventative treatment available and the tests results might
create undue stress to the life. Low et al. (2010) found there was insufficient evidence
to recommend testing to aid in prescribing risk reduction methods for dementia, while
Farrer et al. (1995) recommends against its use for the reason that APOE alone is
insufficient in accurately predicting age of onset.
APOE was considered to be a susceptibility gene for coronary heart disease (CHD)
(Song et al., 2004). However, there is debate as to the validity of the link. In a
large study which controlled for the a variety of known cardiovascular risk factors,
Ward et al. (2009) found no association between APOE and CHD. A recent study
2https://www.23andme.com/health/all/
86
Chapter 3: Modelling Long-Term Care
by Kofler et al. (2012) analysed the interaction of APOE with body mass index,
age and sex and concluded that the risk of developing CHD due to APOE genotype
was ‘unlikely to be homogeneous’. Nonetheless, while the link and risk factors of
particular genotypes for CHD are still being studied, it remains plausible that testing
for APOE genotype might one day be useful in devising treatment for diseases other
than AD. This broadens the possibility that individuals could learn of their genetic
susceptibility to AD even if that was not the intention. We therefore incorporate
APOE genotypes into our model of health which will allow us to use this as a source
of adverse selection.
In actuarial studies, age dependent relative risks are ideal for fitting genotype
specific transition rates, however this is rarely available from epidemiological studies.
Macdonald and Pritchard (2000) used results from Farrer et al. (1997) to fit age
dependent relative risks. As they noted however, the data for males was sparse,
particularly for older ages. Consequently, the pattern seen at older ages — where
ε2ε4 and ε3ε4 have lower risk relative to ε3ε3 in males — was considered possibly
due to the lack of data since females showed higher risk in all ε4 variants. It is
possible that the biological effect of the ε4 allele on the oldest males is to reduce
relative risk, however Macdonald and Pritchard (2001) made an adjustment to their
previous genetic model, such that ε2ε4, ε3ε4 and ε4ε4 are restricted to be at least
the relative risk of ε3ε3 in males.
Denote the set of APOE genotypes by G. Due to the rarity of ε2ε2 and consistent
with Macdonald and Pritchard (2000) and Macdonald and Pritchard (2001), we group
these together with ε2ε3 and consider them indistinguishable. Therefore we have
G = {ε2ε2, ε2ε4, ε3ε3, ε3ε4, ε4ε4}.
We use the fitted relative risks of Macdonald and Pritchard (2001) because these
are still the most useful available. For a life aged x + t with APOE genotype g ∈ G,
these are of the form,
%x+t,g =
rm [(max (f
g
x+t, 1)− 1)m+ 1] if male and g ∈ {ε2ε4, ε3ε4}
rm [(f
g
x+t − 1)m+ 1] otherwise,
(3.13)
where m, is a parameter to reduce the relative risks, allowing for ascertainment bias
and
f gx+t = E exp
[−F (x+ t− k1)2 −G (x+ t− k2)]+H. (3.14)
The fitted parameters are in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Parameters for use with the GM(1, 3) function in Equation 3.14 for the
transition intensities of AD for males and females by genotype. Source: Macdonald
and Pritchard (2001)
Gender Genotype E F G H k1 k2 r1
Female ε4ε4 10.400 0.00504 0 1 60 0 0.88
ε3ε4 3.680 0.00319 0 1 62 0
ε2ε4 4.210 0.01020 0 1 68 0
ε2ε2 0.675 0 0.00692 0 0 60
Male ε4ε4 8.940 0.00656 0 1 60 0 1.12
ε3ε4 1.920 0.00103 0 0 51 0
ε2ε4 1.420 0.00506 0 0 67 0
ε2ε2 0.434 0 0.01600 0 0 60
3.2.6 Onset of Dementias
In this section we will fit transition intensities for non-AD and AD respectively, in
order to apply gene specific relative risks only to AD onset. Our model does not have
separate states for the different types of dementia, so we calculate dementia onset as
the total of these two components.
Launer et al. (1999) pooled 4 population-based prospective studies of onset rates
and risk factors for dementia as a whole and AD in particular by Letenneur et al.
(1994); Copeland et al. (1999); Andersen et al. (1999); Ott et al. (1995). These were
all part of the European Studies of Dementia (EURODEM) Launer (1992). Being part
of the EURODEM network, each of these studies were performed with harmonised
protocols: Participants were either randomly selected or were all of the elderly in
a geographic area. After initial screening where anyone found to have dementia was
excluded, follow-up screening was after approximately 2 years. Each study used Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association (1987) criteria to diagnose mild to severe dementia. In
particular, all patients were given MMSE, the organic section of the Geriatric Mental
State Examination and the Cambridge Examination of Mental Disorders Cognitive
Test. Where the scores of these tests were below a cutoff point, more detailed diag-
nostic testing took place. This standardisation of methodology allows the pooling of
the results.
We choose Launer et al. (1999) because they reported exposures and number of
diagnoses for AD and dementia in 5-year age groups which are shown in Table 3.5,
allowing maximum likelihood estimation of model parameters. Moreover, the largest
contribution to EURODEM, by size of cohort, came from the U.K. study, Copeland
et al. (1999).
For their onset of AD, Macdonald and Pritchard (2001) fitted a Gompertz curve
using a log-linear least squares method to the point estimates of AD incidence by
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Table 3.5: Results from a pooled analysis of studies in the EURODEM network.
Source: Launer et al. (1999).
Non-AD AD
Age Exposure No. of Diagnoses Exposure No. of Diagnoses
eNADx d
NAD
x e
AD
x d
AD
x
65–69 6352 6 6340 7
70–74 7778 17 7755 21
75–79 6529 43 6462 63
80–84 4538 38 4489 97
85–89 2390 39 2341 89
≥ 90 1181 33 1144 75
Jorm and Jolley (1998). Jorm and Jolley (1998) collected the results of 23 studies, 13
of them European. Of these European studies, only 5 included the mild classification
of AD used by Macdonald and Pritchard (2001). Exposure values were not included
so maximum likelihood estimates were not available.
The genetic relative risks for AD in Section 3.2.5 are sex specific and applied to
the aggregate onset rate so we fit the aggregate onset rate here. However, we note
that although results separated by gender were not published, sex was found to be a
significant risk factor for AD by Launer et al. (1999), with female rates 54% higher
than male rates, but no significant difference was observed for non-AD dementia.
Denote the population average onset rate of AD at age x by µADx and the onset
rate of non-AD dementia by µNADx . Due to the small size of the data set, we seek
the simplest relationship between non-AD dementia and AD dementia transition in-
tensities such that µNADx /µ
AD
x = κ for some constant κ. We first check heuristically
whether this is a viable option by considering the confidence intervals of these ratios.
For each age x, we use Graham et al. (2003)’s method of constructing lower and upper
confidence limits of the ratio of Poisson rates, denoted φL(x) and φU(x) respectively:
φL(x) =
eADx
eNADx
[
2dADx d
NAD
x + z
2
αdx −
√
z2αdx (4d
AD
x d
NAD
x + z
2
αdx)
2dADx
2
]
(3.15)
φU(x) =
eADx
eNADx
[
2dADx d
NAD
x + z
2
αdx +
√
z2αdx (4d
AD
x d
NAD
x + z
2
αdx)
2dADx
2
]
, (3.16)
where zα is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal
distribution evaluated at α. The results of this are shown in Table 3.6 for α = 0.025
i.e. a 95% confidence interval.
For values of κ such that sup {φL(x); 65 < x} ≤ κ ≤ inf {φU(x); 65 < x}, the ratio
µNADx /µ
AD
x = κ will be within the 95% confidence intervals at every age x. Hence
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Table 3.6: Confidence limits for the ratio of µNAD/µAD.
Age φL φU
65–69 0.302 2.427
70–74 0.430 1.514
75–79 0.460 0.993
80–84 0.267 0.563
85–89 0.295 0.624
≥ 90 0.284 0.640
there will be insufficient evidence to reject a constant ratio of the transition intensities
of AD and non-AD dementias for such values of κ.
Using the method of maximum likelihood, we fit the the Gompertz-Makeham
(GM) family of models to µADx and µ
NAD
x . If function f(x) is GM(r, s), then
f(x) =
r∑
i=0
ai x
i−1 + exp
(
s∑
i=0
bi x
i−1
)
, (3.17)
for some values ai, bj, i ≤ r, j ≤ s and a0 = b0 = 0.
With µNADx = κµ
AD
x , the likelihood function to be maximised is
L ∝
(
eNADx κµ
AD
x
)dNADx
dNADx !
(
eADx µ
AD
x
)dADx
dADx !
exp
(−eNADx κµADx − eADx µADx ) . (3.18)
The results of this maximisation are shown in Table 3.7 along with the log of the
likelihood attained and the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Many of the fitted models are nested — models are said to be nested when one can
be considered to be a more generalised form of another e.g. GM(0,2) and GM(0,3)
are nested. We fit each model independently, so our nesting requires additional pa-
rameters over those implied by Equation (3.17) to allow for difference in param-
eter values. Taking our example, we write a GM(0,2) as a GM(0,3) in the form
µNADx = (κ+κ
′) exp[b1 +b′1 +(b2 +b
′
2)x+b
′
3x
2], where κ, b1 and b2 are the fitted values
when maximising the likelihood for GM(0,2).
We perform likelihood ratio tests on nested models to test whether the addition
of extra parameters in the alternative model provides a significantly better fit to the
data. In the likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis is that the additional param-
eters required to express as the generalised form are equal to zero. Under the null
hypothesis, the test statistic D = 2 (la − l0), where la and l0 are the log likelihoods
under the alternative and null models respectively, is approximately distributed with
a χ2-distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters set equal
to zero (Mendenhall, 1986). In our example, we have GM(0,2) as the null model and
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GM(0,3) as the alternative and the null hypothesis is that κ′ = b′1 = b
′
2 = b
′
3 = 0,
hence four degrees of freedom. The results of this testing are shown in Table 3.8.
We find that GM(0,3) and GM(1,2) are candidates for the best model and we
choose the one with the smallest AIC which is the GM(0,3).
µNADx = 0.5µ
AD
x = 0.5 exp
(−40.9847 + 0.762795x− 0.00379x2) . (3.19)
The overall dementia intensity is therefore,
µ0i,1ix,g = (0.5 + %x,g) exp
(−40.9847 + 0.762795x− 0.00379x2) . (3.20)
The fitted transition intensities for AD and overall dementia (with AD relative
risk, %x,g = 1) are shown in Figure 3.4 with the confidence intervals around the point
estimates of Launer et al. (1999). The fitted models of Macdonald and Pritchard
(2001) and Akodu (2007) are also shown.
Comparing the AD model of Macdonald and Pritchard (2001) with the data of
Launer et al. (1999), we see that their model produces transition intensities slightly
(but significantly) larger. There is great variability in studies of AD, which Corrada
et al. (1995) found to be partially due to differences in methodology. It is possible
that differences in methodology exist in the various studies used in the meta-analysis
of Jorm and Jolley (1998) and those pooled by Launer et al. (1999), contributing to
the differences observed here.
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Figure 3.4: Onset of AD and overall dementia (different scales).
For overall dementia we compare to the models fitted by Akodu (2007) to the
British CFAS data. The confidence intervals of Launer et al. (1999) are generally
between the fitted models for MMSE scores of 18 and 20, perhaps following a pattern
for an MMSE score of 19.
As with the AD transition intensities, Jorm and Jolley (1998)’s dementia intensi-
ties are significantly greater than those we have used. However, they are very similar
to Akodu (2007)’s MMSE score of 21.
Unlike those being compared to, our model has decreasing transition intensities
among the oldest old (> 100 years old). There is very little data available for such
ages and since any LTC claim would be short (due to the very high mortality at such
ages) there would be little distortion of adverse selection costs, we proceed with the
transition intensities as they have been fitted.
3.2.7 Post-dementia Mortality
In this section we parameterise the force of mortality for lives with dementia, and lives
who have been put into a nursing care facility due to their dementia. We assume the
same relative risks due to functional ability as derived in Section 3.2.3 applies after
diagnosis of dementia and that the transition intensities fitted here apply to lives with
no ADLs.
Several studies have been performed to identify any difference in the survivorship of
Alzheimer’s type dementia and that of vascular dementia. Burns (1993) summarises
the findings of 12 of these studies. While 3 of them (including the largest study)
found vascular dementia to have poorer survivorship, the majority could not find any
significant difference in the prognosis between the two forms of dementia. There is
also a possibility of heterogeneity in the classification: since AD can only be confirmed
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through autopsy, there may have been cases of mis-diagnosis of dementia type. Since
vascular dementia is the most common of the non-AD dementias, we use this as
a proxy for all non-AD types and assume the mortality of lives with any form of
dementia as independent of the type of dementia.
Colgan (2006) found the forces of mortality for lives with AD and for those with
AD in an institution using data from the Consortium to Establish a Registry for
Alzheimer’s Disease (CERAD). CERAD was a case-control study of sufferers of AD
in the U.S., which aimed to observe the progression of the disease, including the
progression into a nursing home, through annual examinations. Confirmation of diag-
noses through autopsy was performed where possible. The analysis covers the period
1986–1995, so we assume the rates are effective for a life attaining age x on the 1st of
January, 1990.
Macdonald and Pritchard (2000) fitted mortality rates to a very small data set
which limited the number of parameters they could fit and chose simple adjustments
to their healthy mortality. We use Colgan (2006)’s work since it uses a larger data
set and is based on the raw data rather than summary statistics (which Macdonald
and Pritchard (2000) used).
The force of mortality after diagnosis but before institutionalisation for males was
found to be significantly different to females, so sex specific rates were calculated. For
males this was,
µ10,4x = exp (−8.17 + 0.071x) , (3.21)
and for females it was,
µ10,4x = 0.029 + exp (−22.014 + 0.221x) . (3.22)
The force of mortality after institutionalisation for males was also found to be
significantly different to females, so sex specific rates were calculated. For males it
was,
µ20,4x = exp (−5.13 + 0.052x) , (3.23)
and for females it was,
µ20,4x = 0.105 + exp (−16.220 + 0.166x) . (3.24)
We apply the same mortality improvements model to each of these, as we used for
non-demented mortality (see Section 3.2.4). The results of this are shown in Figures
3.5 and 3.6. For comparison, also shown are the forces of mortality used by Macdonald
and Pritchard (2001).
As Colgan (2006) noted, Macdonald and Pritchard (2000)’s pre-institutionalisation
are much lower. The results which the latter used, suggested lighter mortality than
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Figure 3.5: Force of mortality from the ‘Dementia’ state with and without CMI
improvements. Improved mortality shown from 2013 with points representing the
start and end points of a 30 year period for lives aged 62.5, 67.5, . . . , 87.5 in 2013.
that of healthy lives, which they justified as being due to the informal care which
sufferers would be receiving while their symptoms progressed.
For the post-institutionalisation mortality, Colgan (2006) is initially lighter and
higher at older ages. Colgan (2006) suggested it was due to Macdonald and Pritchard
(2000)’s limitation of fitting as a simple function of their baseline mortality, thereby
being restricted in the shape.
3.2.8 Institutionalisation After Dementia
In this section we parameterise the progression after being diagnosed with dementia
to the state where they require care in an institution.
Ballard et al. (2001) found that the major causes of dementia (Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, Vascular dementia and Dementia with Lewy Bodies) had similar progression.
Moreover, although there have been some links between APOEε4 and the rate of de-
cline in AD, most studies have not found any association (Gauthier et al., 2006). We
therefore assume that the cognitive decline is independent of the dementia type, i.e.
an individual who is diagnosed with dementia will reach a stage where they require
nursing care at the same rate regardless of what caused the dementia to occur.
Colgan (2006) fitted a model for transition intensities into an institution after
diagnosis with AD to CERAD data. He found no significant difference between males
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Figure 3.6: Force of mortality from the ‘Institutionalised’ state with and without
CMI improvements. Improved mortality shown from 2013 with points representing
the start and end points of a 30 year period for lives aged 62.5, 67.5, . . . , 87.5 in 2013.
and females so fitted in aggregate. Under our assumption of equal progression, this
is assumed to apply to any dementia, hence,
µ10,20x = exp (−2.92 + 0.016x) . (3.25)
3.2.9 Undiagnosed Dementia
Since dementia is progressive, it may be noticeable to the life or their family mem-
bers before a clinical diagnosis. Without details of the disease in medical records, the
insurer’s ability to detect it in propositions is limited and thereby giving rise to infor-
mation asymmetry and possible adverse selection in LTC. Introducing to our model
(as shown in Figure 3.7), an intermediate stage of cognitive decline where the individ-
ual shows some of the signs, e.g. memory degrading at an increased rate, will allow
us to use a higher rate of insurance purchase from those lives who have noticed this
greater need for long term care and assess the cost of this source of adverse selection.
We now need to parameterise the transition intensities between the stages of cog-
nitive function. Choosing the Initial Signs state such that the rate of entry to the
state is equal to the rate of exit simplifies the parameterisation to calculating one
transition intensity. This is purely a modelling assumption as a means of introducing
the possibility of such a state into the model. In reality the rates in and out of this
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state could differ — particularly since having suspicions might be expected to cause
the life to go to the doctor for diagnosis. Moreover, our Markov assumption may be
expected to break down.
By further assuming that mortality is unaffected at this early stage of dementia,
all transition intensities are independent of whether the life is healthy or has the initial
signs of dementia. This allows us to reduce the parameterisation to models with only
the cognitive function transitions without any further loss of generality:
• Model A — consider a 2-state model used to represent a life by whether they
have been medically diagnosed. This is shown in Figure 3.8.
• Model B — If we insert a state representing when the life has noticed the initial
signs of dementia but before being medically diagnosed, we will get the 3-state
model depicted in Figure 3.9.
Let αt be transition intensity between Healthy and Diagnosed. This can be ob-
served and estimated from prospective studies. However, our intermediate Initial
Signs (1) state is at some arbitrary stage between Diagnosis (2) and Healthy (0) and
as such, the transition intensities are unavailable. Let βt be this unknown transition
intensity between Healthy and Initial Signs, and between Initial Signs and Diag-
nosed. In terms of our models which include functional disability, µ0i,1ix,g = αt, and
µ0,4x,g = µ
4,8
x,g = µ
1,5
x,g = . . . µ
7,11
x,g = βt.
To ensure consistency between both models, we require the probabilities of being
diagnosed under models A and B to be equal. Denote by tA
ij
x , the probability of being
in state j at age x + t conditional on being in state i at age x under model A and
similarly for model B, tB
ij
x . If we assume no lives have developed the initial signs at
age x, our equivalence requirement can be represented by tA
02
x = tB
02
x or alternatively,
tA
00
x = tB
00
x + tB
01
x . (3.26)
Clearly tB
00
x = exp
(
− ∫ t
0
βx+s ds
)
and similarly tA
00
x = exp
(
− ∫ t
0
αx+s ds
)
. For
tB
01
x we have,
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tB
01
x =
∫ t
0
sB
00
x βx+s t−sB
11
x+s ds
=
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
βx+r dr −
∫ t
s
βx+r dr
)
βx+s ds
= exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βx+r dr
)∫ t
0
βx+s ds
= tB
00
x
∫ t
0
βx+s ds. (3.27)
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Figure 3.8: Model A: a 2-state model of the onset of dementia
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Figure 3.9: Model B: a 3-state model of the onset of dementia
Inserting Equation (3.27) into Equation (3.26) yields a differential equation for βt
in terms of αt:
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
αx+s ds
)
= exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βx+s ds
)(
1 +
∫ t
0
βx+s ds
)
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(αx+s − βx+s) ds
)
= 1 +
∫ t
0
βx+s ds
−
∫ t
0
(αx+s − βx+s) ds = log
(
1 +
∫ t
0
βx+s ds
)
βx+t − αx+t = d
dt
log
(
1 +
∫ t
0
βx+s ds
)
=
βx+t
1 +
∫ t
0
βx+s ds
αx+t = βx+t
(
1− 1
1 +
∫ t
0
βx+s ds
)
βx+t = αx+t
(
1 +
∫ t
0
βx+s ds∫ t
0
βx+s ds
)
. (3.28)
To avoid βx+t exploding to infinity at t = 0, for some small time step h, we assume
βx = βx+s, for s ∈ [0, h]. This assumption allows us to calculate βx as
βx = βx+h = αx+h
(
1 + βx+hh
βx+hh
)
=
αx+hh±
√
α2x+hh
2 + 4αx+hh
2h
. (3.29)
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3.3 Simulating Long-Term Care Insurance Payments
In this section we describe how simulation can be used to estimate the expected
present values of benefits and premiums in a long-term care insurance contract.
3.3.1 Notation
We first define the notation introduced in this section which will be used in later
sections.
1. The force of interest and force of inflation are assumed constant at rates δ per
annum and ν per annum respectively.
2. The set of periods which a policy may go through is denoted by P , and consists
of P — after inception but before any claim; C — after a claim on a functional
disability but before dementia; D — after the first claim involving dementia.
For a life aged x at the simulation start date, of sex ς, with genotype g and insured
at time t, from health state j:
3. The smoothed probability that this life is in period ρ at the start of calendar
year c is denoted by cp
j,ρ
x,ς,g,t.
4. Given this life is in period ρ, the smoothed average present value of future
benefits and premium income are denoted by Aj,ρx,ς,g,t:c and a
j,ρ
x,ς,g,t:c, respectively.
3.3.2 Reason for Simulation Approach
The model of health depicted in Figure 3.7 is Markov — transition intensities depend
on the state currently occupied, not the path to get there. However, LTC payments
could be capped by the insurer with a limit on annual payouts or some total sum
assured, or the government could limit the liability faced by the individual before
state support is paid (a policy currently under discussion in the U.K. which we discuss
further in Chapter 4). In cases such as these, the cashflow at any point in time depends
not only on the current health status, but on the entire history of health statuses.
This disjoint nature between the cashflows and current health status creates a
difficulty in calculating the expected present value of benefits for the purpose of setting
premiums. Consider a contract with all the limits as described above, bought by a
life aged x, when in state i:
• The insurer limits total of payments over the lifetime of the policy to sum
assured, s and the benefits payable within a calendar year to, a.
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• The government pays for care costs once the individual’s care liability (which
may be paid by the insurer) has surpassed, g.
• ‘Hotel’ costs (accommodation cost in a care home) are excluded from the gov-
ernment cap but covered by the insurer, up to its own benefit limits.
• The care and hotel costs for state j, amount to cj and hj, respectively.
• All costs and caps increase over time at the same constant force of inflation, de-
noted by ν. All benefit payments and caps are compared at the same purchasing
power.
Let tI
j
x be an indicator random variable such that,
tI
j
x =
1 if x, is in j at age x+ t0 otherwise. (3.30)
Let I (f) be another indicator function such that,
I (f) =
1 if f > 00 otherwise. (3.31)
We denote the random variable representing the care cost if x is in state j, at time t,
as a continuously payable annual rate, by tC
j
x and calculate it as,
tC
j
x = cje
νtI
(
g −
∑
l
∫ t
−x
rI
l
x rC
l
xe
−νr dr
)
. (3.32)
We further denote the random variable representing the insurance benefit payment if
x is in state j, at time t, as a continuously payable annual rate, by tB
j
x, and calculate
it as,
tB
j
x =
(
tC
j
x + hje
νt
)
I
(
s−∑
l
∫ t
0 r
I lx rB
l
xe
−νr dr
)
×I
(
a−∑
l
∫ t
btc rI
l
x rB
l
xe
−νr dr
)
. (3.33)
The expected present value of benefits paid to x can then be calculated as,
E (PV Benefits payable to x) = E
(∑
j
∫ ∞
0
rB
j
x rI
j
xe
−δr dr
)
. (3.34)
Equation (3.34) involves a complicated system of integration which is simplest to
solve approximately using simulation. We perform simulations of future lifetimes and
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the consequent LTC benefit cashflows that occur (by solving Equations 3.32 and 3.33).
Equation (3.34) can then be found by taking the average of the discounted values of
our simulated benefit cashflows. If we assume that no care liability has been faced
prior to purchasing insurance, we avoid the complication of setting premium rates for
a varying degree of potential benefit sizes (as limited by the government cap) and
simplify our pricing problem to simulating from the point of insurance purchase.
3.3.3 Simulation Method
To simulate life histories, represented by transitions between states in our health
model, we first find the time of a transition. By conditioning on the transition oc-
curring at this time, we then find the state the life moves to. Denote the random
variables representing the time of the ith transition by, Ti, and Si, as the state a life
is in after the ith transition. Further, denote the value taken by them as, ti and si,
respectively. We assume a life aged, x, at the start of the simulation is in state, s0,
at time, t0 = t. For a life in state, si−1, at time, ti−1, we simulate the next transition
time using the inverse transform method (Devroye, 1986) solving FTi(ti) = u where u
is an observation from the Uniform [0,1] distribution and
FTi(ti) = 1− exp
(
−
∫ ti
ti−1
∑
j∈S
µ
si−1,j
x+u du
)
, (3.35)
for ti. These integrals are solved using Simpson’s rule with a step size of 2
−11 and our
simulation period is 30 years to capture most of a life’s future lifetime.
Given a life makes the ith transition at time ti, the probability that the movement
was to state j is
P (Si = si|Ti = ti) = µ
si−1,si
x+ti∑
j∈S
µ
si−1,j
x+ti
. (3.36)
Define the conditional cumulative distribution function as
FSi|Ti=ti(si) = P (Si ≤ si|Ti = ti) =
si∑
j=0
µ
si−1,j
x+ti∑
j∈S
µ
si−1,j
x+ti
. (3.37)
We simulate the jump at time ti by applying the inverse transform method on
FSi|Ti=ti(si) = v, where v is an observation from the Uniform [0,1] distribution, solving
for si.
With knowledge of the future lifetime of our simulated life, we can calculate the
present value payments in respect of a long-term care insurance contract bought at
time t0. By averaging over a large number of simulations, we calculate an estimate of
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Equation (3.34). To allow a product design with regular premiums, we also estimate
the expected present value of an annuity in premium paying states, which we refer to
as the premium annuity. The premium annuity and benefit payments are increased
at the same force of inflation, ν per annum. As in our above example, all benefit
payments and caps are compared at the same purchasing power.
A deferred period can be set, such that benefits do not commence payment until the
life has been in benefit paying states for longer than the deferred period. Associated
with the deferred period, we can define a linked claim period, if a life recovers after
the benefit payment has commenced and subsequently enters a claim state within
the linked claim period, the benefit payment will recommence immediately instead
of having to wait until the end of the deferred period. This is a common feature of
products with deferred periods e.g. income protection insurance, to allow for relapses
in illness, however the Markov nature of our model would prevent any true relapse.
We assume that a life cannot buy insurance if it would put them into a claim
immediately. Additionally, since we are primarily concerned with the potential cost
of adverse selection, we do not model the purchase of insurance after dementia has
been diagnosed — this is observable to an insurer so we assume they can underwrite
them appropriately. We call the set of remaining states insurable.
Since we simulate from the point of insurance purchase, we require the EPVs from
each time step at which insurance can be purchased, which we refer to as purchase
time steps. Due to the computing time required, we restrict our purchase time steps
to the 30 year period in steps of 0.015625 years. Simulations are performed for 50,000
lives at each purchase time step, for males and females of each APOE genotype for
each insurable state. Thus we perform 50, 000 × 2 × 5 × 6 = 3, 000, 000 simulations
at each purchase time step.
3.3.4 Information Gained by the Insurer
Integral to adverse selection is the notion of asymmetric information — where the
policyholder knows more about their health than the insurer. Over time, the insurer
can learn about the mix of business it has on its books, based on its claims experience.
By better understanding the mix of lives to whom they have been selling, the insurer
will be better placed to estimate the mix of future business and the premiums to
charge. This will form the basis for the dynamic premium rates of Section 3.4.2.
From details of claims payouts, an insurer could observe 3 key events over the
lifetime of a policy, which will change their knowledge of the mix of business:
• Inception — At the point of inception, the insurer has no information on the
actual mix of business beyond what is implied in the pricing basis.
• A claim for functional disability (unrelated to dementia) — The insurer now
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knows what functional disability state the life is in; transition between states of
functional disability is determined only by current functional disability.
• Claim involving dementia — When the insurer knows the life has dementia (we
assume they also learn of functional disability at this point also), everything
relevant to its future transitions is now known and no more useful information
is gleaned from further claims.
These observations will tell them more about the mix of the policyholders than was
known at underwriting and allow them to more accurately value future cashflows in
the periods following them:
• P — After inception but before any claim.
• C — After the first functional disability claim but before a claim involving
dementia.
• D — After the first claim involving dementia.
The set of these periods can therefore be written as, P = {P,C,D}. We explain
further by use of an example: Assume some benefit is payable to an insured life while
in states {3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15}. Consider life x, who bought his insurance from
state 5 at time t0. The insurer cannot distinguish him from any other life in states
{0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6}.
1. x reaches state 7 at time t1, making a claim unrelated to dementia. The insurer
now knows he is in either state 3 or state 7 and can improve its modelling in
respect of this.
2. x recovers to state 6 at time t2.
3. x subsequently claims again in state 7 at time t3. In a large portfolio of business,
this does not tell the insurer anything new because x’s transitions between
functional disability are being modelled appropriately already based on being in
either state 3 or state 7 at time t1 and the Markov nature of the model (recall
that functional ability transitions are assumed to be independent of cognitive
function).
4. x develops dementia and claims from state 11 at time t4. The insurer knows x
is in state 11 and updates its model with this information.
5. x’s claim ceases upon movement to state 8 at time t5.
6. x dies at time t6.
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In this example, period P was from t0 until t1; period C was from t1 until t4; and
period D was from t4 until the policy ended at t6.
To model this information development, at the start of each calendar year of our
simulations, we calculate the probability that a life, who purchased insurance at time
t, is in each period. Additionally, we estimate the expected present value of all future
benefits and of future income (including those cashflows which will occur within a
subsequent period) for lives who are in each of our periods.
3.3.5 Smoothing
The simulated expected present values and probabilities within each calendar year
c are smoothed with respect to insurance purchase time t ≤ c + 1, by fitting cubic
splines using the ALGLIB package for C++ (Bochkanov and Bystritsky, 2013). This
removes the random noise and gives us a means of estimating the expected present
values, Aj,ρx,ς,g,t:c and a
j,ρ
x,ς,g,t:c, and the probability of being in period ρ, cp
j,ρ
x,ς,g,t, for any
insurance purchase date t ≤ c+ 1. Splines are fitted to these independently for every
combination of initial age, sex, genotype, policy period and the health state which
insurance was purchased from.
To explain further what smoothing is performed, in Table 3.9 we present the
simulated present values of benefits for males in period P , with genotype ε2ε2, who
were aged 62.5 at calendar year 0 and buy insurance at time t from state 0. In
each calendar year for which the life has not yet made any claim, all future premium
payments are discounted to the start of the year. Purchases at integer times are
considered to be in force in the year before to provide a knot for fitting the final
section of the year — in the table, when t = 1, there is a value for c = 0. Smoothing
is then performed on each column independently, with respect to t. The results of
smoothing calendar year 3 are shown in Figure 3.10.
3.4 Long-Term Care Insurance Market
In this section we set up a model for the market of LTC by adding states our health
model of Figure 3.7, to represent the presence of insurance. To allow us to set higher
(or lower) rates of insurance purchase from lives who have received a genetic test
(and hence allow this as a source of adverse selection), we also add states representing
whether a genetic test has been received. This market model is depicted in Figure
3.11.
We name each state by reference to its insured status, its test status, ι ∈ B, and
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Table 3.9: Simulated present values of future benefits for males in period P , with
genotype ε2ε2, aged 62.5 at calendar year 0, buying insurance from state 0.
Purchase Calendar year (c)
Time (t) 0 1 2
0.000000 6644.56 6608.76 6458.43
0.015625 6638.55 6579.41 6421.86
0.031250 6616.18 6575.82 6437.73
...
0.953125 6370.83 6431.86 6360.77
0.968750 6302.85 6364.04 6296.52
0.984375 6446.14 6507.69 6436.21
1.000000 6378.06 6441.84 6403.86
1.015625 - 6354.15 6300.15
1.031250 - 6468.30 6418.69
...
1.968750 - 6114.98 6174.80
1.984375 - 6224.97 6287.52
2.000000 - 6134.46 6195.80
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Figure 3.10: Simulated and smoothed present values of future benefits, as at the start
of calendar year 2, for males in period P , with genotype ε2ε2, who were aged 62.5 at
calendar year 0, buying insurance from state 0.
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its health status, i ∈ S, as ιϑi, where B = {0, 1},
ϑ =
0 if the life is untested1 if the life is tested, (3.38)
and similarly,
ι =
0 if the life is uninsured1 if the life is insured. (3.39)
3.4.1 Notation
We introduce notation for this section:
1. The set of states belonging to underwriting class k is denoted by Uk.
2. Let pix,ς,g be the probability at the start of modelling, that a life aged x is of sex
ς, has genotype g, and is in state i. This will be specific to the market to which
the model is being applied so we calculate it in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2), where
we apply our modelling to the U.K. market, but set out how it will be used in
formulae in this section.
3. The conditional probability that a life aged x+ t who purchased insurance into
class k, at time t, was of sex ς, with genotype g, and insured from health state
j, is denoted by η
j|k
ς,g|x,t.
Consider a life aged x at the start of our modelling (1st January, 2013), of sex ς, with
genotype g.
3. The probability this life is in state def at age x+ t, given they were in state abc
at age x, is denoted by tp
abc,def
x,ς,g .
4. µabc,defx,t,ς,g is the transition intensity between state abc and state def , for this life
at time t.
5. Let $kx,t and ω
k
x,t denote the regular (paid annually) and single (initial lump
sum) premium respectively, that would be charged to a life aged x + t at time
t, insured into underwriting class k, if there was no adverse selection. We will
refer to this as the base premium.
6. Let ψ
k
x,c and ψ
k
x,c denote the repricing adjustment made in calendar year c, to
the underwriting class k base premium for regular premium and single premium
contracts respectively.
7. The premium charged as a result of repricing activity is denoted by, Π
k
x,t and
Πkx,t, for regular and single premium respectively.
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9. Let Bk,ρx,t:c and I
k,ρ
x,t:c be stochastic processes representing the present value of
future benefit payments and premium income respectively as at the start of
calendar year c, for a life who bought insurance in underwriting class k, at time
t and is now in period ρ. Their associated filtration is denoted Fc at calendar
year c.
To distinguish between the pricing basis and the experience basis, let the addition of
a tilde to the equivalent pricing basis notation, denote experience basis.
3.4.2 Dynamic Premium Rates
Our prime interest is in how the costs of adverse selection will develop over time after
setting up a new market for insurance. This will be related to information gained
by the insurer, from its claims experience, discussed in Section 3.3.4: In a start-up
market, the insurer has no experience with which to properly set a pricing basis. They
would make assumptions as to their business mix, but this might not be borne out
in their sales if the product appealed more to one group and less to another. Where
the differences between groups are noticeable, underwriters could assign additional
premiums to high risk groups and still have actuarially fair premiums for all. However,
where the details of an individual’s risk is hidden from the insurer at policy inception,
the insurer would not learn of the difference from its assumed mix until some later
time, when it observes a higher than expected volume of claims. As the insurer learns
who is buying the product, they can reassess their assumptions of business mix and
reprice appropriately. In doing so, the can reduce the adverse selection costs which
they face.
Our aim is to model this repricing in such a way as to reflect how an insurance
company would behave. We assume it occurs annually and is not to recover past
losses, but to try to set premiums sufficient to cover the benefits of the lives who are
actually buying the product at that time (recovering past losses might be deemed
to be treating customers unfairly). Additionally, we assume that they treat cohorts
independently. In this way, the pricing of a group of policies that is split into age
groups or underwriting classes, is influenced by its own experience but not that of
any other age group or underwriting class.
We will consider two versions of insurance contract: single premium and regular
premium paid continuously while the policyholder is not being paid benefits. Single
premiums can be large sums of money, particularly for a life living on a pension.
Regular premium could be more marketable if it is affordable. The potential costs
of adverse selection in a regular premium design are larger than in a single premium
— benefit costs in each will be the same however premium income will be lower than
assumed since it is not paid upfront. Formulae will be presented for unisex premiums,
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in accordance with European Court of Justice (2011), but we will also consider a
version with gender specific premiums to analyse the cross-subsidy between the sexes.
In that case, we can calculate sex-specific equivalents for all formulae given below by
setting the purchase rate for the opposite sex to zero. Where unisex premiums are
charged, since the Court’s ruling does not explicitly prohibit asking a life’s sex, we
assume the company asks this on the application form. The unisex premium rates
charged at time, t, therefore reflect the actual mix of sex to which business has been
sold.
The premiums for an underwriting class will be calculated using the equivalence
principle, whereby the expected present values of outgo and of premium income within
an underwriting class are equal. The pricing basis will assume there is no adverse
selection. We do not include any expenses, nor are there any loadings for profit, so
outgo is limited to benefit payments.
These expectations are conditional on a life purchasing insurance at time t. The
conditional probability that a life who purchased insurance at time t was of sex ς,
with genotype g and insured from health state j, η
j|k
ς,g|x,t, is calculated as,
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t =
∑
i∈S,ϑ∈B
pix,ς,g tp
00i,0ϑj
x,ς,g µ
0ϑj,1ϑj
x,t,ς,g∑
i∈S,ϑ∈B,l∈Uk,g∈G
(
pix,M,gtp
00i,0ϑl
x,M,g µ
0ϑl,1ϑl
x,t,M,g + p
i
x,F,gtp
0ϑl,1ϑl
x,F,g µ
0ϑl,1ϑl
x,t,F,g
) . (3.40)
The probabilities tp
00i,0ϑj
x,ς,g are found by solving the Kolmogorov forward equations:
d
dt
tp
00i,0ϑj
x,ς,g =
∑
(k,l)6=(ϑ,j)
(
tp
00i,0kl
x,ς,g µ
0kl,0ϑj
x,t,ς,g − tp00i,0ϑjx,ς,g µ0ϑj,0klx,t,ς,g
)
− tp00i,0ϑjx,ς,g µ0ϑj,1ϑjx,t,ς,g . (3.41)
This was done using a 4th order Runge Kutta algorithm with a step size of 2−12 and
boundary conditions 0p
00i,jkl
x,ς,g = δ00i,jkl, where δ00i,jkl is the Kronecker delta.
The unisex premium needs to take account of the actual sex mix since this is
known at outset, so we scale the respective expected present values to the size of
business from each sex. The unisex base regular premium for a life aged x at outset
and insured into class k at time t (in calendar year c = btc), is calculated as
$kx,t =
∑
ς∈{M,F}
 ∑j∈Uk,g∈G η˜j|kς,g|x,t∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,tA
j,P
x,ς,g,t:c

∑
ς∈{M,F}
 ∑j∈Uk,g∈G η˜j|kς,g|x,t∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,ta
j,P
x,ς,g,t:c
 . (3.42)
In the single premium version, the base premium for a life aged x entering an
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insured state in Uk at time t, is calculated as
ωkx,t =
∑
ς∈{M,F}

∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η˜
j|k
ς,g|x,t∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,tA
j,P
x,ς,g,t:c
 . (3.43)
The premiums actually charged to policyholders will reflect the insurer’s acquired
knowledge of the mix of lives who have been buying it. The method we use to calculate
the premiums to charge does not change the underlying assumptions in the pricing
basis. Instead, we find a repricing adjustment factor, ψ
k
x,btc, by which to multiply
the base premiums to represent the repricing we have assumed occurs annually. The
regular premium rate charged to lives aged x at the start of our modelling who buy
insurance into class k at time t, is calculated as
Π
k
x,t = ψ
k
x,btc$
k
x,t, (3.44)
and similarly for single premium, Πkx,t.
We calculate the repricing adjustment by comparing the premium rates charged
to existing customers, with what would be charged to these same customers given
what is now known of their experience, to find how much larger their premium should
have been. This can be expressed as
Premium adjustment =
Actual Benefit Payments + Expected Future Benefits
Actual Premium Income + Expected Future Income
.
(3.45)
The insurance company would be able to observe the actual benefit payments and
premium income up to the point of analysis. Their expectations for the future will
reflect the knowledge of their business mix which they have gained from their claims
experience. In our model, we estimate them by considering the present value of future
benefit and income as stochastic processes, Bk,ρx,t:c and I
k,ρ
x,t:c, respectively. Note that
for single premium,
Ik,ρx,t:c =
Πkx,t if c = btc and ρ = P0 if c > btc or ρ 6= P. (3.46)
The basis for calculation of the expected value of these stochastic processes will reflect
the information gained from the insurance pool’s claims history. Hence the claims
history up to year c forms filtration, Fc. We rewrite the components of Equation
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(3.45) for business sold at time t, in terms of our stochastic processes as,
E
(
Bk,Px,t:btc|Fc
)
= Actual Benefit Payments + Expected Future Benefits
= E
(
Bk,Px,t:btc −
∑
ρ∈P
Bk,ρx,t:c|Fc
)
+
∑
ρ∈P
E
(
Bk,ρx,t:c|Fc
)
(3.47)
E
(
Ik,Px,t:btc|Fc
)
= Actual Premium Income + Expected Future Income
= E
(
Ik,Px,t:btc −
∑
ρ∈P
Ik,ρx,t:c|Fc
)
+
∑
ρ∈P
E
(
Ik,ρx,t:c|Fc
)
(3.48)
We calculate Equations 3.47 and 3.48 by calculating each part in turn, first ‘Actual’
and secondly ‘Expected Future’ using our simulations.
To calculate the ‘Actual’ component, for payments up to calendar year c, we
calculate their expected values on the experience basis. For benefits this is calculated
as,
E
(
Bk,Px,t:btc−
∑
ρ∈P
Bk,ρx,t:c|Fc
)
=
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G,ς∈{M,F}
η˜
j|k
ς,g|x,t
(
Aj,ρx,ς,g,t:btc −
∑
ρ∈P
cp
j,ρ
x,ς,g,tA
j,ρ
x,ς,g,t:ce
(c−btc)(ν−δ)
)
,
(3.49)
Similarly, for regular premium income this is calculated as
E
(
Ik,Px,t:btc−
∑
ρ∈P
Ik,ρx,t:c|Fc
)
= Π
k
x,t
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G,ς∈{M,F}
η˜
j|k
ς,g|x,t
(
aj,ρx,ς,g,t:btc −
∑
ρ∈P
cp
j,ρ
x,ς,g,t a
j,ρ
x,ς,g,t:ce
(c−btc)(ν−δ)
)
.
(3.50)
Next we calculate the expected future benefit payments and regular premium
income on policies in each of the periods in P . We assume the insurer cannot discern
between lives within an underwriting class beyond gender, i.e. when a policy is sold,
they do not know the particular functional disability status, cognitive ability type or
genotype. Each piece of information hidden from the insurer (genotype, functional
ability and cognitive function) relates either to the onset of dementia or functional
disability but not both. At the point of a claim, the insurer will gain information and
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can update their assumptions over the mix of business in the pool.
When a life buys insurance at time t, and until the first claim, the insurer sees it
as any other within the underwriting class it is written. Hence the expected benefits
and premium income from lives in the P period are calculated on the pricing basis,
scaled to the volume of business remaining in this pool. For the benefits, this can be
expressed as
E
(
Bk,Px,t:c|Fc
)
=
∑
ς∈{M,F}

∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η˜
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,P
x,ς,g,t∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,P
x,ς,g,t
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,P
x,ς,g,tA
j,P
x,ς,g,t:c
 ,
(3.51)
and for similarly for regular premium income
E
(
Ik,Px,t:c|Fc
)
= Π
k
x,t
∑
ς∈{M,F}

∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η˜
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,P
x,ς,g,t∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,P
x,ς,g,t
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,P
x,ς,g,ta
j,P
x,ς,g,t:c
 .
(3.52)
At the point of the first claim unrelated to dementia, because no benefit payments
have yet been made and the movement around health states is Markov, the initial
functional disability state becomes unimportant since the insurer knows what func-
tional state the life is in at the time of claim. However, because lives move between
the functional disability states at the same rate regardless of cognitive function, a
claim unrelated to dementia does not tell the insurer anything about cognitive ability
type so the insurer must assume the mix to be as in their pricing assumptions. Denote
the set of states that belong to the same functional disability type as state i which
would be underwritten to class k as Di,k. We calculate the expected future benefit
payments and premium income for each functional disability type at entry on the
expected basis and scale this for the volume of business which is in the C period (i.e
the volume of business which has claimed for functional disability but not dementia).
Let V i,Cx,ς,t:c =
∑
j∈Di,k,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,C
x,ς,g,t and V˜
i,C
x,ς,t:c =
∑
j∈Di,k,g∈G
η˜
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,C
x,ς,g,t be the volume
of business at the start of calendar year c of lives aged x in 2013 and insured from
the same functional disability type as state i at time t on the pricing and experience
basis respectively.
E
(
Bk,Cx,t:c|Fc
)
=
∑
ς∈{M,F}
2∑
i=0
 V˜ i,Cx,ς,t:c
V i,Cx,ς,t:c
∑
j∈Di,k,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,C
x,ς,g,tA
j,C
x,ς,g,t:c
 , (3.53)
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and
E
(
Ik,Cx,t:c|Fc
)
= Π
k
x,t
∑
ς∈{M,F}
2∑
i=0
 V˜ i,Cx,ς,t:c
V i,Cx,ς,t:c
∑
j∈Di,k,g∈G
η
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,C
x,ς,g,ta
j,C
x,ς,g,t:c
 , (3.54)
for benefits and regular premiums respectively.
Once a life develops dementia, their genotype or whether they entered the insur-
ance pool after having recognised the signs of dementia are irrelevant to their future
health status. Additionally, we assume that at a dementia claim, the insurer also
learns the life’s current functional disability type, making initial functional disability
type redundant if no previous claim had been made. The insurer will not observe the
life’s transition into a demented state until a claim commences, at which point they
know how much has already been claimed and what state the life is in. The future
value of benefit and premium for lives in the D period can be calculated using the
actual mix of business sold:
E
(
Bk,Dx,t:c|Fc
)
=
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G,ς∈{M,F}
η˜
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,D
x,ς,g,tA
j,D
x,ς,g,t:c, (3.55)
and
E
(
Ik,Dx,t:c|Fc
)
= Π
k
x,t
∑
j∈Uk,g∈G,ς∈{M,F}
η˜
j|k
ς,g|x,t cp
j,D
x,ς,g,ta
j,D
x,ς,g,t:c, (3.56)
for benefits and premiums respectively.
To allow for changing business patterns caused by the highest risks buying early,
in calendar year c, we assign a relevancy factor based on the age of business sold at
time t, θ (c− t). For its sigmoid shape, we choose an adaptation of the Gompertz
function. Reversing the direction of the characteristic ‘s’ shape will allow us to assign
the most recent observations a similar, high relevancy; while policies sold long ago
are assigned lower relevancy:
θ (c− t) = exp [β exp (−γ (c− t))] , (3.57)
where β, γ ≤ 0.
We now have everything required to calculate the regular premium adjustment
factor ψ
k
x,c as,
ψ
k
x,c =
c−1∑
y=0
ψ
k
x,y
∫ y+1
y
θ (c− t) E
(
Bk,P
x,t:btc|Fc
)
E
(
Ik,P
x,t:btc|Fc
) dt∫ y+1
y
θ (c− t) dt , (3.58)
and similarly for the single premium factor ψkx,c.
This technique could also be used by regulators to monitor the level of premiums.
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It is important that premiums are sufficient such that the company selling LTC will
not have issues in solvency.
3.5 Discussion
The Markov property allowed us to easily implement a pricing model which used
the development of claims experience to update a pricing basis for adverse selection.
However, this property is a simplifying assumption for mathematical convenience re-
quired due to limited data being available to fit anything more complex. Without this
assumption, the expected present values Aj,ρx,ς,g,t:c and a
j,ρ
x,ς,g,t:c will be dependent upon
the time of the event which the insurer observes. With a simulation based approach
like ours, that would make it necessary to store an inhibitively large quantity of data.
Additionally, the formulae given in Equations (3.53 to 3.56) would be invalidated and
need amending.
Although it is plausible that the Markov property does not reflect reality, our
approach gives a first look at a methodology which could be developed if further data
were available.
3.6 Summary
We have set out a modelling methodology that will allow us to calculate the benefit
outgo and premium income on LTC business, under a set of assumptions about buying
behaviour. This came in two stages, first the simulation of health of insured lives to
calculate occupancy probabilities and expected present values of benefit outgo and
premium income at the start of each calendar year. Secondly, using the results of these
simulations, we calculate the premium rates which would be charged if an insurer
repriced annually to take into account the information it learns about the mix of
existing business from its claims history.
To perform this modelling, we will require additional assumptions over the benefits
related to particular states, and of an initial distribution of lives. These are specific
to the market to which the model is being applied, so have been purposely excluded
from this chapter to retain generality. With such a set of assumptions, the profits
or losses which will ultimately be made on business sold at a particular time can be
calculated as the difference between the EPVs of benefit outgo and premium income,
on the experience basis. The loss which ultimately occurs will represent the cost of
adverse selection, and we can observe how this changes in respect of our dynamic
premium rates. In the next chapter we do exactly this in the U.K. market.
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In this chapter, we take the LTC models of the previous chapter and run them with
appropriate assumptions for economic parameters and buying behaviour. We aim to
measure the adverse selection risk in starting up a start-up market for LTC. Further-
more we will perform some sensitivity analyses to consider how sensitive profitability
is to our chosen parameters.
4.1 Long-Term Care in the United Kingdom
Although individuals face a risk in their future care costs which might be mitigated by
some form of LTC product (Guille´n and Comas-Herrera, 2012 presents a methodology
for measuring how well this is done), there is currently no deferred-needs cover —
where the customer is not currently in need of care — for sale in the U.K. During the
1990s, attempts were made by the U.K. insurance industry to produce and market
such a product, but this sold in very few numbers and companies stopped selling it.
At the end of 2009, there were about 36,000 LTC policies in force among Association
of British Insurers (ABI) members (Commission on Funding of Care and Support,
2010).
In the U.K. there is an expectation among the public, that the state pays for the
care of the elderly — Fletcher (2011) quotes an Ipsos-Mori survey that says 54% of
the public think care is free at point of use — but in England, Northern Ireland and
Wales, personal care is paid for by the individual. However, in these jurisdictions, to
protect the poorest, means-tested support is provided by local authorities for those
with assets worth under £23,250. The value of one’s home can be considered in this
financial assessment if a partner no longer lives there, creating the possibility of having
to sell one’s home to pay for care.
The arrangements in Scotland are quite different. A fixed contribution toward
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the cost of care is paid for by the Scottish Government, regardless of an individual’s
assets. However, the individual is still required to pay ‘hotel’ costs — the cost of
accommodation in a care home — although means-tested support is available for this
also. Where the price charged for care is higher than the government’s contribution,
the liability to pay this is the individual’s.
In July 2010 the Commission on Funding of Care and Support, chaired by Sir
Andrew Dilnot, began reviewing the system for care support in England and published
its findings in 2011. Among the suggestions was a cap on the lifetime care costs of
between £25,000 and £50,000 (Commission on Funding of Care and Support, 2011),
while hotel costs would not be subject to this and would remain uncapped. The
U.K. government has instead proposed to cap care costs at £75,000 in 20171, while
increasing the point at which means-tested support is made available to assets under
£100,000. There has been no mention how inflation will affect the size of the cap
but for the purposes of our modelling we assume it behaves as described in Section
3.3.2 (whereby the cap inflates at the same rate as costs and all comparisons between
costs and caps are made on the same purchasing power). It is worth noting that other
countries have instituted controls over public care provision e.g. in France it is only
available to those above age 65, and in Spain the first two years of disability are not
covered.
Despite the failure of previous attempts at establishing an LTC market in the
U.K., Commission on Funding of Care and Support (2011) outlines a role for insurers
alongside the state. They investigated whether the problem of pooling of risk could
be left solely to the private sector but there was too much uncertainty for affordable
products to be designed. They also considered how a fully social scheme could work
and found it could be unsustainable and sensitive to political pressure — countries
which have adopted such a policy have made cutbacks in response to fiscal pressures
resulting in rising unmet needs. The proposition of a cap reduces the ‘tail risk’ of
an insurance policy as this cap transfers part of the risk of excessively large and long
claims to the government.
A previous commission, established in 1997, had recommended in 1999 that both
personal and nursing care be provided by the state on the basis of need (Royal Com-
mission on Long Term Care, 1999). Moreover, they suggested that private insurance
would be too costly. The Westminster government rejected the recommendation of
personal care provision but accepted that nursing care should be provided to those
who needed it (the Scottish government accepted both recommendations).
Lloyd (2011) suggests various barriers to the success of an LTC market, from
the perspective of both the supply and demand sides. Among the supply barriers
is adverse selection costs (recall from Chapter 1 that there was evidence for adverse
1Hansard HC Deb 11 February 2013, vol 558, cols 592–607.
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selection in LTC products found by Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Courbage and
Roudaut, 2008; Oster et al., 2010). In such a small volume of business as the U.K.’s,
the inability to spread the cost of high claims could pose a significant risk to the
insurer. It should be noted that Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)’s adverse selection
did not translate into high claims, possibly due to an incorrect self-assessment of the
survey participants’ health. Other factors he discussed were:
• Limited profitability and market size — weighing the potential costs of entering
the market against the potential profits, it might not be seen worth re-entering
the market.
• Longevity and morbidity risk — there is significant uncertainty over the future
of life expectancies and how trends in disability might be shaped in the future.
• Uncertainty over future claims patterns — changes in availability of informal
care or social care services in response.
• Reputation risk — if benefits do not meet the needs of customers, there could
be an effect on sales for other products so an insurer may need to be generous
in terms of claims underwriting.
• Financial advisors’ resistance — the product history may be tainted in the eyes
of advisors making it difficult to sell through these channels.
• Claims assessments — providers of care may be incentivised to overstate needs
knowing that the cost was being covered by an insurer. Training underwriters to
perform full claims underwriting would be a significant up-front cost. However,
evidence from the health insurance industry in the U.S. suggests the uninsured
would get overcharged since insurers have greater negotiating power (Melnick
and Fonkych, 2008).
• Solvency II — capital requirements with such uncertainty could be inhibitive to
entering the market.
From the demand side he lists reasons why an individual might not buy the product.
The key reasons are:
• Cost — many households would have great difficulty in affording the large single
premiums on a LTC contract, especially in the context of competing expenditure
requirements.
• Alternative strategies — some households keep their savings or plan on using
anticipated inheritance from older relatives or the value of their home in order
to pay for the old age requirements.
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• Ignorance over the need for care arrangements — as mentioned above, many do
not realise the care system is not fully state supported. Additionally, there is
some ignorance as to the in-home care requirements some people will experience
in their old age.
• The complexity of products and a distrust of financial services.
Furthermore, Pauly (1990) makes the case for the rational non-purchase of LTC
based on utility theory and a lack of awareness to the probability that long-term care
services are required. He considers where utility can and cannot be gained from a
bequest and finds that maximising expected utility might mean not purchasing the
insurance, although this is in the specific context of the U.S. Medicare programme.
Additionally, he argues that the purchase of LTC disincentivises the provision of
informal care from children which would allow them to stay in their own home rather
than moving to a care home.
Zhou-Richter et al. (2010) used empirical data to investigate the role of adult
children and their knowledge of care costs in the demand for LTC. They surveyed 1045
adult children in Germany, asking about ownership of LTC by themselves and their
parents and after giving various statistics of the costs and probabilities of requiring
long-term care services, whether they were more or less likely to purchase cover. Their
results suggested that the increased knowledge among adult children about the likely
needs of their elderly parents, leads to increased willingness to buy insurance. To
reinforce this idea, they looked at whether the decision to buy insurance of those
who already had it had been influenced by knowledge of the risk and their results
supported such a link.
4.2 Parameterising the UK LTC Market
In this section we estimate the market specific parameters necessary for the modelling
described in Chapter 3. First we will parameterise the cost of care provision in each
health state and secondly, the initial distribution of lives at 1st January, 2013.
4.2.1 Care Costs
The costs to pay for care varies greatly by region. Region specific costs for care
homes, nursing homes and hourly rate for in-home carers are given in Tables 4.1 and
4.2. The in-home care cost differs for weekend and weekday (as well as by day or
night but for simplicity we assume daytime) and we find the average daytime rate
as Weekday rate × 5/7 + Weekend rate × 2/7. To find the UK average for each, we
calculate the weighted average using the 2010 population size as weights from Office
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Table 4.1: Average annual costs (£) for a residential care home with and without
nursing by UK region in 2011/12. Source: Laing & Buisson, Care of Elderly People
Report 2012/13 via http://www.payingforcare.org
Region Care Home Fees
With Nursing Without Nursing
East Midlands 32,136 26,312
East of England 41,600 29,328
London 42,692 31,096
North East 31,044 24,492
North West 34,476 24,336
Northern Ireland 29,640 24,232
Scotland 35,620 28,860
South East 45,188 30,888
South West 39,728 28,652
Wales 33,800 25,532
West Midlands 36,816 25,740
Yorkshire & Humber 32,448 24,076
for National Statistics (2012a) given in Table 4.3. The costs need to be inflated to
our modelling start date, 1st January 2013. Care home costs are given for the period
2011/2012 so we assume they are as at 1st January, 2012 while in-home care costs
are for the period 2009/2010 so we assume they are as at 1st January, 2010. Office
for National Statistics (2013) gives sector specific weekly earnings up to November,
2012, from which we calculate salary inflation. In-home care costs are inflated using
the experienced inflation rates for health and social workers to 1st January, 2012. An
annualised rate for January, 2012 to November, 2012 is assumed to cover the full year
from 1st January, 2012 to 1st January, 2013 and is applied to inflate all care costs to
this date. Thus the average annual costs for staying in a care home with and without
nursing provision are £27,900 and £38,100 respectively. The average hourly rate for
in-home care is £14.00.
Once the government’s cap has been reached, the individual has no liability for
care costs, but still must pay for staying in a care home, for food and for the utilities
— the so-called hotel costs. This cost is fixed regardless of whether there is any
nursing care provided. Hancock et al. (2007) breaks up the hotel costs from the full
cost of staying in a residential care home without nursing care in 2002 as £7,900 per
annum and £17,000 per annum respectively. They based their estimate of hotel cost
on the Guarantee Credit component of the U.K. Pension Credit benefit. We assume
the proportions remain the same today, i.e. hotel costs are 46% of residential care
home without nursing care, or £12,965.
We consider an institutionalised life without any ADLs or with only an IADL as
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Table 4.2: Average hourly daytime in-home care cost (£) by UK region in 2009/10.
Source: Laing & Buisson, Domiciliary Care UK Market Report 2011 via http://www.
payingforcare.org
Region Weekday Weekend Average Day
East Midlands 12.79 14.66 13.32
East of England 14.02 15.12 14.33
London 13.94 16.41 14.65
North East 13.94 14.88 14.21
North West 12.13 12.48 12.23
Northern Ireland 10.44 10.44 10.44
Scotland 11.42 12.7 11.79
South East 13.61 15.16 14.05
South West 13.98 14.9 14.24
Wales 11.91 13.65 12.41
West Midlands 12.34 13.74 12.74
Yorkshire & Humber 13.23 13.62 13.34
Table 4.3: Population sizes of UK regions in 2010. Source Office for National Statistics
(2012a)
Region Population
East Midlands 4,481,431
East of England 5,831,845
London 7,825,177
North East 2,606,625
North West 6,935,736
Northern Ireland 1,799,392
Scotland 5,222,100
South East 8,523,074
South West 5,273,726
Wales 3,006,430
West Midlands 5,455,179
Yorkshire & Humber 5,301,252
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requiring only residential care. Lives who are in an institution and suffering more
than 1-ADL will need the most care so we assign these lives to a residential care home
with nursing care. Institutionalised lives with 1-ADL might need a bit less attention
but more than lives with no functional disability, so we arbitrarily deem this halfway
between the cost of a residential care home with and without nursing care.
The condition for claiming based on functional ability in the LTC market is com-
monly to suffer from at least 2 ADLs. The costs faced by these lives depends on the
number of hours of in-home care required. Jones (2006) surveyed 28 care providers
(most of which were in a single local authority area) to find the number of hours of
formal in-home care provided. They found an average of 6.5 hours per week (from a
total of 6442 hours weekly). This only measures the formal care; informal care which
might be provided by the life’s spouse, child or a friend is excluded.
Forder and Ferna´ndez (2009) found that the local authority’s care provision de-
pended greatly on whether the life lived alone or had access to informal care. They
assumed a need based on what is received by lives eligible under the Department of
Health’s Fair Access to Care framework: 1 ADL (6.8 hours per week); 2 ADLs (7.3
hours per week); 3 ADLs (8.8 hours per week); 4 ADLs (15.6 hours per week); and
5 ADLs (18.7 hours per week). If the life is insured, when they meet the claim re-
quirement, they would be contractually entitled to benefits regardless of their living
arrangements if they chose to get a carer. In this situation, with lives who (wrongly)
think they are being a burden on their family, the number of hours of care could
be substantially more than what the local authority faces. There could however be a
stigma felt by claimants not wanting to be seen by their peers as needing a professional
carer which might curb this increase slightly.
Nuttall et al. (1994)’s model assumed a number of hours per week which differed
by level of disability and classified by need: low need (5 hours per week); moderate
need (15 hours per week); regular need (30 hours per week); and continuous (45 hours
per week). We leave the number of hours a week as a scenario specific parameter and
denote it by H.
For our contract, when a life has been diagnosed with dementia, this will reduce
the functional disability requirement to trigger a functional disability claim to 1-ADL.
Lives with dementia and > 1ADL are given 2H hours of care a week.
Without the existence of the government cap, payments faced by the individual
which don’t meet the claim requirements are irrelevant to the insurer. In our market,
if the individual pays for care which does not meet the insurance company’s claim
underwriting but is included within the government’s cap, this will reduce the insurer’s
expected future liability. To simplify the situation, we assume the government and
insurer have the same criteria regarding claims and set the care costs in states other
than those detailed above to be zero.
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Table 4.4: Annual rates for care and hotel costs for individuals in our insurance
market.
State State Care Hotel
Index Name Cost (£) Cost (£)
0 Healthy 0 0
1 IADL 0 0
2 1-ADL 0 0
3 > 1ADL 5114H 0
4 Initial Signs 0 0
5 IADL(IS) 0 0
6 1-ADL(IS) 0 0
7 > 1ADL(IS) 5114H 0
8 Dementia 0 0
9 IADL(D) 0 0
10 1-ADL(D) 5114H 0
11 > 1ADL(D) 10227H 0
12 Institution 14935 12965
13 IADL(I) 14935 12965
14 1-ADL(I) 20035 12965
15 > 1ADL(I) 25135 12965
16 Dead 0 0
A summary of the care costs dependent on the current state in the model depicted
in Figure 3.7, are given in Table 4.4.
4.2.2 Initial Distribution of Lives
Unlike our model of an established CI market in Chapter 2 where we modelled from
age 30 and assumed all lives started healthy, in our start-up market, we model the
progression of the market from introduction of the product. In such a case there will be
lives of different ages buying the product and influencing the adverse selection costs.
Some lives at each age have already developed some form of cognitive or functional
disability so to model forward from the current time, it is necessary to calculate the
distribution of lives in each state in our model for each sex, genotype and age group
as at 1st January, 2013. To do this, we will first estimate a mix of lives at age 60.
From this mix at age 60, we will calculate the occupancy probabilities for each state
for the elderly population which we will then use to form our insurance market, split
into 5-year age groups in terms of age last birthday: 60–64, 65–69,70–74, 75–79, 80–84
and 85–89.
Denote the probability that a life has genotype g ∈ G at age 60, by PG (g). Further
denote the probability that a life of sex ς, has functional disability type i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
at age 60 by PADL,ς (i).
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Table 4.5: Distribution of APOE genotypes. Source: Farrer et al. (1997).
Genotype Probability, PG (g)
ε2ε2 0.135
ε2ε4 0.026
ε3ε3 0.609
ε3ε4 0.213
ε4ε4 0.018
Since we are concerned with dementias of old-age, we assume that no lives have
any signs of decrease of cognitive function at age 60 and the distribution of genotypes
is that used by Macdonald and Pritchard (2000), and derived by Farrer et al. (1997)
(shown in Table 4.5). Farrer et al. (1997) performed a meta-analysis of 40 studies
of APOE, and provided the genotype frequencies among both lives with AD and the
controls split by ethnicity (the chosen results being Caucasian controls).
The remaining part of the mix of lives at age 60 exactly, is the prevalence of func-
tional ability. We find the prevalences of functional ability at age 60 for males and
females, which when projected forward following the transition intensities (for sim-
plicity, we exclude mortality improvements) in our model of health (see Figure 3.7),
best fits the prevalences observed in the first phase of the CFAS study, as reported by
Akodu (2007) (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7). They list these at age groups in terms of age
last birthday, 65–69,70–74,75–79,80–84,85–89,90+, which we represent by the set of
midpoints (and 92.5 for 90+), denoted X ′, where X ′ = {67.5, 72.5, 77.5, 82.5, 87.5, 92.5}.
By varying the proportions originally in each state at age 60, we use a weighted least
squares method, with weights equal to the number of lives in each age group, as
estimated by Office for National Statistics (2011) for 2010 (shown in Table 4.8), to
minimise the difference between the observed and our calculated prevalences, thereby
extrapolating Tables 4.6 and 4.7 to age 60. The function to minimise is,
∑
x∈X ′
 ∑
j∈{0,1,2,3}
Obsjx −
∑
g∈G,i∈{0,1,2,3},k∈{0,4,8,12}
x−60p
i,j+k
60,ς,gPG (g)PADL,ς (i)∑
g∈G,i∈{0,1,2,3},k∈S\{16}
x−60p
i,k
60,ς,gPG (g)PADL,ς (i)

2
PX ,ς (x) ,
(4.1)
where Obsjx is the observed prevalence of functional ability j, at age x, subject to
the constraints that
∑
i∈{0,1,2,3}
PADL,ς (i) = 1, and PADL,ς (i) ∈ [0, 1]. The occupancy
probabilities, x−60p
i,j+k
60,ς,g, are found by solving the Kolmogorov forward equations,
d
dt
tp
i,j
x,ς,g =
∑
k 6=j
(
tp
i,k
x,ς,g µ
k,j
x,t,ς,g − tpi,jx,ς,g µj,kx,t,ς,g
)
. (4.2)
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Table 4.6: Distribution of functional ability in males by age group in terms of age last
birthday. Source: Akodu (2007).
Functional Age group
Ability 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85–89 90+
None 0.8406 0.8112 0.6791 0.5382 0.3545 0.1757
IADL 0.0534 0.0602 0.0756 0.1191 0.1231 0.1081
1-ADL 0.0737 0.0860 0.1556 0.2075 0.3134 0.2568
> 1ADL 0.0323 0.0426 0.0898 0.1352 0.2090 0.4595
Table 4.7: Distribution of functional ability in females by age group in terms of age
last birthday. Source: Akodu (2007).
Functional Age group
Ability 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+
No ADLs 0.7759 0.6854 0.5486 0.3483 0.1813 0.0847
IADL 0.1013 0.1194 0.1382 0.1749 0.1827 0.1229
1-ADL 0.0851 0.1515 0.2272 0.302 0.3626 0.2542
> 1ADL 0.0376 0.0436 0.0860 0.1749 0.2734 0.5381
This was done using a 4th order Runge Kutta algorithm with a step size of 2−12 and
boundary conditions 0p
i,j
x,ς,g = δij, where δij is the Kronecker delta. The result of the
minimising Equation (4.1) is shown in Table 4.9, with no lives having any ADLs at
age 60.
Using the assumptions and calculated distributions of lives at age 60, we can find
the distribution of lives who are alive at age x, of sex ς, have genotype g and are in
Table 4.8: U.K. population by sex and age group in terms of age last birthday in
1,000s. Source: Office for National Statistics (2011).
Age Male Female
60–64 1840.08 1923.52
65–69 1412.11 1519.56
70–74 1160.31 1307.44
75–79 893.91 1107.84
80–84 607.09 885.55
85–89 326.08 608.47
90+ 131.89 331.54
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Table 4.9: Proportion of lives of each sex in each functional disability type, at age 60
exactly.
No ADLs IADL 1-ADL > 1 ADL
Male 1 0 0 0
Female 1 0 0 0
state j at 1st January 2013, pjx,ς,g, by calculating,
pjx,ς,g =
3∑
i=0
PADL,ς (i) PG (g) tp
i,j
60,ς,g PSex,x (ς)∑
ς∈{M,F},g∈G,s∈S
3∑
i=0
PADL,ς (i) PG (g) tp
i,s
60,ς,g PSex,x (ς)
, (4.3)
where PSex,x (ς) is the probability a life aged x is of sex ς based on Table 4.8.
This will not necessarily produce an accurate depiction of the mix of lives of
the U.K. population, however the purpose of such a distribution is to provide an
approximate baseline from which we can illustrate how adverse selection may impact
costs. The aim of our model is not to accurately estimate or project future demand
for services and our results should not be used in this way.
4.3 Distribution of Insured Lives
To provide context for adverse selection costs, we consider the joint distribution of
insurance purchase time, age and sex, conditional on insurance being purchased.
Let T INS, X and Σ be the random variables representing insurance purchase time,
age group and sex respectively. We denote the joint density function for insur-
ance purchase time, sex and age group, conditional on insurance being purchased
by fT INS ,Σ,X|T INS<∞(t, ς, x), and calculate it as,
fT INS ,Σ,X|T INS<∞(t, ς, x) =
∑
g∈G,i,j∈S,ϑ∈B
pix,ς,g tp
00i,0ϑj
x,ς,g µ
0ϑj,ϑj
x,t,ς,g∫∞
0
∑
y∈X ,σ∈{M,F},g∈G,i,j∈S,ϑ∈B
piy,σ,g sp
00i,0ϑj
y,σ,g µ
0ϑj,ϑj
y,s,σ,g ds
, (4.4)
with the integration calculated numerically using Simpson’s rule and a step size of
2−11. The resulting density functions are shown in Figures 4.1 (males) and 4.2, as-
suming adverse selection is due to lives with the initial signs of dementia or 1-ADL
buying at a rate of 0.25 per annum.
We can see that the majority of business is sold during the first 10 to 15 years;
very few lives buy when x + t is greater than 90 years old. There is an interesting
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feature among both males and females, for x = 62.5, whereby there is a local minimum
followed by a local maximum for the smaller markets at t = 5 and t = 15, respectively
for males and t = 2 and t = 10, respectively for females. These turning points are
due to the changing pattern of health with age: initially the adverse selectors in this
age group are functionally disabled; as dementia onset increases, the adverse selection
comes from lives with the initial signs of dementia.
Since we are concerned with a start-up market, we choose to model for 20 years.
As very few lives purchase insurance after this time (we have not modelled entry to the
market from younger lives), the implication of this is limited. Moreover, this is longer
than the previous attempt at selling the product in the U.K. lasted. If the product is
successful, a large body of claims history might allow a more robust analysis, perhaps
performed by the CMI, to estimate an insured lives morbidity table which insurers
could adjust to suit their own market segment.
4.4 Analysis of Premium Rates
In this section we calculate and analyse the premiums that would be charged to lives
if the insurer knew all relevant information (applicant’s exact health status, sex and
genotype) and was able to underwrite fully i.e. an underwriting class for each sex,
state and genotype combination. This will aid the understanding of the potential
sources of adverse selection.
To do so we run the previous chapter’s models with assumptions as follows:
• The insurance contract indemnifies the life up to a maximum lifetime coverage
of £200,000, with no annual claim limit.
• Care costs, other than hotel costs, are capped at £75,000, adjusted for 4 years
of inflation at a force of inflation of ν = 0.04 per annum.
• The number of hours of in-home care per day for lives with > 1ADL is H = 1.
• There is no deferred period.
• The force of interest is δ = 0.04 per annum.
• The market size i.e. the rate at which lives are assumed to buy insurance, is
0.001 per annum.
The resulting regular premium rates per annum, dependent on purchase time, are
shown in Figures 4.3 to 4.8 (note that scales are not consistent from figure to figure).
Figure 4.3 shows the progression of premium rates for lives who were aged 62.5 at 1st
January, 2013 and purchase their insurance at time t; Figure 4.4 shows the same for
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Figure 4.1: Joint density function for insurance purchase time, sex and age group,
conditional on insurance being purchased for males.
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Figure 4.2: Joint density function for insurance purchase time, sex and age group,
conditional on insurance being purchased for females.
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lives who were aged 67.5 at 1st January, 2013 and so on. Overlayed onto each of these
are the premium rates that would be charged if all lives buying insurance were written
into one underwriting class for the age group, without any adverse selection in the
market (what we termed base premium in Section 3.4 and calculated using Equation
(3.42)). The equivalent plots for single premium rates are shown in Appendix D
We can see the biggest difference in premium rates is derived from the initial signs
of dementia. Also, if pricing men and women separately, premiums for women are
larger than those for men, reflecting the higher rate of dementia found in women.
Prior to showing the initial signs of dementia, the premium rates do not differ
hugely by genotype. The effect of moving to an initial signs type state increases the
premium rates more for females than males. Since this is closer to a dementia claim,
the effect of genotype becomes more important and differences between premium rates
for genotypes are apparent.
At around age 80, the fully underwritten premium rates generally start to decrease
and the differences between them lessen. This is due to the increased mortality related
to old-age causing the probability that a life claims to decrease. Additionally, where a
life does claim, high mortality acts to cause the length, and hence the value, of claims
to be lower. An exception to this observation is made for males in the IADL state.
In this case, the proportion of transition rates into > 1ADL is increasing and hence
the probability of a claim is also increasing.
Also at around age 80, the premium rates for genotype ε4ε4 drop below those for
ε3ε3. At these ages the relative risk for AD, relative to ε3ε3, is only slightly greater
than 1 (for males this is fixed as a minimum), while the integral in Equation (3.28)
is greater for ε4ε4 and hence the transition rates between Initial Signs and Dementia
states are greater for ε3ε3.
After age 85, the premium rates charged start to decrease. When this occurs, the
rational behaviour for lives who are not in claim would be to continuously lapse and
re-enter for a cheaper premium. To avoid this problem, contract designs would need
to have some form of advancement of premium payment e.g. by limiting the period
for which premium is payable. The adverse selection cost for such a design would be
somewhere between that of a single premium contract and our regular premium so
we continue without any action to correct or account for this lapse risk.
In terms of perceived cheapness of the premiums that would be charged without
full information (the thick lines in the figures), at younger ages when the majority
of lives have no signs of dementia, premiums are closer to the Healthy rates, so in
1-ADL it appears cheap. For lives with the initial signs of dementia, base premiums
represent as much as half of the premium which they would pay if fully underwritten.
As age increases, the proportion of lives with the initial signs of dementia increases
and premiums become expensive even for lives with 1-ADL. The high unisex premium
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Figure 4.3: Regular premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete in-
formation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and
health status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 62.5 at 1st January,
2013. The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure 4.4: Regular premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete in-
formation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and
health status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 67.5 at 1st January,
2013. The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure 4.5: Regular premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete in-
formation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and
health status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 72.5 at 1st January,
2013. The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure 4.6: Regular premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete in-
formation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and
health status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 77.5 at 1st January,
2013. The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure 4.7: Regular premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete in-
formation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and
health status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 82.5 at 1st January,
2013. The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure 4.8: Regular premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete in-
formation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and
health status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 87.5 at 1st January,
2013. The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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caused by female lives’ dementia claims makes the premium seem expensive for males
with APOE genotypes ε2ε2, ε2ε4 and ε3ε4. Where people see the premium as cheap,
we assume they buy the insurance at a higher rate as they are receiving better value
for money and this we see as adverse selection.
Attention should be drawn to the people who these products would be marketed
to: old people who own their own home, but nonetheless are living on a pension.
Premiums between between £1,500 and £2,000 per annum are likely to be seen as a
substantial portion of a tight budget.
4.5 Calculating Adverse Selection
In this section we consider the impact of lives making the rational decision to either
buy LTC insurance at an increased rate when faced with a cheap premium with respect
to what they know about their own risk or at a lower rate when premium is expensive.
This will be calculated in the context of a new market for the product being created at
the modelling date, 1st January, 2013. We will show how the cost of adverse selection,
as defined in Section 2.5.1, will develop over time when the insurance company is able
to respond to the cashflows it observes from in-force business by adjusting premium
rates charged to new business. Each age group is modelled independently of any other
so the repricing adjustments relate only to the claims history of the particular cohort.
Based on the analysis in Section 4.4, we consider the possibility of higher than
expected purchase rates from lives who find they have a high risk variant of the APOE
gene; lives who have observed the initial signs of dementia; and lives in a high risk
ADL state beyond the detection of underwriting capabilities in the scenario. We also
allow lives with a low risk variant of the APOE gene or in the lowest risk state in the
class to buy at a lower rate.
4.5.1 Adverse Selection Sources in Isolation
To demonstrate the relative impact of each source of adverse selection, we model
with buying behaviour changing due to one factor at a time. We use the same set of
assumptions as above and where the buying rate is high, this is at a rate of 0.25 per
annum.
For the purposes of this exercise, we consider high risk variants of APOE to be
ε3ε4 and ε4ε4, while low risk variants are ε2ε2 and ε3ε3 with testing occurring at a
rate of 0.08916 per annum, the High rate from Section 2.5. This is used to exaggerate
the costs in order to illustrate how genetic testing interacts with other scenarios. As
discussed above, testing for APOE variations in relation to AD is unlikely to be done
at the request of physicians, but may be done if an individual uses a personal testing
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service. Figure 4.9 shows the repricing adjustment factors to the base premiums over
time, using Equation (3.58) — these are calculated based on the information the
insurer gains through its claims history. To provide this with context, Figure 4.10
shows the adjustments that would be made to the base premiums, if the insurance
purchase pattern was exactly the same, and the insurer knew everything about the
customer which was relevant to pricing when the policy was sold — this is the factor
by which the base premium should be multiplied to pay for all benefit outgo.
What we can observe from these plots is that lives with the initial signs of dementia
buying at a higher rate should have the biggest effect on premium rates, although this
is overtaken at the oldest ages by lives with 1-ADL. However, the rate at which losses
from this source of adverse selection are recognised is slower than that of lives in the
Healthy state not buying and lives with 1-ADL buying at a high rate. This means the
premiums charged to new business don’t increase enough to cover the benefit costs of
the business, leaving a larger cost of adverse selection.
There is a general downward trend in the adjustments that should be made as the
relative difference between the underlying premium rates decreases. This is caused
by the higher proportions of lives with dementia or functional disability among the
population aligning the base premiums more closely to the adverse selectors.
We can also see that on its own, genetic testing at this test rate should increase
premiums a moderate amount, however the threat posed by this is small relative to
the other potential sources of adverse selection. Overlap between the factors may
cause smaller influence from genetic tests than these would suggest. A limitation of
the methodology used — lives with particular genotype buy at a higher rate for the
remaining period after receiving test results — is that at later ages, the relative risk
model used gives the “high risk” APOEε4 variants, ε2ε4 and ε3ε4 the same relative
risk as ε3ε3 in males.
4.5.2 Multiple Sources of Adverse Selection
In assessing a more complete picture of adverse selection, with more than one source
at a time, we will use the following assumptions:
• The size of the market will be represented by purchase rates of 0.001, 0.01 and
0.05 per annum.
• Lives who buy at an increased rate will do so at either 0.25 or 0.1 per annum
and in the case of the smallest market, at 0.01 per annum also.
• Underwriters will either group all lives into one class or group lives with 1-ADL
in their own class.
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Figure 4.9: Repricing adjustments made to new business regular premiums through
the emerging information from claims history, when a single source of adverse selection
is present: “Healthy” — lives in the Healthy state don’t buy; “Low Gene” — lives
with AOPE genotypes ε2ε2 and ε3ε3 don’t buy; “High Gene” — lives with AOPE
genotypes ε3ε4 and ε4ε4 buy at an increased rate; “Initial Signs” — lives with initial
signs of dementia buy at an increased rate; “1-ADL” — lives with 1-ADL functional
disability type buy at an increased rate.
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Figure 4.10: Adjustments which would be made to new business regular premiums if
the insurer knew everything relevant about the customer at the point of sale, when a
single source of adverse selection is present: “Healthy” — lives in the Healthy state
don’t buy; “Low Gene” — lives with AOPE genotypes ε2ε2 and ε3ε3 don’t buy; “High
Gene” — lives with AOPE genotypes ε3ε4 and ε4ε4 buy at an increased rate; “Initial
Signs” — lives with initial signs of dementia buy at an increased rate; “1-ADL” —
lives with 1-ADL functional disability type buy at an increased rate.
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• Lives receiving in-home care will be given either H = 1 or H = 2 hours of care
per day, corresponding to the results of Jones (2006); Forder and Ferna´ndez
(2009) and the assumption in Nuttall et al. (1994)’s moderate needs estimate
respectively. Costs of care are as outlined in Table 4.4.
• Testing will be performed at a rate of 0.08916 per annum.
• The force of inflation will be 0.02 or 0.04 per annum, while the force of interest
is 0.05.
• An individual’s care liability will be capped by the government at £75,000,
adjusted for 4 years’ inflation.
• The insurance contract will indemnify the policyholder up to £200,000 with no
limit on annual payouts.
• The relevancy function in Equation (3.57) will be parameterised using β = −0.01
and γ = −0.25.
• The number of lives of age x and sex ς is as in Table 4.8 and denoted by N(x, ς,).
In our modelling we assume adverse purchase rates for males and females are equal.
However this is not necessarily how it would be borne out in practice as the product
represents a different value to each sex — females may be expected to have a higher
purchase rate as the product represents greater value to them.
We calculate the cost of adverse selection for all business sold in underwriting
class k during calendar year c by realising the future losses the business will incur
when adverse selection is present, and discounting these to start of year c. We assume
the premiums are calculated using the claims history to apply a repricing adjustment
to the base premiums, the latter calculated assuming no adverse selection. By ex-
pressing the loss as a percentage of premium income, we show how much further the
premiums need to be increased, in order to reach the actuarially fair premiums that
were intended. Benefit outgo and premium income arising from business sold to lives
aged x at 1st January, 2013, are weighted by the number of lives in that age group.
This can be expressed as,
Adverse Selection Cost = E(PV Benefits-PV Premium|Adverse Selection)
E(PV Premium|Adverse Selection)
=
∑
x∈X ,ς∈{M,F},g∈G,i∈S,j∈Uk,ϑ∈B
N(x,ς)
∫ c+1
c p
i
x,ς,g tp˜
00i,0ϑj
x,ς,g µ˜
0ϑj,1ϑj
x,t,ς,g
(
Aj,Px,ς,g,t:c−Π
k
x,t a
j,P
x,ς,g,t:c
)
dt
∑
x∈X ,ς∈{M,F},g∈G,i∈S,j∈Uk,ϑ∈B
N(x,ς)
∫ c+1
c p
i
x,ς,g tp˜
00i,0ϑj
x,ς,g µ˜
0ϑj,1ϑj
x,t,ς,g Π
k
x,t a
j,P
x,ς,g,t:c dt
, (4.5)
where X = {62.5, 67.5, 72.5, 77.5, 82.5, 87.5} is the set of midpoints of each of our age
groups.
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We start by considering adverse selection costs when lives with the initial signs of
dementia and lives with 1-ADL buy at an increased rate without any underwriting.
The progression of these costs are shown in Figure 4.11 for regular and single premium
on unisex and gender specific bases with H = 1 and ν = 0.04.
The patterns shown are much the same regardless of the premium basis: very high
costs attributable to business sold at the start of the market, while policies sold after
20 years since market set-up have negative costs. These negative costs reflect the
repricing process increasing premiums too much — referring back to Figure 4.10, we
see the premium adjustments which should be made gradually decrease, which is due
to the base premium accommodating a greater proportion of higher risk lives without
adverse selection. Losses are noticed more rapidly when the purchase rate for adverse
selectors is highest, and despite being the highest cost initially, the smallest market
with high adverse purchase rate responds quickest and becomes the most negative.
The regular premium version of the contract has approximately 30% higher costs
initially and these costs become more negative when policies are being charged too
much.
There are a number of uncertain parameters involved in our model. To assess
how the choice of value of these parameters might influence results, we present some
analysis of the sensitivity.
The sensitivity of adverse selection costs over time to the inflation rate parameter
can be seen in Figure 4.12 to be very low — the shape of the emergence over time and
the size are very similar. Since the highest costs are at the start of the market, before
the insurer has been able to adjust their correct their pricing assumptions, when the
inflation rate is higher (and consequently the real discount rate lower) the smaller
cost incurring/profit making business in the latest years is given more weight making
the overall adverse selection cost, as a percentage of premium income, lower.
Figure 4.12 also shows the sensitivity to the number of hours of in-home care
provision, H. Increasing H from 1 to 2 decreases the adverse selection cost. This may
seem counter intuitive since we have lives at risk of claiming in-home care provision
buying at an increased rate. However, as noted above, the biggest part of adverse
selection cost is from lives observing the initial signs of dementia. These lives are
also exposed to the parameter H, pre-institutionalisation but once they have been
institutionalised, their care costs are no longer based on H. Consequently, although
overall benefit costs are higher when H = 2, the increased premium rate offsets some
of the adverse selection costs. Since the shape of the development of the costs does
not change markedly, only the scale, we continue in this section with H = 1.
Now when we include adverse selection from lives who have had a genetic test
(shown in Figure 4.13), the effect is two-fold: initially the costs are lower with genetic
adverse selection due to lives with high-risk genes buying insurance earlier than they
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Figure 4.11: Progression of adverse selection cost when lives with the initial signs of
dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate with H = 1, ν = 0.04.
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Figure 4.12: Sensitivity of adverse selection costs to number of hours of care provision
and the force of inflation when lives with the initial signs of dementia and lives with
1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate and premiums are charged on a unisex
basis.
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would when they move to a state where the difference between their benefit costs
and premium income is greater; at later purchase times, the adverse selection cost is
higher with genetic adverse selection because losses due to genetic adverse selection
are realised slowly (see Figure 4.9) so premiums have not been changed sufficiently.
In the large market, this creates a local minimum and subsequently a local maximum
for males and where premiums are unisex.
If the market fails to attract lives in the Healthy state but lives with the initial
signs or 1-ADL buy at an increased rate there will be little difference between the
market sizes (see Figure 4.14) since only the relatively small proportion of lives with
an IADL buy at the standard market rate. The effect of genetic testing in this case
is minimal since the only lives in the IADL state will change buying behaviour due
to test results.
The scenarios above have assumed there is a restriction on underwriting. If we
permit insurers to underwrite based on functional ability, as would be the case in
the UK, there would be no reason for lives with 1-ADL to purchase insurance at an
increased rate, merely because of their functional disability.
Since our model is Markov, a life’s health history (beyond its current state) tells
nothing of it’s future health. Therefore when a life has been underwritten into a
high risk class, if the life subsequently recovers they could lapse their policy and buy
another written in a lower risk class with a correspondingly lower premium. This is a
consideration that would be necessary only when charging regular premiums, similar
to the problem mentioned in Section 4.4.
The results of introducing underwriting are shown in Figure 4.15 when lives with
the initial signs of dementia buy insurance at an increased rate and change buying
behaviour after the result of a genetic test. Despite eliminating functional ability
as a source of adverse selection, the costs as a percentage of premium income have
increased when we compare to Figure 4.13, particularly for females and the smaller
market sizes. This should be expected because the biggest part of adverse selection
cost is from the insurer being unable to discern between lives with and without the
initial signs of dementia. This still remains, while lives in the ‘low risk’ underwriting
class pay a smaller premium than without underwriting. Hence, the nominal amount
of loss has decreased, but less than the nominal amount of premium income has.
Additionally, the local maximum observed upon introducing genetic adverse selection
is more pronounced and exists for the other market sizes. Losses due to adverse
selection from 1-ADL are realised relatively rapidly hence increased premiums can be
used to cover losses from high purchase rates from lives with initial signs of dementia
which are realised more slowly.
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Figure 4.13: Progression of adverse selection cost when lives with the initial signs
of dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate and lives change buying
behaviour after having a genetic test, with H = 1, ν = 0.04.
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Figure 4.14: Progression of adverse selection cost when lives with the initial signs of
dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate and lives change buying be-
haviour after having a genetic test, while healthy lives do not buy insurance regardless
of genotype, with H = 1, ν = 0.04.
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Figure 4.15: Progression of adverse selection cost when lives with 1-ADL are written
into a separate class while lives with the initial signs of dementia buy insurance at
an increased rate and lives change buying behaviour after having a genetic test, with
H = 1, ν = 0.04.
149
Chapter 4: Long Term Care Costs in the United Kingdom
4.5.3 Varying the Caps
We have used a cap on care costs before the government takes on the liability assuming
£75,000 in 2017, as per the Westminster government’s stated intentions. If this does
not get approval of parliament, there will be no cap on the liability faced by the
individual. Moreover, we have not considered the situation in Scotland, where care
costs are, intended to be met by the Scottish government. We examine these extremes
of policy here.
First we consider the Scottish government’s policy and assume that their payment
is sufficient to meet the care costs. The adverse selection costs (shown in Figure 4.16)
as a percentage of premium are substantially larger than those where the insurance
policy also pays for care costs. In this situation, the role of the insurance policy is
to meet the hotel costs, a benefit only associated with dementia. Correspondingly,
benefit sizes are smaller and the probability of reaching a claim is reduced, hence the
premiums are also reduced. This smaller premium base, as we have seen above (in
the scenario with underwriting), creates large adverse selection costs.
Next we look at adverse selection costs if the U.K. government does not implement
their proposed cap. These are shown in Figure 4.17. Comparing these with the
equivalent scenario with the cap, in Figure 4.11, we see very little impact from the
removal of the cap on care costs.
To investigate this further, we amended our simulation model to estimate the
distribution of total care individuals face over their lifetime. For each sex, genotype
and health state, we simulated the future life histories and the associated care costs
of 1,000,000 lives aged x ∈ X . Where the total care costs for lives was non-zero, these
were separated into ‘bins’ of size £1,000 in terms of 1 January, 2013’s purchasing
power. A further bin existed for lives who never had any care expenditure. Summing
the number of lives in each bin over genotypes g ∈ G and states j ∈ S, with weighting
equal to the probability for the initial distribution, pjx,ς,g (calculated in Section 4.2.2),
allows us to estimate a distribution for a discretised care cost, for a particular age
group x and sex ς.
The nature of adverse selection means that in our pool of insurance business,
the mix of lives who buy insurance does not match the mix of lives in the general
population — there will be a higher proportion of lives who require care. As a proxy
for the mix of insured business, we consider the distribution of care costs, conditional
on the care cost being non-zero. Denote the number of lives aged x, of sex ς, with
genotype g, and in state j at 1st January, 2013, whose simulated care costs were
between 1000i and 1000(i+ 1), by bjx,ς,g(i). For lives aged x, of sex ς, we estimate the
probability mass function of care costs, conditional on the cost of care being non-zero,
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Figure 4.16: Progression of adverse selection cost when lives with the initial signs
of dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate with H = 1, ν = 0.04.
Insurance pays for hotel costs only.
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Figure 4.17: Progression of adverse selection cost when lives with the initial signs of
dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate with H = 1, ν = 0.04. The
government does not cap care liability.
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Figure 4.18: Probability density functions of care costs, conditional on the cost of
care being non-zero, separated by age and sex.
as,
P (1000i < Care cost ≤ 1000(i+ 1)|Care cost > 0) =
∑
g∈G,j∈S
pjx,ς,g b
j
x,ς,g(i)∑
g∈G,j∈S,k∈N
pjx,ς,g b
j
x,ς,g(k)
.
(4.6)
For ages 62.5 and 87.5, this is shown in Figure 4.18.
The adverse selection we have considered does not impact upon the duration of
care requirements. We therefore suggest the distribution of care costs would not differ
greatly between what is anticipated in pricing and what is experienced. Since only
a small proportion of lives are affected by the removal of the cap (see Table 4.10),
where a difference in this distribution were to arise, the associated loss would not be
large when spread over a portfolio of business. This explains why the changes in costs
of adverse selection were so small when the government cap was removed.
4.6 Cross-subsidy in Unisex Premiums
As noted in Section 4.4, premiums for females are substantially higher than those for
males when using sex as as a pricing factor. Hence, under a unisex format where
the costs are spread over both sexes, males will be paying more than they otherwise
would.
Define the cross-subsidy to be the excess of premium income from one group (call
this group A) over the benefits paid to them used to cover losses on business from
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Table 4.10: Conditional probabilities of reaching the U.K. government’s proposed care
cap of £75,000, adjusted for 4 years’ inflation, assuming a force of inflation of ν = 0.04
per annum.
Sex Age P (Care costs=0) P (Reach Proposed Cap—Require Care)
Male 62.5 0.5574 0.0516
67.5 0.5338 0.0521
72.5 0.5362 0.0479
77.5 0.5402 0.0474
82.5 0.5446 0.0374
87.5 0.5430 0.0190
Female 62.5 0.3351 0.0617
67.5 0.3109 0.0689
72.5 0.3045 0.0734
77.5 0.2986 0.0786
82.5 0.2961 0.0706
87.5 0.3033 0.0408
another group (call this group B):
Cross subsidy =

Profit from A, if 0 < Profit from A ≤ Loss from B
Loss from B, if 0 < Loss from B < Profit from A
0, otherwise.
(4.7)
For the existence of a cross-subsidy, it is therefore necessary for a simultaneous oc-
currence of both profit from one group of lives and losses from the other.
When the mix of lives matches what is priced for, this will create a cross-subsidy
which is measurable simply by comparing the premium rates in Figures 4.3 to 4.8.
However, in the context of adverse selection, this cross subsidy may disappear if
premium income from males is insufficient to cover the benefits males receive or if
the premium adjustment is such that females’ benefits are fully covered by females’
premiums. In this section we analyse the premium income and benefit payments at
the level of particular sex to quantify the cross-subsidy in the unisex premiums. In
this case group A are the male lives and group B are the female lives.
We can calculate the profit from males aged x in 2013, who purchased insurance
in calendar year c, which we denote by A(x, c) and A(x, c), for regular and single
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premium versions respectively, as
A(x, c)
=
∑
g∈G,i∈S,j∈Uk,ϑ∈B
N(x,M)
∫ c+1
c
pix,M,g tp˜
00i,0ϑj
x,M,g µ˜
0ϑj,1ϑj
x,t,M,g
(
Π
k
x,t a
j,P
x,M,g,t:c − Aj,Px,M,g,t:c
)
dt,
(4.8)
and
A(x, c) =
∑
g∈G,i∈S,j∈Uk,ϑ∈B
N(x,M)
∫ c+1
c
pix,M,g tp˜
00i,0ϑj
x,M,g µ˜
0ϑj,1ϑj
x,t,M,g
(
Πkx,t − Aj,Px,M,g,t:c
)
dt.
(4.9)
Similarly, we calculate the loss from females aged x in 2013, who purchased insurance
in calendar year c, which we denote by B(x, t) and B(x, t), as
B(x, c)
=
∑
g∈G,i∈S,j∈Uk,ϑ∈B
N(x, F )
∫ c+1
c
pix,F,g tp˜
00i,0ϑj
x,F,g µ˜
0ϑj,1ϑj
x,t,F,g
(
Aj,Px,F,g,t:c − Π
k
x,t a
j,P
x,F,g,t:c
)
dt,
(4.10)
and
B(x, c) =
∑
g∈G,i∈S,j∈Uk,ϑ∈B
N(x, F )
∫ c+1
c
pix,F,g tp˜
i,j
x,F,gµ˜
j,INS
x,t,F,g
(
Aj,Px,F,g,t:c − Πkx,t
)
dt,
(4.11)
for regular and single premium versions respectively.
Let the cross-subsidy across all business sold in calendar year c, expressed as a
percentage of male premium, be denoted by χ(c) and χ(c) and calculated as
χ(c) =
min
[
max
(
0,
∑
x∈X
A(x, c)
)
,max
(
0,
∑
x∈X
B(x, c)
)]
∑
x∈X ,g∈G,i∈S,j∈Uk,ϑ∈B
N(x,M)
∫ c+1
c
pix,M,g tp˜
00i,0ϑj
x,M,g µ˜
0ϑj,1ϑj
x,t,M,g Π
k
x,c a
j,P
x,M,g,t:c dt
, (4.12)
and
χ(c) =
min
[
max
(
0,
∑
x∈X
A(x, c)
)
,max
(
0,
∑
x∈X
B(x, c)
)]
∑
x∈X ,g∈G,i∈S,j∈Uk,ϑ∈B
N(x,M)
∫ c+1
c
pix,M,g tp˜
00i,0ϑj
x,M,g µ˜
0ϑj,1ϑj
x,t,M,g Π
k
x,c dt
, (4.13)
for regular and single premium versions respectively.
We analyse the cross-subsidies in the the same scenarios as above in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.19: Progression of the cross-subsidy from males in unisex premiums when
lives with the initial signs of dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate,
with H = 1, ν = 0.04. Black indicates the cross-subsidy is the profit on males, while
red indicates that it is the loss from females.
Figure 4.19 shows the progression of the cross-subsidy when lives with the initial
signs of dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate. There is an inverse
relationship between cost of adverse selection and the cross-subsidy — while adverse
selection cost is high, it is unlikely there is a profit being made from males and
when adverse selection cost is negative, it is possible that there is no loss on female
business. Consequently, the large market has the greatest cross-subsidy and is non-
zero throughout. Smaller market sizes make a loss on both male and female business
initially so have no cross subsidy. This lasts longer under the regular premium product
than the single premium version.
When we introduce genetic testing to this scenario (see Figure 4.20), the shape
shows some distortion in a similar fashion to the adverse selection cost but with local
minima in place of local maxima.
If healthy lives do not buy insurance but lives with the initial signs of dementia
buy insurance at an increased rate and lives alter buying behaviour after a genetic
test (see Figure 4.21) then a loss is made on males in all market sizes, lasting between
7 and 9 years in the regular premium version and 4 and 6 years for the single premium
version. At which point the cross subsidy begins increasing until a total profit is made
and starts to decrease as the loss on females decreases due to the premium adjustment
being made.
In Figure 4.22 we have lives with 1-ADL being underwritten into a separate class
of business. Lives with the initial signs of dementia buy insurance at an increased
rate and lives alter buying behaviour after a genetic test. In this case, a cross subsidy
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Figure 4.20: Progression of the cross-subsidy from males in unisex premiums when
lives with the initial signs of dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate
and lives change buying behaviour after having a genetic test, with H = 1, ν = 0.04.
Black indicates the cross-subsidy is the profit on males, while red indicates that it is
the loss from females.
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Figure 4.21: Progression of the cross-subsidy from males in unisex premiums when
lives with the initial signs of dementia or 1-ADL buy insurance at an increased rate
and healthy lives do not buy insurance and lives change buying behaviour after having
a genetic test, with H = 1, ν = 0.04. Black indicates the cross-subsidy is the profit
on males, while red indicates that it is the loss from females.
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Figure 4.22: Progression of the cross-subsidy from males in unisex premiums when
lives with 1-ADL are written into a separate class while lives with the initial signs of
dementia buy insurance at an increased rate and lives change buying behaviour after
having a genetic test, with H = 1, ν = 0.04. Black indicates the cross-subsidy is the
profit on males, while red indicates that it is the loss from females.
initially exists in the large market but becomes zero around year 15. Other market
sizes see a cross-subsidy once premiums have been adjusted: in the single premium
version, cross-subsidy exists for all cases but is short-lived for all but the lowest rate
of adverse selection in the small market; under a regular premium, cross-subsidy only
exists in the smallest market in the final years, and lasts for a short time in market
with purchase rate 0.01.
4.7 Conclusions
Renewed interest in long-term care from the government, and coverage in the press
highlighting the need for reform, has made the prospect of creating a new LTC market
in the U.K. a possibility. Adverse selection has been suggested as a potential barrier
to the success of such a market. This adverse selection could come from lives who
have had their APOE genotype tested, have the initial signs of dementia, are healthy,
or depending on underwriting practice, have some functional disability.
Our dynamic pricing strategy allows insurers to correct their premiums. We have
seen that losses from dementia are realised slower than losses from functional ability,
but it is dementia where the the greatest adverse selection costs arise.
These costs vary greatly over time. The reason for this is twofold: the insurer
adjusts its premium rates to factor in its experience; and the base premiums assume
increasing proportions of the high risk lives — who are adversely selecting. In the
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early years of the market, where the majority of the modelled lives purchase their
contract, they can reach significantly large levels. In the context of large premiums
on contracts being sold to pensioners on tight budgets, any increase of premiums to
pay for adverse selection would present challenges in marketability.
The adverse selection costs are insensitive to movements of inflation and to the
level of benefits paid for functional disability. While an improvement in the size of
the government’s cap on care liability changes adverse selection costs significantly,
removing the cap made very little impact. We found this was due to there being a
small percentage of lives benefiting from the introduction of such a cap. How well
this meets the needs of citizens is a matter for social policy researchers to consider
and politicians to debate, however actuaries will be interested in the extent that it
removes tail risk, which our results cannot say anything about.
Within unisex premiums for LTC, there is a high degree of cross-subsidy from
males to pay for the higher benefit costs of females. LTC is not unique in such
a cross-subsidy, a common example of a contract with one being motor insurance
(where females subsidise males), but introducing a new product with cross-subsidy
may make selling to men difficult. Whereas our pricing responds immediately to
differences between the genders, an insurer might take somewhat longer.
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Conclusions and Further Work
The work we have done has been to analyse the costs of adverse selection in insurance
markets where there are multiple causes of information asymmetry, including genetic
information. In this chapter we conclude the work and highlight where further work
may be done to explore the ideas covered in this work.
We remind the reader that the models we have presented were parameterised
using data from various periods and populations. Moreover, the uncertainty of the
estimated parameters has not been accounted for. While the compatibility of these
sources and the uncertainty is not a concern for our work, these should be considered
before our models are put to use for other purposes.
5.1 Conclusions
5.1.1 Breast Cancer
Chapter 2 was concerned with a polygenic model of BC, where a large number of
common but low impact genetic variations independently alter the risk of developing
BC. Working from epidemiology of newly discovered polygenes, we parameterised a
model to estimate the distribution of polygene relative risk among women with and
without a family history of breast or ovarian cancer. We found women with a family
history have a significantly higher risk of developing breast cancer, making it a good
proxy for genetic risk in the absence of genetic test results. We used our estimated
relative risk distributions to estimate the distributions for the CI premiums chargeable
to lives with and without family history and found that reasonable terms could be
offered.
In the context of the European Court of Justice’s sex discrimination ruling, we
recalculated these as unisex premiums. We envisaged two potential underwriting
scenarios for a family history of BC or OC among female relatives: only females are
rated; or males and females given an equal rating. Ratings of the former differ slightly
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due to the change in unrated premium from pattern of male claims being lighter than
females at early ages but heavier at older ages. In the latter case, since there were
approximately twice the lives over which the ratings are spread, the ratings were
approximately halved, as was their standard deviations.
We expanded our model of CI into a market for the insurance product, with
purchasing behaviour of individuals potentially changing after a genetic test. We
calculated adverse selection costs under a range of cases, some of which had results
which would be noticeable to an insurance company or a customer. From our sce-
narios, we were able to conclude that the greater part of the adverse selection cost is
due to the polygene component, rather than the major genes, confirming the conclu-
sion of Macdonald and McIvor (2009). Moreover, we found that lives with a low-risk
polygenotype choosing not to buy the contract, could present a reasonable adverse
selection cost.
5.1.2 Long-term Care Insurance
In Chapters 3 and 4 we were interested in a start-up market for LTC and how the
costs of adverse selection varied over time. We first outlined and parameterised a
model for old age health which included states for varying levels of functional ability
and cognitive function. We added and parameterised a hypothetical, intermediate
state of cognitive decline where we assumed the initial symptoms were observable
to the individual but not yet diagnosable and hence, invisible to the insurer. This
information asymmetry gave rise to a possibility of adverse selection from these states
of health.
An insurer could be expected to reprice when it learns that the mix of lives buy-
ing the product differs from what was assumed. We incorporated a novel dynamic
repricing methodology into our model, which adjusts some base premium based on
claims history.
When we applied this model to the U.K. market, we found that the sources of
adverse selection differed in the rate at which losses were realised, and hence, how
fast an insurer was able to adjust premiums to account for the adverse selection
it was experiencing. When adverse selection came from lives with the initial signs
of dementia, the rate premiums were adjusted was slowest compared to the other
potential sources of adverse selection.
On its own and with an exaggerated rate of testing, genetic testing poses a mod-
erate cost which is dwarfed when compared to the other potential sources of adverse
selection. Since a large proportion of lives with the initial signs of dementia progress
to large claims, they were also responsible for the largest adverse selection costs.
When other sources of adverse selection were included, in addition to the initial signs
of dementia, adverse selection costs were decreased because the selection was able to
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occur earlier, when lives were of a slightly lower risk. Moreover, claims from lives with
functional disability adversely selecting, allowed the repricing mechanism to increase
premiums to cover some of the losses to be incurred from the dementia claims.
We investigated the effect of the U.K. government’s proposed cap on an individ-
ual’s care liability. At the level which they are proposing, only a small proportion of
people will face enough care costs to benefit from it. Consequently, it has very little
impact on the costs of adverse selection.
5.2 Further Work
In our BC polygene model, we assumed independence in both inheritance and how the
polygene acts on BC risk. Without evidence to the contrary, this assumption allowed
us to create a simple model which gives good guidance. If the number of polygenes
turns out to be as large as we have assumed, there will likely be numerous loci close
enough together in the genome that they are often inherited together. Moreover,
there could be interactions between loci, such that the effect of particular combinations
differs to what the same combination would cause in our assumption of independence.
Another simplifying assumption was made with regards to our hypothetical state
for the initial signs of cognitive decline, in that we assumed equal transition intensity
into and out of the state. How well this model fits reality would need to be considered
and, when further understanding of the progression of dementia becomes available, a
re-parameterisation of this state would be appropriate.
Our model of an LTC market is dynamic from the perspective of the insurance
company, in that it reflects the repricing activity that could be made based on claims
and income experience. However, we do not make any consideration for where a
buying behaviour might change in response to the relative cheapness of the premium
rates, beyond simple deterministic scenarios. Our CI market model worked in a
similar fashion. These could be improved by applying some form of decision making
methodology, such as utility theory or prospect theory or using an elastic model of
demand with a suitably parameterised price elasticity based on solid empirical data.
Given the high costs from adverse selection and the uncertainty over purchasing
patterns, it is likely that there is a large risk inherent in writing LTC contracts.
To quantify this risk, the LTC simulation model could be amended to calculate the
distributions of benefit payments. From these distributions and a suitable model of
purchases, measures of risk including value at risk could be calculated which would
aid in understanding the risk of the product and how it is influenced by adverse
selection. This would be especially important in the context of a risk-based capital
requirement regime such as Solvency II. Product designs which share the insurance
risk with the policyholder such as with-profits or reviewable premiums could act to
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reduce the capital requirements. How well these types of products meet the needs
of the customer would need further research, in a similar approach to that taken by
Guille´n and Comas-Herrera (2012) in Spanish LTC products.
Alternatively, a product which serves as a life annuity, bought out of pensions
savings and also provides LTC benefits, might reduce the adverse selection costs.
Macdonald and Pritchard (2001) considered this mixing of an annuity and LTC and
found the adverse selection costs became much more manageable. However, this is
not a solution for today’s elderly but may help the situation in the future.
A recent case in the Supreme Court of the United States has prevented the patent-
ing of naturally occurring genes1 in the U.S. This will allow increased competition in
the market for genetic tests and potentially increase innovation and bring down the
costs involved. Cheaper testing and future developments in genomic medicine will
make it more likely that gene testing for the purposes of treating or preventing dis-
eases will become routine, although such a scenario is not yet on the horizon. Increased
awareness of risks brings with it a potential for adverse selection if this information is
not shared with an insurance company. Empirical evidence of adverse selection related
to genetic testing is limited and further work is necessary to make solid conclusions.
The direction of genetic research is moving towards analysing the function of
risk genes, to understand how they cause predisposition to particular diseases. Such
improved understanding might in turn lead to the further development of genomic
medicine. Advances in genomic medicine have been slow to surface, but a recent
review by Manolio et al. (2013) is optimistic about its future if more collaboration
were to take place. Moreover, recent results from the second Cognitive Function and
Ageing Study reported by Matthews et al. (2013), showed a significant decrease in
prevalence of dementia. They interpreted this as providing evidence for a cohort
effect in dementia prevalence. Actuaries will need to adapt their modelling in line
with where the epidemiology leads, whether this could mean the use of multi-factorial
models which include the additional factors of e.g. cigarette smoking or weight, or
how developments lead to changing patterns of morbidity over time.
1Association for Molecular Pathology vs. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013)
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Appendix A
Numerical Methods
A.1 Kolmogorov Forward Equations
Throughout this thesis we will use Markov multiple state models to represent the
health of our modelled populations. The transition intensity from state i to state j
at age x + t is denoted µijx+t. Denote the probability a life is in state j at age x + t
conditional on being state i at age x is denoted tp
ij
x . The occupancy probabilities in
a Markov model can be found by solving differential equations known as Kolmogorov
forward equations:
d
dt
tp
ij
x =
∑
k 6=j
(
tp
ik
x µ
kj
x+t − tpijx µjkx+t
)
, (A.1)
with boundary conditions 0p
ij
x = δ
ij, where δij is the Kronecker delta.
In a two-state model with no backward transitions, this reduces to solving
d
dt
tp
ii
x = tp
ii
x µ
ij
x+t, (A.2)
so
tp
ii
x = 1− exp
(∫ t
0
µijx+s ds
)
. (A.3)
However, in a more complicated model, there may be no tractable form and the
solution will need to be found numerically.
A.2 Runge-Kutta Method
The simplest method for solving differential equations is Euler’s method which approx-
imates the function based on the derivative at the beginning of each step. However,
the stability and error for a given step size can be improved by using a method that
incorporates an approximate calculation of the derivative at the midpoint of the step.
One such method is the 4th-order Runge-Kutta method.
182
Chapter A: Numerical Methods
To find a function y(t), with derivative of the form y′ = f(t, y) and whose initial
value y(t0) = y0 with the 4th-order Runga-Kutta method and a step size of h, we use
iterations
yn+1 = yn + h
1
6
(k1 + 2k2 + 2k3 + k4)
tn+1 = tn + h
for n = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , using
k1 = f(tn, yn),
k2 = f(tn +
1
2
h, yn + h
1
2
k1),
k3 = f(tn +
1
2
h, yn + h
1
2
k2),
k4 = f(tn + h, yn + hk3).
This is repeated over the entire period.
Using a negative value for h, and a terminal condition instead of an initial condi-
tion, we can solve differential equations backwards.
A.3 Simpson’s Rule
We will face functions which need to be integrated but for which the anti-derivative
cannot be written in elementary form. Numerical methods exist to integrate such
functions approximately.
By rewriting an integral in the form of an initial value problem I ′(x) = f(x) with
I(a) = 0, and solving with the 4th-order Runge Kutta method, the method reduces
to the widely used Simpson’s rule:∫ b
a
f(x) dx ≈ b− a
6
[
f(a) + 4f
(
a+ b
2
)
+ f(b)
]
. (A.4)
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Transition Intensities for Other CI
The model of critical illnesses in Chapter 2 has transitions from healthy to BC, OC,
Other CI and Dead. The transition intensities we use for the state Other CI are
based on the onset rates from Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2003), with an adjustment
to remove BC and OC using the onset rates of Macdonald et al. (2003a).
Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2003) fitted models for cancer, heart attack and stroke
for each sex. Heart attacks and strokes often result in death. Stand alone critical
illness insurance commonly does not pay out if there is a death within 28 days of
illness, so they make adjustment for survival after stroke and heart attack (death
from cancer usually occurs more than 28 days after diagnosis). We list their functions
here. Let µcx, µ
b
x, µ
o
x, µ
h
x and µ
s
x, denote the onset rates at age x, of cancer, breast
cancer, ovarian cancer, heart attack and stroke respectively. Further, denote the
probability of survival for 28 days after heart attack and stroke at age x, by phx and
psx, respectively.
Cancer
Onset rates for cancer were estimated using cancer registrations in England and Wales
between 1990 and 1992 from Office for National Statistics (1999).
For males their fitted model was,
µcx =
exp (−11.25 + 0.105x) if x < 510.2591585− 0.0124735x+ 0.0001916916x2 − 8.952933× 10−7x3 if x ≥ 60.
(B.1)
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Between the ages 51 and 60 they blend these functions linearly,
µcx+t =
60− x
9
exp (−11.25 + 0.105x)
+
x− 51
9
(
0.2591585− 0.0124735x+ 0.0001916916x2 − 8.952933× 10−7x3) .
(B.2)
The fitted model for females is discontinuous due to the impact of the breast cancer
screening programme available to all women over the age of 50:
µcx =
exp (−10.78 + 0.123x− 0.00033x2) if x < 53−0.01545632 + 0.0003805097x if x ≥ 53 (B.3)
Female breast cancer and ovarian cancer onset rates were fitted to the same cancer
registration data source as above, by Macdonald et al. (2003a). In the case of breast
cancer, this also had a discontinuity at age 53:
µ′BCx =

1
Γ (8.7305)
0.07428.7305 exp (−0.00742x)x7.7305 if x < 53
0.00012 + 0.00018 (x− 35)
− 0.000005 (x− 35)2 + 5.29× 10−8 (x− 35)3 if x ≥ 53
(B.4)
For ovarian cancer, it was,
µ′OCx =
 1Γ(6.92)0.0356.92 exp (−0.035x)x5.92 if x < 450.0001554 + 0.000029 (x− 45)− 0.00000048 (x− 45)2 if x ≥ 55. (B.5)
Between ages 45 and 55, these were blended in a similar fashion as above,
µ′OCx =
1
Γ (6.92)
0.0356.92 exp (−0.035x)x5.92 55− x
10
+
[
0.0001554 + 0.000029 (x− 45)− 0.00000048 (x− 45)2] x− 45
10
. (B.6)
Heart Attack
Heart onset rates were estimated using the cases of first-ever heart attack from Mc-
Cormick et al. (1995), data from U.K. general practices in the period 1991–1992. For
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Table B.1: 28-day survival probabilities for males, following a heart attack. Source:
Dinani et al. (2000), via Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2003).
Age (x) phx Age (x) p
h
x
40–42 0.84 60–61 0.78
43–46 0.83 62–64 0.77
47–52 0.82 65–74 0.76
53–56 0.81 75–79 0.75
57 0.80 80+ 0.74
males the fitted rates were,
µhx =
exp (−13.2238 + 0.152568) if x < 44−0.01245106 + 0.000315605x if x > 49, (B.7)
with blending between ages 44 and 49:
µhx = exp (−13.2238 + 0.152568)
49− x
49− 44
+ (−0.01245106 + 0.000315605x) x− 44
49− 44 . (B.8)
The onset rates for females were fitted as,
µhx =
0.598694
Γ (15.6412)
0.1531715.6412 exp (−0.15317x)x14.6412. (B.9)
The 28-day survival probabilities were taken from Dinani et al. (2000). Males
follow the probabilities given in Table B.1 and females phx = 0.79 for all ages x.
Stroke
The onset rates of stroke were fitted to the ungraduated onset rates of Stewart et al.
(1999), a prospective community stroke register of population of 234,533 lives in south
London over 1995–1996. Male onset rates were fitted as,
µsx = exp
(−16.9524 + 0.294973x− 0.001904x2 + 0.00000159449x3) . (B.10)
Female onset rates were fitted as,
µsx = exp (−11.1477 + 0.081076x) (B.11)
The 28-day survival probability after a stroke, taken from Dinani et al. (2000),
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were calculated as
psx =
0.9− 0.002x
0.9
, (B.12)
for males and females.
Total Transition Intensity for Other CI
Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2003) assumed that critical illness claims due to other
diseases amounted to 15% of the claims due to cancer, heart attack and stroke. The
transition intensity from Healthy to Other CI in our model (depicted in Figure 2.1)
can be calculated as,
µCI (x+ t) = 1.15
(
µcx+t + p
h
x+tµ
h
x + p
s
x+tµ
s
x+t
)− µbx+t − µox+t. (B.13)
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CMI Mortality Improvements
Model 2011 Assumptions
In this appendix we list the assumptions underlying the mortality improvements model
of CMI (2011).
• The experienced mortality improvement rates for the period 1991–2008 are in
Tables C.1 to C.12.
• The age effects component of the 2008 mortality improvements are in Tables
C.13 and C.14.
• The cohort component of the 2008 mortality improvements are in Tables C.15
and C.16.
• The long-term rates of mortality improvement for the age effects component are
the same for males and females and are in Table C.17.
• The number of years taken to reach these long-term age effects component of
improvement are in Table C.18.
• The long-term rate of improvement for the cohort component is zero.
• The number of years taken to reach the long-term rate of improvement for the
cohort component is in Table C.19.
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Table C.1: Experienced mortality improvement for males aged 20–59 in the years
1991–2000 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
20 0.47 0.35 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.51 0.81 1.19 1.66 2.20
21 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.40 0.68 1.06 1.50 2.00
22 -0.16 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.13 0.29 0.54 0.89 1.33 1.80
23 -0.60 -0.45 -0.30 -0.14 0.02 0.19 0.43 0.75 1.14 1.60
24 -1.04 -0.85 -0.66 -0.44 -0.21 0.04 0.32 0.64 1.00 1.41
25 -1.43 -1.21 -0.99 -0.76 -0.50 -0.21 0.13 0.50 0.88 1.28
26 -1.78 -1.52 -1.26 -1.02 -0.77 -0.48 -0.14 0.27 0.71 1.15
27 -2.06 -1.79 -1.49 -1.21 -0.95 -0.70 -0.39 -0.01 0.44 0.94
28 -2.08 -1.99 -1.69 -1.36 -1.07 -0.81 -0.56 -0.24 0.15 0.63
29 -1.87 -1.97 -1.83 -1.51 -1.18 -0.88 -0.63 -0.39 -0.09 0.32
30 -1.51 -1.74 -1.77 -1.60 -1.28 -0.96 -0.69 -0.46 -0.24 0.05
31 -1.10 -1.37 -1.52 -1.50 -1.33 -1.03 -0.75 -0.51 -0.31 -0.13
32 -0.76 -0.95 -1.14 -1.23 -1.19 -1.04 -0.78 -0.55 -0.35 -0.20
33 -0.50 -0.60 -0.72 -0.84 -0.90 -0.86 -0.74 -0.55 -0.37 -0.22
34 -0.31 -0.32 -0.36 -0.43 -0.51 -0.55 -0.53 -0.46 -0.33 -0.22
35 -0.21 -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.18 -0.22 -0.23 -0.21 -0.16
36 -0.22 -0.01 0.12 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.00
37 -0.38 -0.02 0.23 0.38 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.41 0.34 0.26
38 -0.73 -0.19 0.21 0.48 0.63 0.70 0.73 0.70 0.62 0.53
39 -1.18 -0.54 0.04 0.46 0.71 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.75
40 -1.32 -1.00 -0.31 0.29 0.70 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.90
41 -1.03 -1.16 -0.80 -0.09 0.53 0.93 1.11 1.12 1.07 1.02
42 -0.29 -0.89 -1.01 -0.63 0.11 0.73 1.12 1.28 1.25 1.17
43 0.81 -0.17 -0.79 -0.90 -0.51 0.25 0.89 1.28 1.44 1.40
44 1.77 0.94 -0.07 -0.70 -0.83 -0.43 0.35 1.01 1.42 1.59
45 2.43 1.91 1.06 0.02 -0.64 -0.78 -0.37 0.43 1.11 1.54
46 2.73 2.54 2.01 1.14 0.08 -0.60 -0.73 -0.32 0.50 1.21
47 2.69 2.78 2.60 2.07 1.20 0.12 -0.57 -0.69 -0.26 0.59
48 2.57 2.71 2.81 2.63 2.10 1.23 0.15 -0.52 -0.64 -0.18
49 2.45 2.58 2.73 2.83 2.65 2.13 1.27 0.20 -0.46 -0.55
50 2.30 2.43 2.58 2.74 2.85 2.68 2.18 1.33 0.29 -0.35
51 2.15 2.26 2.40 2.56 2.74 2.88 2.74 2.26 1.44 0.42
52 2.09 2.10 2.21 2.36 2.54 2.74 2.92 2.81 2.37 1.58
53 2.14 2.04 2.05 2.17 2.34 2.53 2.77 2.97 2.90 2.49
54 2.35 2.12 2.01 2.03 2.16 2.34 2.56 2.82 3.05 3.00
55 2.66 2.33 2.10 2.01 2.04 2.20 2.40 2.64 2.90 3.14
56 2.95 2.65 2.32 2.10 2.02 2.09 2.27 2.49 2.74 3.01
57 3.18 2.93 2.64 2.32 2.12 2.06 2.15 2.35 2.59 2.85
58 3.36 3.17 2.93 2.65 2.35 2.16 2.11 2.21 2.44 2.69
59 3.49 3.36 3.19 2.96 2.69 2.40 2.22 2.18 2.28 2.50
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Table C.2: Experienced mortality improvement for males aged 20–59 in the years
2001–2008 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
20 2.79 3.31 3.72 4.02 4.23 4.39 4.52 4.62
21 2.54 3.10 3.57 3.92 4.14 4.26 4.35 4.41
22 2.31 2.84 3.37 3.79 4.08 4.23 4.27 4.29
23 2.08 2.58 3.09 3.58 3.96 4.20 4.29 4.26
24 1.86 2.33 2.80 3.28 3.74 4.08 4.27 4.32
25 1.69 2.11 2.55 2.99 3.43 3.86 4.17 4.32
26 1.56 1.96 2.34 2.73 3.13 3.55 3.95 4.22
27 1.41 1.83 2.20 2.54 2.88 3.25 3.63 4.00
28 1.17 1.66 2.07 2.42 2.71 3.02 3.34 3.69
29 0.81 1.37 1.87 2.28 2.61 2.87 3.14 3.44
30 0.45 0.96 1.53 2.05 2.46 2.78 3.02 3.27
31 0.15 0.54 1.05 1.64 2.17 2.59 2.92 3.17
32 -0.05 0.20 0.58 1.10 1.71 2.25 2.70 3.06
33 -0.12 -0.01 0.22 0.59 1.12 1.75 2.33 2.81
34 -0.13 -0.07 0.00 0.21 0.59 1.13 1.80 2.40
35 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.20 0.59 1.16 1.86
36 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.20 0.61 1.21
37 0.18 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.24 0.66
38 0.43 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.35
39 0.65 0.55 0.43 0.31 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.28
40 0.82 0.73 0.62 0.51 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.38
41 0.94 0.86 0.77 0.68 0.59 0.51 0.48 0.51
42 1.09 0.99 0.89 0.80 0.72 0.66 0.62 0.63
43 1.30 1.20 1.08 0.95 0.85 0.78 0.74 0.74
44 1.55 1.46 1.34 1.20 1.04 0.92 0.85 0.83
45 1.74 1.73 1.64 1.52 1.35 1.16 1.02 0.95
46 1.67 1.89 1.91 1.84 1.72 1.53 1.31 1.15
47 1.32 1.81 2.06 2.11 2.05 1.93 1.73 1.50
48 0.69 1.45 1.97 2.24 2.30 2.26 2.14 1.95
49 -0.08 0.82 1.59 2.13 2.41 2.49 2.46 2.34
50 -0.43 0.05 0.96 1.75 2.28 2.57 2.65 2.62
51 -0.20 -0.27 0.22 1.13 1.91 2.44 2.71 2.77
52 0.59 -0.02 -0.08 0.41 1.30 2.06 2.57 2.83
53 1.73 0.76 0.17 0.12 0.59 1.47 2.21 2.70
54 2.61 1.87 0.93 0.35 0.29 0.76 1.61 2.33
55 3.10 2.72 1.99 1.06 0.48 0.42 0.88 1.71
56 3.25 3.20 2.82 2.10 1.17 0.60 0.53 0.97
57 3.12 3.35 3.30 2.92 2.20 1.27 0.70 0.62
58 2.95 3.22 3.44 3.39 3.01 2.30 1.39 0.81
59 2.76 3.02 3.29 3.51 3.46 3.10 2.41 1.52
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Table C.3: Experienced mortality improvement for males aged 60–99 in the years
1991–2000 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
60 3.53 3.48 3.38 3.23 3.02 2.76 2.48 2.30 2.25 2.35
61 3.49 3.51 3.49 3.43 3.30 3.12 2.87 2.58 2.39 2.34
62 3.40 3.46 3.50 3.52 3.51 3.42 3.25 3.00 2.71 2.51
63 3.25 3.36 3.44 3.52 3.58 3.62 3.57 3.42 3.17 2.86
64 3.00 3.20 3.33 3.45 3.56 3.67 3.76 3.75 3.61 3.35
65 2.67 2.94 3.16 3.33 3.48 3.63 3.78 3.91 3.91 3.78
66 2.31 2.63 2.91 3.16 3.37 3.57 3.75 3.92 4.05 4.05
67 1.97 2.29 2.61 2.92 3.21 3.47 3.71 3.90 4.06 4.16
68 1.77 1.97 2.29 2.63 2.97 3.30 3.62 3.88 4.08 4.20
69 1.72 1.79 2.00 2.33 2.70 3.07 3.44 3.80 4.07 4.25
70 1.80 1.73 1.81 2.05 2.41 2.80 3.20 3.60 3.98 4.25
71 1.92 1.78 1.74 1.86 2.13 2.53 2.95 3.37 3.77 4.15
72 1.94 1.86 1.75 1.75 1.92 2.24 2.68 3.12 3.55 3.94
73 1.92 1.88 1.81 1.74 1.78 1.99 2.35 2.83 3.30 3.72
74 1.93 1.91 1.87 1.81 1.76 1.84 2.08 2.47 2.98 3.46
75 1.93 1.95 1.95 1.92 1.88 1.83 1.92 2.17 2.58 3.11
76 1.84 1.90 1.98 2.03 2.04 1.99 1.94 2.02 2.26 2.68
77 1.70 1.74 1.86 2.04 2.16 2.20 2.15 2.06 2.10 2.33
78 1.62 1.57 1.64 1.84 2.13 2.33 2.39 2.32 2.16 2.15
79 1.66 1.50 1.45 1.58 1.87 2.27 2.53 2.60 2.48 2.23
80 1.65 1.55 1.38 1.37 1.55 1.93 2.43 2.75 2.81 2.62
81 1.55 1.54 1.43 1.28 1.31 1.55 2.01 2.61 2.97 3.02
82 1.36 1.44 1.43 1.34 1.21 1.27 1.57 2.11 2.79 3.18
83 1.12 1.27 1.36 1.37 1.29 1.17 1.26 1.61 2.21 2.96
84 0.94 1.01 1.19 1.30 1.33 1.26 1.16 1.27 1.66 2.31
85 0.86 0.83 0.93 1.13 1.27 1.31 1.26 1.17 1.30 1.72
86 0.87 0.75 0.75 0.88 1.09 1.24 1.30 1.26 1.19 1.34
87 0.87 0.75 0.69 0.73 0.87 1.08 1.23 1.29 1.26 1.21
88 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.68 0.76 0.90 1.08 1.21 1.28 1.28
89 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.61 0.70 0.80 0.94 1.09 1.21 1.28
90 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.61 0.73 0.86 0.98 1.10 1.20
91 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.48 0.63 0.78 0.90 1.00 1.09
92 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.53 0.68 0.82 0.93 1.02
93 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.33 0.47 0.60 0.73 0.85 0.95
94 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 0.22 0.39 0.54 0.67 0.78 0.87
95 0.01 -0.09 -0.13 -0.07 0.06 0.27 0.45 0.60 0.71 0.80
96 -0.03 -0.09 -0.14 -0.13 -0.05 0.11 0.33 0.51 0.65 0.75
97 -0.11 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16 -0.10 0.01 0.19 0.40 0.58 0.71
98 -0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.22 -0.15 -0.05 0.09 0.27 0.48 0.65
99 -0.30 -0.35 -0.36 -0.32 -0.25 -0.13 0.01 0.18 0.36 0.56
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Table C.4: Experienced mortality improvement for males aged 60–99 in the years
2001–2008 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
60 2.56 2.81 3.06 3.33 3.55 3.52 3.17 2.51
61 2.42 2.61 2.84 3.08 3.34 3.56 3.54 3.23
62 2.43 2.49 2.65 2.86 3.08 3.33 3.54 3.53
63 2.63 2.53 2.56 2.70 2.88 3.08 3.29 3.49
64 3.01 2.75 2.62 2.63 2.74 2.89 3.06 3.24
65 3.50 3.13 2.85 2.70 2.68 2.77 2.89 3.03
66 3.91 3.62 3.22 2.91 2.74 2.70 2.78 2.88
67 4.14 3.97 3.66 3.25 2.93 2.74 2.70 2.77
68 4.25 4.18 3.98 3.65 3.23 2.90 2.72 2.67
69 4.32 4.29 4.16 3.93 3.58 3.18 2.86 2.69
70 4.39 4.40 4.29 4.09 3.83 3.49 3.11 2.82
71 4.39 4.49 4.42 4.23 3.98 3.69 3.37 3.03
72 4.29 4.49 4.52 4.39 4.12 3.83 3.53 3.24
73 4.08 4.37 4.52 4.50 4.31 3.99 3.66 3.37
74 3.85 4.17 4.40 4.48 4.41 4.18 3.83 3.50
75 3.58 3.94 4.19 4.34 4.37 4.26 4.02 3.67
76 3.21 3.66 3.98 4.16 4.23 4.19 4.06 3.82
77 2.74 3.27 3.70 3.97 4.09 4.07 3.98 3.83
78 2.35 2.75 3.29 3.71 3.94 3.99 3.89 3.75
79 2.16 2.31 2.71 3.27 3.69 3.90 3.89 3.71
80 2.27 2.10 2.22 2.62 3.22 3.66 3.85 3.80
81 2.74 2.25 1.99 2.07 2.50 3.17 3.65 3.84
82 3.19 2.81 2.17 1.81 1.87 2.35 3.12 3.67
83 3.37 3.32 2.83 2.03 1.57 1.62 2.18 3.09
84 3.11 3.52 3.42 2.81 1.85 1.29 1.34 1.99
85 2.41 3.25 3.65 3.49 2.75 1.63 0.98 1.03
86 1.78 2.51 3.37 3.76 3.53 2.67 1.40 0.66
87 1.39 1.85 2.60 3.47 3.84 3.54 2.58 1.17
88 1.26 1.47 1.94 2.70 3.57 3.90 3.55 2.49
89 1.31 1.34 1.58 2.07 2.82 3.66 3.96 3.55
90 1.29 1.37 1.47 1.75 2.26 2.98 3.77 4.01
91 1.20 1.32 1.46 1.65 1.99 2.50 3.18 3.89
92 1.09 1.21 1.37 1.59 1.87 2.26 2.77 3.39
93 1.03 1.10 1.24 1.46 1.75 2.11 2.54 3.03
94 0.97 1.05 1.14 1.31 1.57 1.92 2.35 2.80
95 0.88 0.98 1.08 1.21 1.42 1.72 2.11 2.57
96 0.81 0.89 1.00 1.14 1.31 1.56 1.89 2.30
97 0.79 0.84 0.92 1.04 1.22 1.44 1.72 2.06
98 0.77 0.85 0.90 0.99 1.13 1.33 1.58 1.87
99 0.72 0.85 0.94 1.00 1.11 1.26 1.47 1.72
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Table C.5: Experienced mortality improvement for males aged 100–120 in the years
1991–2000 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
100 -0.41 -0.45 -0.48 -0.45 -0.38 -0.26 -0.10 0.08 0.26 0.45
101 -0.31 -0.35 -0.38 -0.35 -0.28 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.35
102 -0.21 -0.25 -0.28 -0.25 -0.18 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.25
103 -0.11 -0.15 -0.18 -0.15 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15
104 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
105 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
106 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
107 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
108 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
109 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
110 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
111 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
112 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
113 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
114 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
115 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
116 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
117 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
118 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
119 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table C.6: Experienced mortality improvement for males aged 100–12 in the years
2001–2008 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
100 0.64 0.81 0.95 1.05 1.14 1.26 1.43 1.63
101 0.54 0.71 0.85 0.95 1.04 1.16 1.33 1.53
102 0.44 0.61 0.75 0.85 0.94 1.06 1.23 1.43
103 0.34 0.51 0.65 0.75 0.84 0.96 1.13 1.33
104 0.24 0.41 0.55 0.65 0.74 0.86 1.03 1.23
105 0.14 0.31 0.45 0.55 0.64 0.76 0.93 1.13
106 0.04 0.21 0.35 0.45 0.54 0.66 0.83 1.03
107 0.00 0.11 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.56 0.73 0.93
108 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.25 0.34 0.46 0.63 0.83
109 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.24 0.36 0.53 0.73
110 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.26 0.43 0.63
111 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.16 0.33 0.53
112 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.43
113 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.33
114 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.23
115 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
116 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
117 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
118 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
119 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table C.7: Experienced mortality improvement for females aged 20–59 in the years
1991–2000 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
20 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.43 0.54 0.69 0.88 1.07 1.28 1.50
21 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.35 0.48 0.66 0.86 1.07 1.29
22 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.19 0.30 0.45 0.64 0.86 1.08
23 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.29 0.46 0.65 0.88
24 0.21 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.32 0.49 0.69
25 0.30 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.23 0.37 0.54
26 0.45 0.24 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.31 0.45
27 0.63 0.39 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.29 0.41
28 0.79 0.57 0.36 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.40
29 0.93 0.72 0.53 0.36 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.32 0.41
30 1.03 0.84 0.66 0.51 0.38 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.35 0.44
31 1.09 0.93 0.77 0.64 0.52 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.47
32 1.08 0.98 0.85 0.73 0.63 0.55 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.52
33 1.03 0.97 0.89 0.80 0.71 0.65 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.59
34 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.84 0.78 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.66
35 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.72
36 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.78
37 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.86
38 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.82 0.89 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.96
39 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.84 0.93 1.01 1.06 1.08 1.08
40 0.75 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.77 0.88 1.00 1.11 1.18 1.21
41 0.80 0.68 0.63 0.64 0.69 0.79 0.93 1.09 1.22 1.31
42 0.92 0.74 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.70 0.82 0.99 1.19 1.35
43 1.10 0.86 0.69 0.59 0.57 0.62 0.72 0.87 1.07 1.30
44 1.29 1.06 0.83 0.66 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.76 0.93 1.16
45 1.47 1.26 1.04 0.81 0.66 0.58 0.58 0.67 0.81 1.01
46 1.63 1.45 1.25 1.04 0.82 0.67 0.61 0.63 0.73 0.88
47 1.75 1.60 1.44 1.26 1.06 0.86 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.81
48 1.80 1.69 1.57 1.43 1.27 1.09 0.91 0.79 0.75 0.79
49 1.81 1.73 1.64 1.55 1.44 1.31 1.15 0.98 0.87 0.84
50 1.80 1.72 1.66 1.60 1.55 1.47 1.36 1.22 1.06 0.97
51 1.78 1.70 1.65 1.60 1.58 1.55 1.51 1.42 1.30 1.16
52 1.82 1.70 1.63 1.59 1.57 1.57 1.58 1.56 1.49 1.39
53 1.94 1.76 1.64 1.59 1.57 1.57 1.60 1.63 1.63 1.58
54 2.15 1.90 1.72 1.63 1.60 1.59 1.62 1.66 1.71 1.71
55 2.41 2.12 1.88 1.73 1.65 1.65 1.68 1.71 1.76 1.81
56 2.62 2.38 2.10 1.88 1.76 1.71 1.75 1.80 1.84 1.89
57 2.76 2.59 2.36 2.10 1.91 1.81 1.80 1.86 1.93 1.99
58 2.85 2.74 2.57 2.36 2.12 1.95 1.87 1.89 1.98 2.07
59 2.92 2.85 2.73 2.57 2.37 2.15 2.00 1.95 1.98 2.09
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Table C.8: Experienced mortality improvement for females aged 20–59 in the years
2001–2008 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
20 1.72 1.91 2.08 2.21 2.30 2.37 2.41 2.41
21 1.51 1.74 1.93 2.08 2.19 2.27 2.31 2.33
22 1.31 1.53 1.75 1.93 2.07 2.17 2.22 2.25
23 1.11 1.33 1.55 1.76 1.93 2.05 2.13 2.17
24 0.91 1.14 1.36 1.57 1.76 1.92 2.03 2.09
25 0.74 0.96 1.18 1.39 1.59 1.76 1.90 2.00
26 0.62 0.81 1.03 1.24 1.43 1.61 1.77 1.90
27 0.55 0.72 0.90 1.10 1.30 1.48 1.64 1.79
28 0.52 0.67 0.83 1.00 1.19 1.37 1.53 1.68
29 0.52 0.65 0.79 0.95 1.11 1.29 1.45 1.60
30 0.54 0.65 0.78 0.92 1.07 1.23 1.39 1.54
31 0.56 0.67 0.78 0.91 1.05 1.19 1.35 1.51
32 0.60 0.69 0.80 0.91 1.04 1.17 1.32 1.47
33 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.92 1.04 1.16 1.30 1.44
34 0.70 0.76 0.84 0.94 1.05 1.17 1.29 1.43
35 0.74 0.79 0.86 0.95 1.06 1.17 1.29 1.42
36 0.78 0.81 0.87 0.95 1.05 1.17 1.29 1.41
37 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.94 1.03 1.15 1.27 1.40
38 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.96 1.02 1.12 1.25 1.38
39 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.11 1.21 1.35
40 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.15 1.21 1.32
41 1.34 1.34 1.33 1.30 1.27 1.25 1.26 1.32
42 1.45 1.49 1.49 1.47 1.44 1.41 1.37 1.38
43 1.48 1.60 1.64 1.63 1.61 1.58 1.54 1.51
44 1.41 1.62 1.74 1.79 1.78 1.75 1.72 1.68
45 1.25 1.53 1.75 1.88 1.94 1.92 1.89 1.86
46 1.09 1.35 1.64 1.86 2.01 2.06 2.05 2.02
47 0.97 1.18 1.45 1.74 1.97 2.11 2.17 2.16
48 0.90 1.07 1.28 1.54 1.83 2.05 2.19 2.26
49 0.89 1.00 1.17 1.38 1.63 1.90 2.12 2.25
50 0.94 0.99 1.10 1.26 1.46 1.69 1.95 2.16
51 1.07 1.04 1.09 1.19 1.34 1.52 1.74 1.98
52 1.25 1.16 1.14 1.17 1.27 1.40 1.57 1.77
53 1.48 1.34 1.25 1.22 1.25 1.33 1.45 1.61
54 1.67 1.57 1.43 1.33 1.29 1.31 1.39 1.50
55 1.81 1.76 1.65 1.50 1.39 1.35 1.36 1.43
56 1.92 1.91 1.85 1.73 1.57 1.45 1.40 1.41
57 2.03 2.05 2.02 1.94 1.80 1.63 1.51 1.45
58 2.13 2.16 2.16 2.12 2.03 1.88 1.70 1.57
59 2.18 2.24 2.27 2.26 2.21 2.11 1.96 1.78
196
Chapter C: CMI Mortality Improvements Model 2011 Assumptions
Table C.9: Experienced mortality improvement for females aged 60–99 in the years
1991–2000 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
60 2.95 2.96 2.88 2.75 2.59 2.40 2.20 2.07 2.02 2.07
61 2.92 3.02 3.02 2.92 2.78 2.63 2.45 2.26 2.15 2.11
62 2.78 2.99 3.09 3.08 2.97 2.83 2.67 2.50 2.34 2.23
63 2.51 2.83 3.05 3.16 3.14 3.02 2.88 2.73 2.57 2.41
64 2.16 2.53 2.87 3.10 3.22 3.20 3.09 2.94 2.80 2.64
65 1.79 2.17 2.55 2.91 3.16 3.28 3.27 3.15 3.01 2.86
66 1.44 1.81 2.19 2.59 2.97 3.24 3.36 3.35 3.23 3.07
67 1.13 1.46 1.83 2.23 2.64 3.05 3.34 3.47 3.45 3.31
68 0.92 1.16 1.49 1.87 2.28 2.72 3.15 3.45 3.58 3.55
69 0.84 0.96 1.20 1.54 1.93 2.35 2.80 3.25 3.56 3.69
70 0.87 0.87 1.00 1.24 1.60 2.00 2.43 2.90 3.35 3.66
71 0.98 0.89 0.90 1.04 1.30 1.68 2.09 2.53 2.99 3.44
72 1.05 0.98 0.91 0.93 1.09 1.38 1.77 2.20 2.63 3.07
73 1.08 1.04 0.99 0.93 0.98 1.15 1.46 1.87 2.30 2.72
74 1.10 1.08 1.05 1.01 0.97 1.04 1.23 1.55 1.96 2.38
75 1.13 1.11 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.13 1.33 1.64 2.04
76 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.23 1.43 1.73
77 1.14 1.11 1.12 1.16 1.19 1.22 1.23 1.25 1.34 1.54
78 1.15 1.09 1.08 1.12 1.21 1.28 1.33 1.35 1.37 1.46
79 1.17 1.07 1.03 1.05 1.14 1.28 1.40 1.47 1.49 1.50
80 1.16 1.07 0.98 0.97 1.03 1.18 1.38 1.54 1.63 1.65
81 1.12 1.04 0.96 0.89 0.91 1.02 1.23 1.50 1.70 1.80
82 1.08 0.99 0.92 0.85 0.81 0.86 1.02 1.29 1.62 1.86
83 1.06 0.96 0.88 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.84 1.04 1.35 1.74
84 1.06 0.94 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.83 1.07 1.43
85 1.05 0.91 0.81 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.85 1.12
86 1.04 0.88 0.77 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.74 0.90
87 1.03 0.85 0.71 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.73 0.80
88 0.96 0.80 0.64 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.58 0.65 0.73 0.81
89 0.88 0.73 0.58 0.45 0.38 0.37 0.44 0.56 0.69 0.80
90 0.82 0.65 0.51 0.38 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.40 0.57 0.73
91 0.77 0.60 0.44 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.39 0.58
92 0.70 0.56 0.40 0.27 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.26 0.41
93 0.59 0.49 0.37 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.30
94 0.46 0.39 0.30 0.21 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.23
95 0.32 0.27 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.18
96 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.13
97 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.09
98 -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.08 -0.03 0.05
99 -0.04 -0.12 -0.18 -0.22 -0.23 -0.22 -0.19 -0.14 -0.08 0.00
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Table C.10: Experienced mortality improvement for females aged 60–99 in the years
2001–2008 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
60 2.18 2.27 2.33 2.36 2.35 2.29 2.19 2.04
61 2.15 2.26 2.35 2.40 2.43 2.41 2.35 2.25
62 2.19 2.24 2.33 2.41 2.46 2.48 2.45 2.40
63 2.31 2.28 2.32 2.40 2.47 2.51 2.51 2.48
64 2.49 2.40 2.36 2.39 2.46 2.52 2.54 2.54
65 2.71 2.57 2.47 2.43 2.45 2.52 2.56 2.57
66 2.92 2.77 2.62 2.52 2.48 2.50 2.55 2.59
67 3.14 2.97 2.81 2.66 2.55 2.51 2.52 2.58
68 3.39 3.20 3.02 2.84 2.68 2.57 2.52 2.53
69 3.65 3.46 3.25 3.05 2.87 2.70 2.59 2.53
70 3.79 3.73 3.53 3.30 3.09 2.90 2.73 2.61
71 3.73 3.85 3.78 3.57 3.34 3.13 2.94 2.77
72 3.50 3.78 3.88 3.81 3.60 3.38 3.17 2.99
73 3.14 3.54 3.79 3.88 3.82 3.61 3.40 3.21
74 2.79 3.19 3.55 3.78 3.86 3.80 3.61 3.41
75 2.45 2.84 3.21 3.53 3.75 3.82 3.76 3.59
76 2.12 2.50 2.86 3.20 3.50 3.69 3.76 3.71
77 1.82 2.18 2.54 2.87 3.18 3.45 3.63 3.69
78 1.64 1.91 2.24 2.57 2.88 3.16 3.40 3.55
79 1.57 1.73 1.98 2.30 2.61 2.89 3.13 3.35
80 1.62 1.67 1.80 2.04 2.35 2.64 2.90 3.12
81 1.80 1.73 1.74 1.86 2.08 2.39 2.68 2.92
82 1.96 1.94 1.82 1.79 1.89 2.11 2.42 2.71
83 2.00 2.11 2.05 1.88 1.81 1.88 2.11 2.44
84 1.85 2.13 2.23 2.14 1.91 1.80 1.86 2.10
85 1.50 1.95 2.25 2.33 2.20 1.93 1.78 1.83
86 1.18 1.58 2.05 2.34 2.41 2.25 1.94 1.77
87 0.97 1.26 1.66 2.12 2.41 2.46 2.29 1.95
88 0.90 1.07 1.36 1.75 2.20 2.47 2.51 2.32
89 0.90 1.01 1.19 1.48 1.85 2.27 2.52 2.55
90 0.87 1.00 1.13 1.33 1.60 1.96 2.35 2.58
91 0.77 0.94 1.10 1.26 1.47 1.74 2.09 2.45
92 0.61 0.81 1.00 1.19 1.38 1.60 1.88 2.20
93 0.46 0.66 0.87 1.07 1.27 1.48 1.72 1.99
94 0.37 0.54 0.74 0.94 1.15 1.36 1.58 1.81
95 0.31 0.46 0.64 0.84 1.04 1.24 1.44 1.65
96 0.26 0.40 0.57 0.76 0.96 1.15 1.34 1.52
97 0.21 0.35 0.51 0.68 0.87 1.07 1.26 1.43
98 0.16 0.29 0.45 0.62 0.79 0.98 1.17 1.35
99 0.11 0.23 0.38 0.54 0.71 0.89 1.07 1.25
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Table C.11: Experienced mortality improvement for males aged 100–120 in the years
1991–2000 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
100 -0.06 -0.13 -0.21 -0.26 -0.29 -0.29 -0.26 -0.21 -0.14 -0.05
101 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 -0.16 -0.19 -0.19 -0.16 -0.11 -0.04 0.00
102 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00
103 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
105 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
106 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
107 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
108 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
109 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
110 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
111 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
112 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
113 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
114 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
115 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
116 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
117 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
118 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
119 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table C.12: Experienced mortality improvement for males aged 100–12 in the years
2001–2008 (%). Source: CMI (2011).
Age 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
100 0.05 0.17 0.31 0.46 0.63 0.80 0.97 1.14
101 0.00 0.07 0.21 0.36 0.53 0.70 0.87 1.04
102 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.43 0.60 0.77 0.94
103 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.84
104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.40 0.57 0.74
105 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.30 0.47 0.64
106 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.37 0.54
107 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.27 0.44
108 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.34
109 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.24
110 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
111 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
112 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
113 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
114 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
115 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
116 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
117 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
118 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
119 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table C.13: Age effects component of 2008 mortality improvement for males (%).
Source CMI (2011).
Age Improvement Age Improvement Age Improvement
20 4.62 60 3.01 100 2.08
21 4.41 61 3.04 101 1.96
22 4.29 62 3.05 102 1.83
23 4.26 63 3.06 103 1.70
24 4.32 64 3.05 104 1.57
25 4.32 65 3.05 105 1.45
26 4.22 66 3.05 106 1.32
27 4.00 67 3.05 107 1.19
28 3.69 68 3.06 108 1.06
29 3.44 69 3.08 109 0.94
30 3.29 70 3.10 110 0.81
31 3.22 71 3.12 111 0.68
32 3.18 72 3.13 112 0.55
33 3.08 73 3.14 113 0.42
34 2.89 74 3.13 114 0.30
35 2.61 75 3.11 115 0.17
36 2.26 76 3.08 116 0.04
37 2.01 77 3.04 117 0.00
38 1.92 78 3.01 118 0.00
39 1.99 79 3.00 119 0.00
40 2.16 80 2.98 120 0.00
41 2.31 81 2.96
42 2.42 82 2.92
43 2.49 83 2.85
44 2.53 84 2.77
45 2.56 85 2.69
46 2.61 86 2.63
47 2.68 87 2.60
48 2.76 88 2.59
49 2.78 89 2.58
50 2.77 90 2.56
51 2.77 91 2.53
52 2.81 92 2.48
53 2.87 93 2.42
54 2.91 94 2.35
55 2.90 95 2.29
56 2.86 96 2.23
57 2.86 97 2.17
58 2.90 98 2.13
59 2.96 99 2.10
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Table C.14: Age effects component of 2008 mortality improvement for females (%).
Source CMI (2011).
Age Improvement Age Improvement Age Improvement
20 2.41 60 2.01 100 1.39
21 2.33 61 2.05 101 1.26
22 2.25 62 2.10 102 1.14
23 2.17 63 2.13 103 1.02
24 2.09 64 2.16 104 0.90
25 2.00 65 2.19 105 0.78
26 1.90 66 2.23 106 0.66
27 1.79 67 2.27 107 0.53
28 1.68 68 2.33 108 0.41
29 1.60 69 2.39 109 0.29
30 1.56 70 2.45 110 0.17
31 1.57 71 2.51 111 0.05
32 1.61 72 2.57 112 0.00
33 1.70 73 2.62 113 0.00
34 1.81 74 2.65 114 0.00
35 1.91 75 2.67 115 0.00
36 1.98 76 2.68 116 0.00
37 1.99 77 2.68 117 0.00
38 1.95 78 2.68 118 0.00
39 1.89 79 2.68 119 0.00
40 1.82 80 2.69 120 0.00
41 1.79 81 2.69
42 1.78 82 2.68
43 1.80 83 2.64
44 1.83 84 2.58
45 1.84 85 2.51
46 1.83 86 2.44
47 1.81 87 2.38
48 1.79 88 2.31
49 1.77 89 2.24
50 1.73 90 2.17
51 1.70 91 2.09
52 1.68 92 2.00
53 1.68 93 1.92
54 1.71 94 1.84
55 1.75 95 1.76
56 1.79 96 1.68
57 1.83 97 1.61
58 1.89 98 1.54
59 1.95 99 1.46
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Table C.15: Cohort component of 2008 mortality improvement for males (%). Source
CMI (2011).
Birth Improvement Birth Improvement Birth Improvement
Year Year Year
1988 0.00 1948 -0.50 1908 -0.45
1987 0.00 1947 0.19 1907 -0.42
1986 0.00 1946 0.48 1906 -0.40
1985 0.00 1945 0.43 1905 -0.37
1984 0.00 1944 0.19 1904 -0.34
1983 0.00 1943 -0.02 1903 -0.31
1982 0.00 1942 -0.16 1902 -0.29
1981 0.00 1941 -0.29 1901 -0.26
1980 0.00 1940 -0.39 1900 -0.23
1979 0.00 1939 -0.40 1899 -0.20
1978 -0.02 1938 -0.28 1898 -0.17
1977 -0.05 1937 -0.09 1897 -0.15
1976 -0.13 1936 0.10 1896 -0.12
1975 -0.27 1935 0.23 1895 -0.09
1974 -0.49 1934 0.37 1894 -0.06
1973 -0.75 1933 0.56 1893 -0.04
1972 -1.05 1932 0.75 1892 -0.01
1971 -1.34 1931 0.79 1891 0.00
1970 -1.57 1930 0.73 1890 0.00
1969 -1.71 1929 0.71 1889 0.00
1968 -1.77 1928 0.82 1888 0.00
1967 -1.79 1927 0.88
1966 -1.79 1926 0.75
1965 -1.75 1925 0.24
1964 -1.70 1924 -0.78
1963 -1.61 1923 -1.66
1962 -1.45 1922 -1.97
1961 -1.18 1921 -1.43
1960 -0.81 1920 -0.10
1959 -0.44 1919 0.97
1958 -0.15 1918 1.45
1957 0.01 1917 1.36
1956 0.02 1916 0.91
1955 -0.17 1915 0.61
1954 -0.58 1914 0.45
1953 -1.19 1913 0.29
1952 -1.89 1912 0.07
1951 -2.23 1911 -0.12
1950 -2.09 1910 -0.26
1949 -1.45 1909 -0.38
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Table C.16: Cohort component of 2008 mortality improvement for females (%).
Source CMI (2011).
Birth Improvement Birth Improvement Birth Improvement
Year Year Year
1988 0.00 1948 0.04 1908 -0.25
1987 0.00 1947 0.20 1907 -0.22
1986 0.00 1946 0.30 1906 -0.20
1985 0.00 1945 0.35 1905 -0.18
1984 0.00 1944 0.38 1904 -0.16
1983 0.00 1943 0.38 1903 -0.14
1982 0.00 1942 0.37 1902 -0.12
1981 0.00 1941 0.31 1901 -0.09
1980 0.00 1940 0.21 1900 -0.07
1979 0.00 1939 0.15 1899 -0.05
1978 -0.02 1938 0.16 1898 -0.03
1977 -0.06 1937 0.26 1897 -0.01
1976 -0.14 1936 0.42 1896 0.00
1975 -0.26 1935 0.59 1895 0.00
1974 -0.38 1934 0.76 1894 0.00
1973 -0.49 1933 0.92 1893 0.00
1972 -0.56 1932 1.03 1892 0.00
1971 -0.58 1931 1.02 1891 0.00
1970 -0.57 1930 0.88 1890 0.00
1969 -0.54 1929 0.66 1889 0.00
1968 -0.51 1928 0.43 1888 0.00
1967 -0.47 1927 0.23
1966 -0.40 1926 0.04
1965 -0.30 1925 -0.19
1964 -0.15 1924 -0.49
1963 0.02 1923 -0.68
1962 0.19 1922 -0.68
1961 0.35 1921 -0.42
1960 0.46 1920 0.01
1959 0.49 1919 0.31
1958 0.42 1918 0.42
1957 0.28 1917 0.36
1956 0.10 1916 0.20
1955 -0.08 1915 0.07
1954 -0.21 1914 -0.03
1953 -0.32 1913 -0.11
1952 -0.38 1912 -0.16
1951 -0.39 1911 -0.18
1950 -0.32 1910 -0.19
1949 -0.17 1909 -0.21
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Table C.17: Long-term rate of age effects component of mortality improvement (%).
Source CMI (2011).
Age Improvement Age Improvement Age Improvement
20 1.00 60 1.00 100 0.67
21 1.00 61 1.00 101 0.63
22 1.00 62 1.00 102 0.60
23 1.00 63 1.00 103 0.57
24 1.00 64 1.00 104 0.53
25 1.00 65 1.00 105 0.50
26 1.00 66 1.00 106 0.47
27 1.00 67 1.00 107 0.43
28 1.00 68 1.00 108 0.40
29 1.00 69 1.00 109 0.37
30 1.00 70 1.00 110 0.33
31 1.00 71 1.00 111 0.30
32 1.00 72 1.00 112 0.27
33 1.00 73 1.00 113 0.23
34 1.00 74 1.00 114 0.20
35 1.00 75 1.00 115 0.17
36 1.00 76 1.00 116 0.13
37 1.00 77 1.00 117 0.10
38 1.00 78 1.00 118 0.07
39 1.00 79 1.00 119 0.03
40 1.00 80 1.00 120 0.00
41 1.00 81 1.00
42 1.00 82 1.00
43 1.00 83 1.00
44 1.00 84 1.00
45 1.00 85 1.00
46 1.00 86 1.00
47 1.00 87 1.00
48 1.00 88 1.00
49 1.00 89 1.00
50 1.00 90 1.00
51 1.00 91 0.97
52 1.00 92 0.93
53 1.00 93 0.90
54 1.00 94 0.87
55 1.00 95 0.83
56 1.00 96 0.80
57 1.00 97 0.77
58 1.00 98 0.73
59 1.00 99 0.70
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Table C.18: Number of years to reach long-term improvement rate for age effects
component. Source CMI (2011).
Age Years Age Years Age Years
20 10 60 20 100 5
21 10 61 20 101 5
22 10 62 20 102 5
23 10 63 20 103 5
24 10 64 20 104 5
25 10 65 20 105 5
26 10 66 20 106 5
27 10 67 20 107 5
28 10 68 20 108 5
29 10 69 20 109 5
30 10 70 20 110 5
31 10 71 20 111 5
32 10 72 20 112 5
33 10 73 20 113 5
34 10 74 20 114 5
35 10 75 20 115 5
36 10 76 20 116 5
37 10 77 20 117 5
38 10 78 20 118 5
39 10 79 20 119 5
40 10 80 20 120 5
41 10 81 19
42 10 82 18
43 10 83 17
44 10 84 16
45 10 85 15
46 10 86 14
47 10 87 13
48 10 88 12
49 10 89 11
50 10 90 10
51 11 91 9
52 12 92 8
53 13 93 7
54 14 94 6
55 15 95 5
56 16 96 5
57 17 97 5
58 18 98 5
59 19 99 5
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Table C.19: Number of years to reach long-term improvement rate for cohort compo-
nent. Source CMI (2011).
Birth Years Birth Years Birth Years
Year Year Year
1988 40 1948 40 1908 5
1987 40 1947 39 1907 5
1986 40 1946 38 1906 5
1985 40 1945 37 1905 5
1984 40 1944 36 1904 5
1983 40 1943 35 1903 5
1982 40 1942 34 1902 5
1981 40 1941 33 1901 5
1980 40 1940 32 1900 5
1979 40 1939 31 1899 5
1978 40 1938 30 1898 5
1977 40 1937 29 1897 5
1976 40 1936 28 1896 5
1975 40 1935 27 1895 5
1974 40 1934 26 1894 5
1973 40 1933 25 1893 5
1972 40 1932 24 1892 5
1971 40 1931 23 1891 5
1970 40 1930 22 1890 5
1969 40 1929 21 1889 5
1968 40 1928 20 1888 5
1967 40 1927 19
1966 40 1926 18
1965 40 1925 17
1964 40 1924 16
1963 40 1923 15
1962 40 1922 14
1961 40 1921 13
1960 40 1920 12
1959 40 1919 11
1958 40 1918 10
1957 40 1917 9
1956 40 1916 8
1955 40 1915 7
1954 40 1914 6
1953 40 1913 5
1952 40 1912 5
1951 40 1911 5
1950 40 1910 5
1949 40 1909 5
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Figure D.1: Single premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete infor-
mation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and health
status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 62.5 at 1st January, 2013.
The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure D.2: Single premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete infor-
mation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and health
status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 67.5 at 1st January, 2013.
The same legend is used throughout the plots.
210
Chapter D: LTC Single Premium Rates
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
30
00
0
Purchase Time
An
nu
a
l P
re
m
iu
m
 (£
)
0 5 10 15 20
l ε2ε2
ε3ε3
ε2ε4
ε3ε4
ε4ε4
Charged
Male
Female
Unisex
Premium rates for lives buying insurance from Healthy
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
l l l l l l l l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
30
00
0
Purchase Time
An
nu
a
l P
re
m
iu
m
 (£
)
0 5 10 15 20
Premium rates for lives buying insurance from Initial Signs
l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
30
00
0
Purchase Time
An
nu
a
l P
re
m
iu
m
 (£
)
0 5 10 15 20
Premium rates for lives buying insurance from IADL
l
l l l l l l l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
l l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
30
00
0
Purchase Time
An
nu
a
l P
re
m
iu
m
 (£
)
0 5 10 15 20
Premium rates for lives buying insurance from IADL (IS)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
30
00
0
Purchase Time
An
nu
a
l P
re
m
iu
m
 (£
)
0 5 10 15 20
Premium rates for lives buying insurance from 1−ADL
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
30
00
0
Purchase Time
An
nu
a
l P
re
m
iu
m
 (£
)
0 5 10 15 20
Premium rates for lives buying insurance from 1−ADL (IS)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l
Figure D.3: Single premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete infor-
mation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and health
status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 72.5 at 1st January, 2013.
The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure D.4: Single premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete infor-
mation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and health
status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 77.5 at 1st January, 2013.
The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure D.5: Single premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete infor-
mation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and health
status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 82.5 at 1st January, 2013.
The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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Figure D.6: Single premium rates for LTC, assuming the insurer had complete infor-
mation about the customer and put lives in each age group, sex, genotype and health
status into separate underwriting classes, for lives aged 87.5 at 1st January, 2013.
The same legend is used throughout the plots.
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